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Abstract 
 
Amartya Sen’s capability approach has been gaining influence as both an evaluative and a 
prescriptive framework for improving human well-being. Most recently, a ‘deeper’ articulation of 
the capability approach has been presented by Sen in terms of Development as Freedom. He 
presents this as a more comprehensive approach to development, with the intention of it being 
universally applicable. Therefore, Sen’s approach has also been promoted as a framework for 
understanding, evaluating and achieving development in cross-cultural contexts. An important 
instance of its implementation is by Noel Pearson in an Australian Indigenous context. Pearson 
frames his approach to Indigenous development in terms of the capability approach. His project – 
the Cape York welfare reform trials – has been implemented through the Cape York Institute for 
Policy and Leadership and Cape York Partnerships in the Cape York Peninsula. Pearson and these 
organisations have the aim of creating further opportunities to extend policy trials to other 
Indigenous contexts in Australia. In this thesis, I compare and contrast Pearson’s use of the 
capability approach based framework with my interpretation of an ideal-typical version of Sen’s 
capability approach and Development as Freedom. This ‘ideal-type’ is reconstructed from Sen’s 
theoretical work and wider debates about it and allows me to demonstrate that Pearson 
reconceptualises and alters Sen’s framework, changing the conditions within which capability is to 
be realised with important social and political consequences. In particular, this thesis shows how 
Sen’s central development goals, which are oriented towards enhancing individual capabilities and 
expanding freedoms, are reframed and realigned by Pearson. His adaptations have the effect of 
inadvertently shoring up the premises of neoliberal political economic ideals at the expense of 
Indigenous cultural values and practices, a result of the central importance Pearson assigns to 
problems he associates with ‘passive welfare’ and welfare dependency. A critical engagement with 
the problems entailed in Pearson’s reframing of the CA also magnifies what critics have argued to 
be the unfreedoms and contradictions associated with liberalism in Sen’s work too (although in 
Sen’s work this is corrected through the provision of social safety-nets). In light of these findings, I 
argue that Pearson’s use of the language of the capability approach is rhetorical rather than 
substantive. It serves the purpose of justifying the development project of the Cape York Institute 
and Cape York Partnerships, and is typical in embodying problematic assumptions of mainstream, 
global Indigenous development paradigms. 
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‘The relationship between inequality and difference becomes particularly evident 
when we consider that development is anchored not just in institutions and structures 
but also in the lives of its subject.’  
 (DaCosta and McMichael 2007:589) 
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Introduction 
Amartya Sen presents his capability approach (CA) as a universal framework for evaluating the 
well-being of a given society in terms of freedom, or the capability to choose a life a person has 
reason to value (Sen 1999:74). The approach is also presented by Sen as a critique of, and 
supplementary means of evaluating, the dominant approaches to human welfare that are premised 
upon economistic or utilitarian perspectives. The CA’s main emphasis is therefore on the individual 
choice of development subjects,1 and their agency in choosing the life they have reason to value. In 
recent years, Sen has further developed the approach in his outline of Development as Freedom 
(1999). This ‘deepening’ of the approach entails understanding human development as an 
expansion of freedoms that are realised through the expansion of individual capability. In this 
context, poverty is understood as capability deprivation and individual advantage is assessed in 
terms of the capabilities individuals have – the substantive freedoms they enjoy in order to, ‘lead 
the kind of life he or she has reason to value’ (1999:87). The CA can therefore be conceived as a 
partial account of social justice, with an essential measurement of development being whether 
people enjoy greater freedoms than they did in the past (Alkrie & Deneulin 2009:31). Sen’s 
approach stands as an evaluative framework and one that can also be used for prospective analysis. 
The approach’s emphasis on agency and choice makes it a unique framework for considering 
human development and well-being. Sen is therefore to be credited for presenting a human-centred 
approach that focuses on what development (as he conceives it) can do for the development subject. 
This is a move away from mainstream approaches that focus on economic growth.  
In the following chapters of this thesis I establish my interpretation of an ‘ideal-typical’ 
operationalisation of Sen’s CA and Development as Freedom. My interpretation of his ‘ideal-type’ 
is that for Sen, development policy must respond to poverty in terms of capability deprivation in 
order to ensure the expansion of human freedoms and importantly, the achievement of agency 
freedom by development subjects. In keeping with his conception of instrumental freedoms, Sen 
asserts a particular role for government that sees basic capabilities secured through state provision 
of adequate ‘social opportunities.’ These social opportunities include free education, healthcare and 
employment opportunities. According to his outline of the instrumental freedoms (‘economic 
facilities’ and ‘protective security’), welfare payments would also be given to the severely deprived. 
The state would have to guarantee a means of democratic public participation for the selection of 
additional capabilities and for members of society to inform public policy according to Sen’s 
conception of ‘political freedom’ and ‘transparency guarantees.’ In addition, Sen is clear that, 
                                                
1 Although ‘development subjects’ is not a term used by Sen, I do not mean this term to presuppose a notion of 
development. I refer to the recipients of intended development in this way, both theoretically in Sen’s work and with 
regards to the people of Cape York. 
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‘modernity is not to be rejected in favour of tradition’ (Sen 1999:32), and democratic decisions are 
to be made on what aspects of ‘traditional’ life are to be maintained alongside the prescriptions of 
the CA (1999:32).  
However, Sen’s approach is not without its problems. I also establish that his CA and Development 
as Freedom are implicitly premised upon a liberal framework that retains a crucial role for the 
liberal political economy and can be interpreted and applied as such. In understanding Sen’s 
approach as being premised upon a liberal framework, I am specifically referring to what can be 
explained as form of ‘perfectionist liberalism’ underlying his work. This is to say that Sen is liberal 
in encouraging individuals to pursue their own conception of the good.2 However, despite this 
intention and as Deneulin (2002) argues that, ‘Sen’s approach becomes perfectionist when used as a 
means to implement policy because upon its operationalisation it is inevitable that some content 
must be given to the relevant capabilities to promote’ (2002:4). In this sense, Deneulin argues that 
whilst at a theoretical level the CA does not endorse a particular conception of the good, at an 
implementation level it inevitably adopts a particular conception of what constitutes a good human 
life (2002:4). By liberal political economy I am referring to the characteristics of the contemporary 
global political economy – specifically its emphasis on the free market, individual decision-making, 
economic growth and the state retaining a role in providing public goods and services. I argue that 
because he retains a crucial role for the liberal political economy within his framework, implicit 
within Sen’s work is the idea that a ‘good human life’ must ultimately include a role for this 
economy. Specifically, this entails the development subject functioning within the constraints of 
this economy despite the CA framework encouraging individuals to ‘choose a life they have reason 
to value.’ 
According to my interpretation of his approach, the core liberal premises of an ideal-typical version 
of Sen’s CA and Development as Freedom would have to be accepted upon any instance of its 
operationalisation. Therefore, the prescriptions of his liberal framework limit the contexts within 
which the CA and Development as Freedom can be applied – for example, if development subjects 
choose a life they have reason to value outside of a liberal framework say, in terms of an emphasis 
on a community conception of the good rather than separate, individual conceptions, or conceive of 
alternative conceptions of well-being that are incompatible with the liberal premises of Sen’s CA. 
                                                
2 Deneulin (2002) explains that liberalism would view an incentivised policy that encourages people to live a certain 
way as a threat to individual human freedom to pursue their own conception of the good (2002:3). She argues that, ‘the 
government cannot limit individual liberty by claiming that some activities are more worthy of pursuit than others. The 
state should remain neutral regarding what the good life is, and limit itself to ‘promoting the general welfare of the 
citizens by providing them the resources they need in order to lead lives of their own choosing’ (Kraut, 1999, p. 315). 
Each individual is the best judge of what is good for her, and one should not interfere with individual choices, unless 
her choice infringes on someone else’s freedom …’ (2002:3). 
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Despite this, Sen presents his CA and Development as Freedom as a universal approach to 
development that is cross-culturally applicable. That is to say, he assumes that this liberal 
framework can be applied to all societies (including Indigenous societies) in order to improve well-
being. 
In light of the liberal premises of Sen’s framework, this thesis critically engages with wider debates 
on the CA and identifies weaknesses of the approach that render its cross-cultural application 
problematic. These debates show that broadly, Sen insufficiently appreciates the substantive social 
and political realities of the development process. His approach is limited in its political analysis 
and understanding of the substantive conditions within which development is realised. Sen’s 
provision for welfare demonstrates that he does recognise that there are ‘unfreedoms’ or inequalities 
generated by a liberal political economy. However, consistent with him insufficiently appreciating 
substantive social and political realities of the development process, while Sen acknowledges the 
need for intervention in the liberal market economy to ensure social welfare is provided, he does not 
question or address the inequalities generated by liberalism more broadly. Although this point is not 
the main focus of my thesis, it is relevant for appreciating that Sen does not consider his advocacy 
for the provision for welfare in the wider context of ongoing transformations of the liberal political 
economy globally.3 These transformations have seen the political economy increasingly align with a 
neoliberal development project – this is to say that welfare provisions have themselves been 
conceived as a constraint on achieving development objectives (for example, see Gill 1995). I refer 
to the conception and absence of welfare provisions along these lines when using the term 
‘neoliberal’ in relation to development in Cape York in this thesis. 
Fundamentally, Sen assumes that his approach is a universally viable framework for the evaluation 
of well-being. This assumption means that in a context where people are accepting of liberal 
principles, the CA and Development as Freedom provide a viable development framework. 
However, when conceptualised in relation to alternative (non-liberal) societies and cosmologies, 
Sen’s framework becomes problematic, that is to say, it becomes problematic when faced with 
alternate conceptions of development (especially by those who do not subscribe to the logic of a 
liberal political economy). Sen argues that there exists an ‘inevitable choice’ of what specific 
‘traditions’ of cultures or societies are to be maintained alongside the social and economic changes 
necessary for development (Sen 1999:31).  
                                                
3 Whilst it could be argued that in his most recent work on India (see Drèze and Sen (2013) An Uncertain Glory: India 
and its Contradictions) Sen does in fact acknowledge transformations of the liberal political economy, the fundamental 
prescriptions of the CA and Development as Freedom remain unchanged. I therefore maintain the argument that he 
insufficiently appreciates the substantive social and political realities of the development process by engaging more 
thoroughly with relevant literature in Chapter Two.  
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A tension therefore exists within his approach between ‘tradition’ and the liberal political economy. 
A careful reading of Sen’s work suggests that ‘tradition’ or cultural practices and values are by 
implication, to be subordinated if not overcome in order to realise the CA and Development as 
Freedom, which assumes the liberal political economy to be an unquestionable and non-negotiable 
framework.  In light of this tension, whether the CA is a viable development framework for cross-
cultural application is an important line of enquiry.  This is especially the case given a recent use of 
the approach by Noel Pearson in the Cape York Peninsula, Queensland, Australia. Pearson frames 
his approach to Indigenous development in the region in terms of the CA. This thesis therefore 
examines Pearson’s use of Sen’s approach in a substantive cross-cultural human development 
context – within the Aboriginal communities of Cape York and the Cape York welfare reform 
trials.4  
In 2007, the From Hand Out to Hand Up report was submitted to the federal government by the 
Cape York Institute for Policy and Leadership (CYI). The report detailed recommendations for the 
Cape York welfare reform trials in response to perceived community dysfunction and the collapse 
of social integrity within the region. In July 2007, the Howard Government accepted the report’s 
recommendations and commissioned $48.8 million of funding for the trials, to begin in 2008 
(Altman and Johns 2008:13). Altman and Johns state that due to the Queensland government 
matching this amount, allocated funding for the Cape York welfare reform trials reached $96 
million for a four year period (2008:13). The trials were legalised through the Welfare Payment 
Reform Act 2007 (2008:11). In order to regulate the trials, the Families and Responsibilities 
Commission (FRC) was created in 2008. Its creation was enabled by the Families and 
Responsibilities Commission Act 2008, which required the controversial suspension of the Racial 
Discrimination Act 19755 from the Welfare Payment Reform Act 2007, in order to be passed in 
Parliament (2008:13). 
The FRC acts as an Indigenous statutory body comprised of commissioners and respected 
Indigenous community members. Acting in an ‘advisory capacity,’ the FRC has the authority to 
ensure that families within these communities are compliant with initiatives in Cape York 
communities.6 As a punitive body, the FRC has the power to limit and restrict income payments to 
                                                
4 Throughout the thesis I use ‘Cape York’ to refer to these reform trials.  
5 The Racial Discrimination Act was suspended because the FRC was to impose conditions on Indigenous communities 
based solely on their race. I discuss this further in Chapter Five. 
6 Drawing on Blight (2008), Altman and Johns explain that four ‘triggers’ would bring a person before the FRC. These 
are; ‘if a parent or person responsible for a school-aged child allows the child to have more than three unexplained 
absences from school in one school term, or if the child is not enrolled at a school without a lawful excuse’; ‘if the 
parent or person responsible for a child is the subject or a child safety notification or report;’ ‘if a magistrate convicts a 
person of a relatively minor offence;’ and ‘if a person breaches the public or State-owned housing agreement for the 
residence they have tenanted’ (Blight 2008:332 cited in Altman and Johns 2008:12). 
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those who are not compliant in participating in the trials investigated in this thesis and other trials as 
part of the Cape York welfare reform project. Altman and Johns explain that, ‘the stated objective 
of the FRC Act 2008 is to encourage socially responsible behaviour and to ensure the best interest 
and well-being of children are being served … The FRC will have a mandate to work with people to 
make decisions about substance abuse and addiction where those problems are impacting upon their 
children’s well-being, violence, child welfare and neglect and poor money-management’ (2008:14).  
However, although initiated by the From Hand Out to Hand Up report, the Cape York welfare 
reform trials are informed and implemented by the CYI and Cape York Partnerships (CYP), headed 
by Noel Pearson. Sen’s language of capabilities informs the development agenda in Cape York, and 
originates from Pearson’s understanding of Sen. It should be noted that the language of capabilities 
is specifically used by Pearson and these organisational bodies, rather than by the federal 
government or the FRC. Therefore, the focus of this thesis is on Pearson’s framing of the Cape 
York development project, his understanding, reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s CA, and 
how this informs both the CYI and CYP in formulating a development policy response. 
As an Indigenous figurehead, Noel Pearson has identified Indigenous ‘disadvantage and 
dysfunction’ as attributable to what he terms ‘passive welfare.’ That is to say that he attributes the 
poor standard of Indigenous well-being to their reliance on the welfare state. In an attempt to 
address this issue, Pearson has implemented the Cape York welfare reform trials in four Indigenous 
communities; Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale and Mossman Gorge in the Cape York Peninsula. The 
trials have been implemented through the CYI, CYP and the FRC, with the aim of creating further 
opportunities to extend policy trials to other Indigenous communities across Australia (Pearson 
2005). Pearson frames these trials in terms of Indigenous economic and social development and on 
the surface appears to deploy Sen’s CA as a framework with which to operationalise this 
development project. Pearson argues that the welfare reform trials are informed by Sen’s CA, with 
the CYI selecting ‘capabilities’ as a means of evaluating wellbeing in the region and promising to 
give Indigenous Australians the choice to, ‘lead a life they have reason to value’ (CYI 2012).  
However, I will demonstrate that Pearson reconceptualises and alters Sen’s approach, substantially 
deviating from his framework. Most significantly, Pearson reorders Sen’s central development 
goals oriented towards enhancing individual capabilities and expanding freedoms. This reframing 
prioritises the objective of creating a ‘real economy’ in Cape York based on neoliberal political 
economic ideals. Pearson conceives this as a means of solving problems he perceives as associated 
with ‘passive welfare.’ This thesis therefore seeks to establish what purpose exactly the CA serves 
in Cape York and whether Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s CA can be directly 
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attributable to the weaknesses of an ideal-typical version of Sen’s CA and Development as 
Freedom. It also identifies the implications and consequences of Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s 
approach to make some critical observations about the universality of Sen’s CA and Development 
as Freedom. 
Research Questions  
This thesis investigates Noel Pearson’s claim that the Cape York welfare reform trials are informed 
by Sen’s CA. In light of this argument, I ask, ‘Does Pearson apply Sen’s CA in Cape York as Sen 
would have intended?’ If not, ‘What purpose does Sen’s CA serve in Cape York?’ Furthermore, 
‘What are the social and political consequences and implications of Pearson’s development 
framework in this context?’ Given that the existing literature on capabilities renders the CA’s cross-
cultural application problematic, I also ask, ‘Can any alteration or deviation from Sen’s CA by 
Pearson be attributed to the weaknesses of Sen’s approach itself?’ 
Methodological Considerations 
In this thesis I primarily consider the use of the CA in informing Cape York policy up to the 
election of the Abbott government in September 2013. I do however make reference to the potential 
for trials to be rolled-out across Australia, and in informing national Australian policy as of October 
2014. I discuss three relevant policy trials implemented by CYP as empirical evidence to establish 
the implications and consequences of Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s CA. 
This thesis empirically examines qualitative data such as speeches, essays and newspaper articles 
written by Noel Pearson that concern the CA and in relation to Indigenous Australians. It also 
examines CYI and CYP policy documents and relevant policy material. Aligning with constructivist 
interpretivism, I establish the social constructs: ideas, beliefs and norms (Parsons 2010:80) through 
which CYP policy and CYI frameworks of thought are constructed within Cape York. Critical 
discourse analysis will also be used to identify Sen’s language and conception of capabilities, and 
neoliberal principles abundant in the empirical data, as suggested by Taylor (2001:5-6). I use these 
methods because, despite repeated attempts to contact Pearson, the CYI and CYP, they were 
unresponsive to my requests for interviews and an opportunity to conduct fieldwork within the 
region. This thesis is subsequently a theoretical engagement with Pearson’s use of Sen’s approach 
in Cape York, but is substantiated by literature on Indigenous Australian policy more broadly to 
support my argument concerning the social and political implications of Pearson’s approach.  
Throughout the thesis I work with an acceptance of Sen’s conception of ‘capability.’ However this 
concept has been criticised for being vague and challenging to work with (see Qizilbash 2012:11; 
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Gasper 2007a:350-352; Brandolini & D’Alessio 2000:14). For example, ‘capability’ is used by Sen 
in two ways – for referring to both the alternative combinations of functionings a person can 
achieve (his most theoretical use of the term) and also to refer to the opportunity and the ability a 
person has to do something – his Sen’s ‘informal’ sense of ‘capability’ (Qizilbash 2012:11). Sen 
has been criticised for his use of ‘capability’ being unclear in this sense and further, for not 
specifying different types of capability (Gasper 2007a:350-351). It is important to note here that 
although I acknowledge Sen’s concept of ‘capability’ is problematic; an unpacking of the concept 
of capabilities itself is not the focus of this thesis. Rather, I focus on a comparison of Sen and 
Pearson. 
 
It is also worth commenting here on the language that this thesis uses. Throughout, I refer to the 
‘cross-cultural’ application of the CA. Broadly, I am referring to the application of Sen’s liberal 
framework – the CA and its thicker rendition in Development as Freedom (as described by 
Qizilbash 2012:13) – in an Indigenous context in Australia, where Indigenous conceptions of well-
being exist that are alternative to liberal logic and preferences. The term ‘traditional’ is deliberately 
placed in inverted commas to refer to Sen’s particular use of the term. Sen’s use of ‘tradition’ is 
synonymous with his understanding of ‘culture,’ which can be deduced as referring to specific 
societal ways of life that have been historically constructed. The term ‘tradition’ to refer to specific 
cultural norms and practices implies a social evolutionary framing of alternative cultures that is 
linked to western imperialism (see Kuper 1988). 
 
I am mindful not to temporalise Indigenous communities and all cultures when using this term 
throughout the thesis, hence the use of inverted commas. Pearson’s concept of the ‘real economy’ is 
also placed in inverted commas to denote that this is specifically his concept, and is synonymous 
with what others would term a ‘neoliberal economy.’ 
Ethical Considerations 
As a non-Indigenous researcher, I do not make a claim to generalise on behalf of or speak for 
Indigenous Australians in Cape York communities. I also note that when identifying social and 
political implications of the trials, this is not to disregard the fact that for some members of these 
communities, these reform trials will have been of benefit, enhancing some skills that have very real 
substantive benefits for their well-being. My aim rather, is to highlight what may be a very real 
political struggle for some community members who may want to realise development in a different 
way (if at all) than through a pre-established liberal framework or, according to neoliberal 
principles that may be incompatible with their own Indigenous cultural values, practices and/or 
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socio-economics. I acknowledge that more specific anthropological literature on the experience of 
the Cape York welfare reform trials is needed that is inclusive of more Indigenous voices. 
Moreover, I recognise the diversity of Indigenous Australian communities and do not intend to 
imply that they exist in binary categories such as ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ when making the 
distinction between Aboriginal socio-economics and liberal socio-economics. I acknowledge that 
the livelihoods of some communities may be comprised of subsistence economies and the liberal 
political economy. However this still renders Pearson’s (and Sen’s) ‘one-size fits all’ approach 
potentially problematic. 
 
Context of The Thesis 
 
Literature relevant to my research includes case examples of previous applications of Sen’s CA; 
debates on Australian Indigenous well-being, welfare, and policy; and literature on the Cape York 
welfare reform trials themselves. Previous applications of the CA have largely been quantitative, 
conceptualising and measuring poverty or inequality in terms of functionings, rather than using 
functionings and capabilities as explanatory devices (Robeyns 2000:26-27). However, Nussbaum 
(2001) and Jasek-Rysdahl (2000) provide examples where the approach has been applied to 
generate qualitative data. Nussbaum has ethnographically applied the CA to women in India to 
illustrate the approach as a form of social evaluation, demonstrating how the approach can be used 
qualitatively via methods such as narrative accounts, biography and in-depth interviews (Robeyns 
2000:26). Jasek-Rysdahl (2000) has applied the CA to a community project in California, where an 
inventory of inhabitants was created by identifying capabilities in order to try and improve quality 
of life. In a South-African context, Qizilbash and Clark (2005) theoretically use the approach for 
poverty research. Associated research using the CA has been carried out by Chiappero-Martinetti 
(1994; 1996; 2000 cited in Qizilbash and Clark 2005) in an Italian context, exploring the approach’s 
impact on understandings of the concept of poverty. 
 
Sen’s language of capabilities is also used in scholarly work on human development concerning 
education, healthcare and sustainable development. For example, Tibandebage & Mackintosh 
(2005) use the notion of the ability to receive healthcare as a basic capability and human freedom 
when considering monetary healthcare transactions in Tanzania, and Voget-Kleschin (2013) 
considers whether the CA can be used in conceptualising sustainable development. Rius and 
Vigorito (2000) identify Sen’s influence and ideas in conceptualising poverty in Latin America and 
Krishnakumar and Ballon (2008) have constructed a theoretical framework for operationalising the 
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CA in Bolivia. However, the approach has not previously been directly applied in an Australian 
Indigenous political context. 
 
Historical and contemporary Indigenous policy challenges in Australia have been in response to 
what Rowse terms, ‘Australia’s colonial legacy’ (2002:3). Policies have been created to address 
Indigenous Australians’ disadvantage compared to non-Indigenous Australians, which is measured 
in terms of social indicators such as employment, income, health and levels of education. Specific 
Indigenous programs are created with the intention of improving this disadvantage and creating 
equality between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australia in accordance with meeting statistical 
targets on these social indicators (2002:2). These policies have been categorised as a form of 
‘practical reconciliation,’ however there also exists a push for ‘self-determination’ – formulating 
Indigenous solutions to their statistical disadvantage (2002:2). Broadly however, these perspectives 
value Indigenous culture differently. ‘Practical reconciliation,’ which Rowse uses to describe 
Pearson’s response to Indigenous disadvantage in Cape York, is according to him, ‘ ... more likely 
to dwell on the ways that contemporary Indigenous beliefs and behaviour are a hindrance to the 
development of happier and healthier lives’ (2002:4). He argues that, 
 
Indeed, the term ‘disadvantage’ may have more than one meaning, referring not only to 
measurable inequalities in socio-economic conditions and health status but also to the 
inherent ‘disadvantages’ of a life shaped by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
custom. That is, if the Indigenous condition is problematic, and in need of remedial 
programs, one of the lines of corrective action will be that Indigenous Australians will 
reconsider the ways that they see themselves, their obligations to one another, and their 
aspirations for their children. In the process of being uplifted – in terms of their 
measured employment, education, health and income – Indigenous Australians will 
review established behaviours and beliefs critically, leaving behind inhibiting and self-
destructive ways and embracing new ones’ (2002:4).  
 
Subsequently, some literature calls for a broader policy framework that goes beyond notions of equality 
advocated within Australia’s ‘Closing the Gap’7 policy that encompasses cultural diversity and 
difference. Considering Australian Indigenous policy frameworks, Altman (2009) argues that the 
politics of equality are over-determining Indigenous affairs and public policy within contemporary 
Australia, ‘whilst subordinating the more complex and subtle politics of difference and diversity’ 
                                                
7 ‘Closing the Gap’ is a formal commitment and strategy deployed by the Australian government in 2007 with a view to 
obtaining Indigenous health equality with non-Indigenous Australians within twenty five years (Australian Human 
Rights Commission 2008). 
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(2009:13). With Australia committed to livelihood improvements that benefit the mainstream (2009:13) 
– that is, non-Indigenous Australians, Altman argues:  
 
There is a clear logic for the settler-colonial state in rendering Aboriginal disadvantage a 
technical problem with no history, and rendering cultural difference either invisible or too 
visible and something to be eliminated. Such an approach allows the state to ignore politico-
economic relations and the distribution of property and power, and instead to reframe 
difficult political questions as technical – to close the gap (2009:14). 
 
Given this lack of consideration for the socio-historical context and culture of Indigenous Australians 
and in reference to the language of Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2009), Altman (2009) asks, ‘are 
Indigenous people, in all their diversity, being enabled ‘to do and to be?’ (2009:14). Altman advocates a 
broader policy framework that goes beyond a ‘simple trade-off’ of equality or difference, and is instead 
based on, ‘more coherent and inclusive notions of equality and difference’ (2009:14). He argues that 
this framework will, among other components, need to encompass notions of difference. That is, 
‘Indigenous-specific programs negotiated on social justice … principles’ and the acknowledgement of 
historical legacy, ‘to allow catch up for the decades of neglect and the legacy of stolen generations’ 
(2009:14). 
 
Literature that examines the diversity of perspectives concerning Indigenous well-being raises the 
concern that applying such varying  approaches creates tension between statistical equality and cultural 
differences (Jordan, Bulloch and Buchanan 2010:355). These authors call for the normative assumptions 
present within these perspectives to be made clear and ‘open to interrogation’ because, as Jordan, 
Bulloch and Buchanan argue, ‘while policy-makers may always prioritise some notions of well-being 
over others, they must at least be aware of the implications of their decisions for those with different 
perspectives of the ‘good life’’ (2010:255). Therefore, given the challenge of Australian policy to 
incorporate Indigenous cultural diversity and difference into tackling Indigenous disadvantage, 
establishing the extent to which Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s approach allows for development subjects 
to, ‘choose a life they have reason to value’ and the implications of such an approach in this 
context, is important.  
 
It is also important to contextualise this thesis in line with previous development programs in Cape 
York–most significantly that concerning the Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) 
scheme. The CDEP projects were implemented in 1997 with the aim of reducing Indigenous 
unemployment and reliance on welfare. The scheme pooled the welfare payments of individuals 
within communities, which were to be distributed as wages to those who engaged in employment, 
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community projects or programs, rather than receiving individual welfare payments for being 
unemployed (Bernardi 1997:37). Similarly to the Cape York welfare reform trials, Bernardi argues 
that the program aimed to increase Indigenous ‘self-sufficiency’ over, ‘… goods, products, services 
and  access to a regular job market’ (1997:37). However, this scheme was disbanded in 2009 and 
has since been criticised for being a form of ‘welfare colonialism’ (Bernardi 1997; Smith 2002) – 
this is to say, the scheme prioritised mainstream definitions of labour and a capitalist worldview 
where, according to Bernardi, ‘a non-welfare reliant citizen is privileged above a citizenship 
dependent on welfare for its actualisation’ (1997:41). Therefore, although the scheme encouraged 
‘traditional’ Aboriginal activities in principle (1997:41), it emphasised mainstream economic 
equality and a liberal framework rather than being structured for the ‘Aboriginal domain’ (1997:41). 
 
In assessing the CDEP scheme in the Cape York region of Coen, Smith (2002) asserts that some 
effort was put into the employment projects to account for Aboriginal ways of being. For example, 
the projects were designed to account for seasonal shifts in the relocation of the Aboriginal 
population due to their lifestyle. He states,  
 
it followed earlier forms of colonial administration in viewing forms of mobility 
incompatible with the regulation of work programs as undesirable. By implementing a 
‘no work, no pay’ policy and only limited flexibility where CDEP participants moved 
inter-regionally, the corporation sought to exclude ‘undesirable’ workers and encourage 
productivity among those who remained on the scheme. This inclination … was 
apparent in their design of a traineeship scheme which sought to shift CDEP workers 
from outstations, where work was not seen as properly supervised and regulated, to 
white-run pastoral leases (2002:iv). 
 
The scheme therefore had limited success in providing ‘meaningful’ employment opportunities for 
the people of Coen. Literature suggests that the CDEP scheme was unsuccessful in accounting for 
Australian Indigenous diversity as a ‘one-size fits-all’ approach was unsustainable socially and 
economically. This literature therefore implies that a political analysis is important in considering 
the substantive development experiences of Indigenous Australians, and that projects are culturally 
relevant, sympathetic to and inclusive of Indigenous values and practices. Significantly, this thesis 
considers the Cape York welfare reform trials as the next development scheme following the CDEP 
scheme in Cape York. 
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Contribution to Knowledge 
 
Through this thesis I seek to make an original contribution to the literature on capabilities as a 
consideration of a qualitative application of Sen’s CA in an Australian Indigenous context. I also 
seek to make an original contribution to literature on Cape York (post the CDEP scheme) and 
literature on Noel Pearson. I explain the thinking behind and the social and political implications of 
the Cape York welfare reform trials, with the intent of also making an original contribution to 
development literature, by exploring the underpinnings and implications of the CA used as a 
development strategy within an Australian Indigenous context. Finally, I contribute to critical 
literature on capabilities in suggesting that Sen’s theoretical provisions are potentially insufficient 
for the (Indigenous) cross-cultural operationalisation of his ideal-typical development framework. I 
also assert the importance for Sen’s approach to consider the substantive social and political 
relations and experience of development, rather than be based on idealised abstractions. 
 
Thesis Argument 
 
Having carefully considered Pearson’s use of the CA and Cape York development policy, I argue 
that Pearson reconceptualises and alters Sen’s CA with important social and political consequences. 
This is to say that Pearson substantially deviates from my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-typical 
development framework. I argue that this leads to an alteration of the conditions within which Sen’s 
approach is to be realised. Firstly, this deviation begins when he reconceptualises Sen’s approach to 
emphasise the notion of personal responsibility in the conversion of opportunity into capability. 
This reconceptualisation is politically charged in response to his understanding and perception of 
passive welfare – that Indigenous Australians are lacking the personal responsibility required to 
improve their own well-being, despite social investment by the state. Secondly, I explain how, by 
seeing ‘capabilities’ as the ability to access opportunities rather than as the potential for what 
someone is able to do or to be, Pearson also denies the development subject the substantive freedom 
to choose what they are able to do and to be. For Sen however, the notion of ‘capability’ captures 
the ‘opportunity-aspect’ of freedom on its own.  
Thirdly, rather than focusing on the expansion of human freedoms and capabilities (and 
incorporating an unconditional provision for welfare in his approach to development) in Cape York, 
Pearson reorders Sen’s development goals to prioritise the facilitation and maintenance of a 
neoliberal political economy. He also omits provision for unconditional welfare, instead implanting 
conditional welfare provisions. As such, Cape York development policy instrumentalises the 
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development subject and prioritises the facilitation of a neoliberal subject primarily as labourer and 
consumer, with the logic to drive a particular type of functioning that facilitates and maintains a 
‘real economy.’8 With a focus on functioning rather than capabilities, this approach is underpinned 
by a neoliberal logic that is privileged over Indigenous values and cultural practices (including 
socio-economic systems). This compromises the ability of development subjects to, ‘choose a life 
they have reason to value.’ Pearson’s development approach can therefore be seen as an imposition 
on those who may wish to pursue Indigenous conceptions of well-being, and I argue, is implicated 
in ‘development as a method of rule’ (McMichael 2012:50).  
Fourthly and further compromising the ability to choose the life one has reason to value, Pearson 
fails to include a formal notion of political freedom within his alteration of Sen’s framework. As 
such, there exists no formal means of democratic participation or a sufficient community 
consultation process for the selection of capabilities the people of Cape York have reason to value. 
In light of these findings, I argue that Pearson’s use of the CA is rhetorical rather than substantive. 
The use of Sen’s language of capabilities serves the purpose of justifying the development project 
of the CYI and CYP, and their neoliberal political ideology. Moreover, I argue that the Cape York 
welfare reform trials are indicative of a neoliberal trend in Australian Indigenous policy more 
broadly.9 
Despite Pearson reconceptualising and altering Sen’s CA, his attempted operationalisation of the 
approach in this context suggests that the cross-cultural viability of Sen’s framework is not as clear-
cut as Sen assumes when applied in an Indigenous context (despite his commitment to pluralism 
and the provisions that he makes).10 Although I argue that Pearson’s reconceptualisation and 
alteration of the approach cannot be attributed to the problems and tensions within Sen’s framework 
(due to this being a substantial deviation), a fundamental tension within Sen’s framework still 
manifests and, is in fact amplified, in Cape York. This tension is evident in the way in which Sen 
implies that ‘tradition’ and culture should not inhibit the pursuit of development as he conceives it. 
The latter in turn is closely aligned with institutions of a liberal political economy and more in line 
with a welfare oriented form of liberalism. This assessment is based not least on Sen’s assertion that 
‘tradition’ and cultural practices should not encumber the necessary social and economic changes 
for development to take place in order to ensure human freedoms (see Sen 1999:32). 
                                                
8 This is to say that Cape York policy facilitates the employment of development subjects and concomitantly the 
spending of personal income on items characteristic of the global political economy.  
9 I primarily draw on Altman (2010) to establish that the economic future of Aboriginal Australians is increasingly 
being determined by neoliberal development policy (2010:26). 	
10 These provisions are explained as a focus on capabilities instead of functioning, not specifying a list of capabilities, 
and insisting that capabilities are to be decided through democratic deliberation and the exercise of agency and political 
freedoms.  
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I further argue that an insufficient appreciation of the substantive social and political relations and 
experience of development causes Sen (and Pearson) to not fully engage with the unfreedoms and 
deprivations of liberalism (although in Sen’s work this is corrected through the provision of social 
safety-nets). It is assumed by both Sen and Pearson that their respective versions of development 
should be shared and subscribed to by all persons and communities, and in Pearson’s case, by all 
Indigenous Australian communities. Consequently, development subjects who do not wish to 
pursue a conception of development in terms of freedom so conceived, or development according to 
a pre-established, liberal framework, will have their agency freedom and ability to ‘choose a life 
they have reason to value,’ compromised.  
 
I therefore also argue that despite Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of the CA, its use in 
an Australian Indigenous context can reveal potential problems for a direct application of the 
approach in cross-cultural contexts more generally. In such contexts, for example, the ability for 
Indigenous development subjects to ‘choose a life they have reason to value’ according to their own 
conceptions of well-being has the potential to be compromised due to Sen’s implied foundational 
role for the liberal political economy. This is despite his pluralistic provisions: focusing on 
capabilities instead of functionings, not endorsing a list of capabilities, and insisting on democratic 
deliberation in order for societies to decide which capabilities they regard as valuable. The universal 
application of Sen’s approach is therefore brought into question. 
 
Chapter Outline  
 
In order for this thesis to critically engage with Noel Pearson’s use of the CA in Cape York, it seeks 
to establish the extent to which Pearson utilises my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-typical version of 
his CA and its deeper rendition in Development as Freedom. I reconstruct my interpretation of 
Sen’s ‘ideal-type’ from his theoretical work and wider debates in order to demonstrate that Pearson 
substantially deviates from Sen’s framework. I also engage with literature on capabilities that 
renders the CA problematic. This allows me to identify its potential weaknesses and spaces that 
may be open to alteration upon an application of the approach. Before establishing the implications 
of Pearson’s use of the CA in Cape York and whether his reconceptualisation and alteration of the 
approach can be attributed to the weaknesses of Sen’s approach, it is necessary firstly to explain the 
political context of Pearson’s thinking behind the reform trials. I therefore explain Pearson’s 
understanding of ‘passive welfare’ in Chapter Three before explaining how this thinking informs 
the CYI & CYP policy in Chapter Four. I then consider whether the reconceptualisation and 
alteration of Sen’s approach can be attributed to its original weaknesses in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter One reconstructs Sen’s CA and its elaborated version in Development as Freedom to 
establish the theoretical core and premises of Sen’s framework. Sen’s primary objective is to 
provide the CA as a framework of thought for the evaluation of well-being and to present an outline 
of Development as Freedom in terms of capabilities. I will show that Sen’s approach also stands as 
a critique of economism, and although he does provide a role for economic growth within his 
approach, this is as a secondary goal of the development process, subsequent to the expansion of 
freedoms. Firstly, I explain the CA according to the ‘thin view’ as termed by Qizilbash (2014:4). 
Secondly, in order to establish the conditions within which the CA is to be realised, I will 
reconstruct Sen’s Development as Freedom as a conceptualisation of the CA in the context of 
human development – a ‘deepening’ of the approach. Having established the ‘thin view’ and 
‘deepening,’ this chapter identifies the fundamental conditions within which Sen’s CA must be 
realised. I explain how Sen asserts the necessity to secure culture as a means and ends to 
development, supported by his commitment to pluralism by not committing to a list of capabilities 
and functionings. The chapter concludes with a reconstruction of my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-
type, within which I identify potential limitations of his approach, which are problematised further 
in Chapter Two. 
Chapter Two is a critical examination of debates in the literature on the CA and Development as 
Freedom. I identify important criticisms and concerns regarding Sen’s approach to development 
that are most relevant for this thesis. Where relevant, the chapter also considers Sen’s responses to 
these debates. It determines what fundamental conditions (according to my interpretation of Sen’s 
ideal-type) ought to prevail for an operationalisation of the CA framework; democratic deliberation; 
the protection of agency freedom; a role for the liberal political economy; and a provision for 
welfare for the severely deprived. Following this reconstruction, the chapter identifies limitations of 
Sen’s approach as well as where Sen leaves room for its alteration. The extent to which his 
framework can be altered, and with what potential implications, will also be determined. This is 
important for rendering a political analysis of the substantive social and political relations through 
which Sen’s CA and Development as Freedom are to be realised, given that Sen’s approach is 
limited in its understanding of the substantive social and political relations through which 
development occurs. I argue that this also has important implications for its aim to be cross-
culturally applicable. 
Furthermore, I also establish that there exists a fundamental tension within Sen’s development 
framework. According to my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type, by implication, ‘tradition’ – cultural 
values and practices – is to be overcome in favour of the liberal political economy and capabilities 
(and implied functionings) conducive to maintaining and facilitating this economy. Freedoms and 
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the ability to ‘choose a life one has reason to value’ are therefore restricted to the choice afforded by 
this economy. Despite its commitment to agency freedom and democratic deliberation, 
theoretically, Sen’s approach has the potential only to offer the ‘freedoms’ afforded within its 
(liberal) prescriptions. Subsequently, in an Australian Indigenous context, the approach has the 
potential to limit the agency freedom of development subjects. 
Chapter Three explains how the CA is substantively being operationalised in Indigenous Australia 
by Noel Pearson in the Cape York Peninsula. As a founding member of the CYI, Pearson 
operationalises his version of Sen’s approach through welfare reform policy and aims to create a 
‘real economy’ in the region that is synonymous with a neoliberal political economy. Pearson’s 
proposal for economic and social development is in response to his identification of specific social 
conditions within Cape York that he deems problematic. These conditions are described by Pearson 
as ‘disadvantage and dysfunction.’ Pearson chooses to attribute the current social conditions of the 
people of Cape York to ‘passive welfare’ combined with what he refers to as ‘corrupted’ cultural 
obligations of Aboriginal culture to cause ‘inappropriate behaviours.’ He chooses to focus on the 
economy of communities in order to resolve welfare dependency in Cape York. This chapter 
establishes that there is sufficient reason to argue that Pearson reconceptualises Sen’s approach and 
in doing so, begins to alter the conditions within which Sen’s approach is to be realised. 
I argue that there is a conceptual difference and understanding of ‘capability’ between Sen and 
Pearson, and this translates into the Cape York Institute’s framing of development within the 
region. Fundamentally, Pearson places greater emphasis on the notion of personal responsibility in 
the creation of capabilities and reorders Sen’s primary goal of development as the expansion of 
freedoms. Pearson instead prioritises economic growth. The primary goal of development in Cape 
York therefore becomes the creation of a ‘real economy’ in the region, in order to solve the problem 
of ‘passive welfare’ rather than expanding capabilities. Pearson also negates an incorporation of a 
formal means of democratic participation for the community members of Cape York in the selection 
of capabilities with which well-being is to be evaluated. I conclude this chapter by establishing the 
extent to which Pearson’s use of the CA aligns with Sen’s ideal-type. I argue that Pearson 
significantly alters Sen’s three fundamental conditions for an operationalisation of the CA 
according to my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-typical version. By discussing Pearson’s alteration of 
these conditions, I identify the problems upon which the social and political implications of 
Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen can be considered in the following chapters. 
Chapter Four introduces and evaluates the core conceptual and empirical aspects of the 
development project of the CYI. It examines three development policies that are part of the welfare 
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reform trial implemented by CYP as responses to the perceived social conditions in the region by 
Pearson. The three policies are: ‘The Work Placement Scheme,’ ‘M-Power’ and ‘Wise Buys,’ and 
this chapter explains the core tenets of each policy. I establish that although Pearson acknowledges 
the social and historical context of Indigenous Australians, he does not factor this context in 
exploring or understanding contemporary relations. Therefore, his conscious focus is on the 
economic conditions in Cape York and the quest for the creation of a ‘real economy’ as a solution 
to ‘passive welfare.’ This is a direct consequence of his reordering of Sen’s development goals and 
him prioritising economic growth over the expansion of freedoms. This chapter will further 
establish the extent to which these policies align with Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s approach and the 
extent to which these policies deviate from my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-typical development 
framework (within the limits established in Chapter Two). I argue that these policies closely 
replicate Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s approach; however they deviate from 
Sen’s framework significantly. Policy responses do not therefore, amount to a true 
operationalisation of Sen’s approach. By prioritising a neoliberal political economy over 
‘capability’ and by providing welfare only in exchange for functioning that facilitates this economy, 
Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s approach sees it move in a neoliberal direction with significant social 
and political implications. 
Having established that Pearson and CYP substantially deviate from Sen’s CA, Chapter Five is a 
political analysis of this use of Sen’s CA. I explain how the CYI’s aim to have an influence at a 
national level is slowly being realised through the trials being extended into far north Queensland 
and similar neoliberal principles informing the Remote Jobs and Communities Program (RJCP). 
Fundamentally, Pearson’s reordering of Sen’s development goals and CYP’s emphasis on 
functioning (in terms of employment and consumerism) rather than expanding capability, infer that 
the expected behaviours of Indigenous Australians will benefit the mainstream, neoliberal political 
economy. Because of this, I argue that Pearson and CYP only use Sen’s language of capabilities 
rhetorically to justify their neoliberal development agenda. Due to this substantial deviation, it 
cannot be argued that the critiques and weaknesses I identify in Chapter Two are also directly 
applicable to Pearson’s altered version. However, I argue that some critiques remain relevant and 
are amplified in an Indigenous cross-cultural context. Importantly, I argue that the fundamental 
tension I identify in Sen’s approach – that by implication, ‘tradition’ is to be overcome in favour of 
the liberal political economy, still manifests and is in fact amplified in Cape York.  
The presence of this tension means that the freedom to choose the life one has reason to value in 
Cape York is limited to that permitted by Pearson’s and CYP’s development agenda. Cape York 
development policy therefore has the potential to be regarded as an imposition and implicated in 
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‘development as a method of rule’ (McMichael 2012:50), especially by those who wish to pursue an 
alternative conception of well-being to a pre-established liberal framework. This is substantiated 
with literature on Indigenous Australia and Cape York specifically, that suggests that there exist 
cultural incompatibilities between Indigenous Dreaming11 and socio-economic circumstances, and 
non-Indigenous, mainstream neoliberal principles that prioritise economic progress. This chapter 
concludes by explaining how the Cape York welfare reform trials are indicative of a trend in 
Indigenous Policy more broadly to align with neoliberal prerogatives. 
The thesis concludes by arguing that Pearson’s development approach is typical of a wider political 
project – the way in which Indigenous communities are conceptualised in terms of a global 
development paradigm. I also suggest that although not directly determinable from Pearson’s use of 
the CA in Cape York, some observations can be made about the universality of Sen’s CA and 
Development as Freedom from the critical analysis of this thesis. Currently, Sen assumes any 
problems regarding the cross-cultural application of his approach can be resolved by leaving space 
for democratic deliberation. Despite this provision and Sen refusing to endorse a list of capabilities 
to secure agency freedom and individual choice, his approach is problematic when presented as a 
universal development framework. This is due to the (impliedly inflexible) role he assigns to the 
liberal political economy, rendering “open” provision for the democratic selection of capabilities as 
insufficient.  
This is problematic when conceptualised in relation to alternative (non-liberal) societies and 
cosmologies. If Sen’s vision of development is not shared or subscribed to by development subjects 
or particular societies, their agency freedom is compromised. The development subject has no 
alternative pathway to improve well-being other than realising capability and freedom in the way 
the CA prescribes, even if their cultural epistemologies are incompatible with the principles of a 
liberal political economy. This prescriptive nature of the approach is due to Sen’s ultimate 
embedding of Development as Freedom within a liberal framework. This approach is therefore 
based on an ideal-typical framework that abstracts too much in problematic ways from the 
substantive social and political relations and experiences of the development process in order to 
sufficiently address inequality in its many different manifestations. 
 
                                                
11	 Indigenous Dreaming is an intricate concept, but Stanner (1970) has explained that, ‘a central meaning of The 
Dreaming is that of a sacred, heroic time long ago when man and nature come to be as they are…We shall not 
understand The Dreaming fully except as a complex of meanings. A blackfellow [sic] may call his totem, or the place 
from which his spirit came, his Dreaming. He may also explain the existence of a custom, or a law of life, as causally 
due to The Dreaming’ (1970:304).	
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Further Research 
Given that cross-cultural applications of the CA and Development as Freedom are potentially 
problematic, additional research on Indigenous applications of Sen’s approach is necessary to 
establish the specific implications and consequences of operationalisations of Sen’s approach that 
reflect his ideal-typical framework. Sen’s development approach would be more cross-culturally 
viable if it was inclusive of sufficient provision for societies or communities who may not wholly 
subscribe to its liberal framework and prescriptions. With regards to Cape York, anthropological 
research that is more inclusive of Indigenous voices is necessary to build a more comprehensive 
picture of the substantive experiences of the Cape York welfare reform trials. This would enable 
researchers to establish deeper implications and consequences of a neoliberal development agenda 
in this context according to the people of Cape York themselves. 
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Chapter One 
 A Reconstruction of Sen’s Capability Approach & Development as Freedom 
Introduction 
In order for this thesis to critically engage with Sen’s CA, which informs his framework of 
Development as Freedom, and in order to assess Noel Pearson’s adoption of the approach in Cape 
York, this first chapter will reconstruct the theoretical core and premises of Sen’s framework. His 
approach entails conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for Development as Freedom to be 
realised so that development subjects in question can exercise their capabilities. The chapter 
outlines these conditions and their underlying premises in order to distill an ideal-typical framework 
of ‘development policy recommendations’ consistent with Sen’s CA. The purpose of this is to 
construct a critical backdrop against which Pearson’s claim that the Cape York welfare reform trials 
are informed by Sen’s CA can be assessed, relative to how faithfully the trials reproduce key 
premises and prescriptions of the approach.12 This ideal-typical framework is premised on criteria, 
which will therefore aid the evaluation of whether Pearson’s application is consistent with a 
defensible version of the CA (according to Sen). 
 
Through the reconstruction of Sen’s approach, this chapter will establish that Sen’s primary 
objective is to provide the CA as a framework of thought for the evaluation of well-being and to 
present an outline of Development as Freedom in terms of capabilities. In order to do so, it will 
explain his approach as an evaluative framework within which to consider and assess well-being in 
terms of functionings and capabilities – the combination of functionings from which one can choose 
a life one has reason to value (Sen 1999:74). In order to establish the conditions within which the 
approach is to be realised, Sen’s Development as Freedom will also be reconstructed as a 
‘deepening’ of the conceptualisation of the CA in the context of human development. Subsequently, 
in this context, it will be shown that Sen’s approach entails a critique of economism – that is, of 
other approaches to welfare and development that primarily focus on economic growth. This 
chapter will establish that although Sen does provide a role for economic growth within his 
approach, this is as a secondary goal of the development process; that is, instead of positing 
economic growth as a primary goal of development, as is characteristic of dominant approaches to 
                                                
12 Sen himself is unclear on the social and political processes through which the CA should be operationalised through 
public policy. Sen’s ‘silence’ on the social and political processes through which freedom is to be realised is identified 
by many authors; Chiappero-Martinetti & Roche 2009; Patnaick 1998; Shanmugaratnam 2001; and Stigliz, Sen & 
Fittousi 2009. Chiappero-Martinetti & Roche (2009) explicitly state that Sen has no specific guidelines on how the 
approach can be concretely implemented for policy and social evaluation (2009:4).  
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welfare that focus solely on the increase of individual income and Gross National Product (GNP). 
For Sen, it is important that development subjects have the freedom and the capability to choose the 
life they have reason to value (1999:74) and as such, the CA and Development as Freedom are 
presented as universally applicable. 
 
The first section of this chapter will reconstruct the CA according to the ‘thin view,’ that is, in terms 
of Sen’s primary objective for the approach – as a conceptual framework for the evaluation of well-
being. It will also explain Sen’s secondary objective of the CA – as a critique of other approaches to 
welfare. This will be followed by a reconstruction of Sen’s theory of Development as Freedom as a 
‘deepening’ of the CA. The second section situates capability in the context of human development 
and explains Sen’s role for instrumental freedoms and the role of the state. Further, this section 
identifies and explains three fundamental conditions necessary for the realisation of the expansion 
of freedoms in/as development. The first of these is the way in which Sen conceptualises the 
development subject and accounts for inter-individual variation in converting resources to 
capability and well-being by incorporating inequalities into his analysis and accounting for 
‘capability handicaps.’ This examination will establish the extent to which the CA and Development 
as Freedom theoretically account for agency freedom, that is, the freedom to pursue goals and 
values that a person regards as important. The second necessary condition is a role for the liberal 
political economy, in alignment with a welfare-state oriented, social democratic model of 
development. Sen’s theoretical accommodation of the role for economic growth and redistribution 
within his approach is presented in more detail here.13  
 
The third condition presented in this section is Sen’s commitment to democratic participation. I 
explain his theoretical provisions for public participation, and how these are to inform public policy. 
This condition is indicative of his commitment to a social democratic model more broadly. For Sen, 
political freedoms must be secured by the state so that they enable a two-way relationship to exist 
between individuals and public policy. Individual capability is to be enhanced by public policy and 
public policy in return, is to be enhanced by the political and participatory capabilities of 
individuals (1999:18). The state must therefore strengthen and safeguard social arrangements that 
secure political freedoms to have the opportunity to determine who should govern and on what 
principles. Theoretically, individuals will then have free political expression and contribute to 
public policy (1999:38). A thick conception of this democratic provision is then presented through a 
                                                
13 Although this informs Sen’s theoretical response to his critique of economism and dominant approaches to welfare, 
this ultimate embedding is presented in this chapter as a potential source of unfreedom. This is highly problematic, 
especially in cross-cultural applications of Sen’s approach. The reasons for this will be expanded upon as part of the 
critique. 
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discussion of Sen’s commitment to pluralism and his argument that ‘culture’14 should be seen as a 
means and ends of development (Sen 2001:2). This is indicative of his assertion that the CA is a 
universal framework. Sen understands that culture is a constitutive part of life and influence on the 
types of freedom sought by individuals (Sen 1999:39). Existing cultural and social values influence 
individual choice in the selection of capabilities; however the capabilities they value may be 
incompatible with the economic and social prescriptions according to the CA and Development as 
Freedom. Sen argues that this should be settled through democratic deliberation, leading to the 
recognition of the importance of securing cultural freedoms. This is substantiated by him refusing to 
endorse a specific list of capabilities or functionings.  
Following the reconstruction of the CA and Development as Freedom, this chapter will conclude by 
establishing my interpretation of an ‘ideal-type’ of the approach that, when operationalised, would 
be consistent with Sen’s deepening of the CA in the context of human development. Drawing on 
Sen’s own inferences, including his extended logic of the CA to his framework of Development as 
Freedom, this ideal-type will help to disclose the principles informing any operationalisation of the 
CA when implemented in a human development context. Specifically, this ideal-type will aid in 
establishing the extent to which Pearson’s appropriation of Sen replicates this reconstruction. It 
should reflect as faithfully as possible the objectives of the CA and Development as Freedom and 
begin to identify a fundamental tension within Sen’s work. This tension will be further investigated 
in Chapter Two in order to begin to problematise the approach for its application in a cross-cultural 
context. 
The CA as a Framework of Thought for the Evaluation of Well-Being 
According to the ‘thin’ view, Sen’s CA exists as a framework with which to evaluate personal 
advantage and individual well-being in terms of a person’s ability to perform acts they value or 
reach states of being they value (Sen 1993a:30). As a universally applicable framework of thought, 
the approach is a normative and evaluative framework through which to consider and assess well-
being in terms of freedom, or put differently, the capability to choose a life a person has reason to 
value (Sen 1999:74). Sen defines ‘capability’ as the possible combinations of functionings that are 
feasible for a person to achieve, and from which a person can choose one collection (Sen 1993a:31; 
Sen 1999:75). ‘Functionings’ are, ‘the various things that a person may value doing or being’ 
                                                
14 Sen does not define his use of the term ‘culture,’ but I explain later on in the chapter that it can broadly be understood 
in his work as encompassing what he terms ‘traditional’ ways of living – specific societal ways of life that have been 
historically constructed. This implies that his understanding of ‘culture’ refers to societal groups that embody 
alternative social structures and value systems. 
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(1999:75), and include enjoying adequate nourishment, good health, self-respect and social 
integration (1999:75). Based on a view of living as a combination of these various ‘doings and 
beings,’ within the CA, quality of life is assessed in terms of a person’s capability to achieve 
valuable functionings (Sen 1993a:31). A person has lower advantage in terms of opportunity than 
another if he or she has less capability (less real opportunity) to achieve those things they have 
reason to value (Sen 2009:231). 
For Sen, the approach therefore centres on a particular conception of freedom, which he defines as, 
‘the freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that – things that he or she may value doing 
or being’ (2009:231-232). He states, ‘capability is thus a kind of freedom – the substantive freedom 
to achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to achieve 
alternative various lifestyles)’ (Sen 1999:75). The freedom to achieve certain functionings entails 
the individual freedom to choose functionings from an individual capability set and although an 
individual may have the same capability as another, they may choose a different bundle of 
capabilities depending on what functionings they value in line with their particular goals. Therefore, 
two people with the same capabilities and the same goals may end up with different outcomes (Sen 
1990:116). Robeyns (2000) asserts that a person’s actual freedom to pursue their own ends will also 
depend on what ends he or she has in the form of personal characteristics and social arrangements 
(2000:5). Personal characteristics such as metabolism, physical condition (the presence/absence of 
disabilities for example) and intelligence will influence how a person can convert commodities 
(resources) or primary goods into functioning (2000:5). Social arrangements such as infrastructure, 
public policy and social norms will also affect the conversion of primary goods or a service into 
functioning (2000:5), by their presence, absence or dynamic.15 
The CA as a Critique of Other Approaches to Welfare 
Following the presentation of the CA as a universal framework of thought for the evaluation of 
well-being, the second most important objective for Sen is for this approach to exist as a critique of 
other approaches to welfare evaluation that are economically focused (Robeyns 2000:3; Sen 
                                                
15 The specific social variations that influence individual ability to convert resources into functionings that Sen accounts 
for will be discussed in more detail later on in the chapter.  
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1979:200-218; 1990:112-116).16 The approach therefore concomitantly exists as Sen’s response to 
the inadequacy of these dominant approaches and established welfarist conceptions of equality for 
the assessment of individual well-being such as utilitarian equality, total utility equality and 
Rawlsian equality.17 These approaches involve an informational focus on personal utility (pleasures, 
happiness, desire fulfillment); absolute/relative opulence (commodity bundles, real income, wealth); 
negative freedoms (procedural fulfillment of libertarian rights); comparisons of means of freedom 
(primary goods – things citizens need as free and equal persons and, ‘things that every rational man 
[sic] is presumed to want’) (Sen 1990:14) as per Rawls’ theory of justice; and comparisons of 
resources holdings as a basis of just equality (Dworkin’s equality of resources) (Sen 1993a:30).  
 
With regards to the shortcomings of these approaches and specifically of utilitarian theory (which 
encompasses utilitarian equality and total utility equality), Sen argues that in fact, utilitarianism 
says very little about well-being (Sen 1979:200). This theory places its core value solely on 
individual utility – the mental condition of happiness, pleasure or desire fulfillment (Sen 2005:5). 
This measurement of well-being is misleading as it fails to represent an individual’s real 
deprivation – as a deprived person may have high utility if his/her hardship is accepted by that 
individual. This problem of adaptive preference formation occurs when personal desires are reduced 
to ‘modest “realistic” proportions’ (2005:5), therefore an assessment of utility (pleasure and desire 
fulfillment), does not provide an adequate indication of a person’s real deprivation, despite them 
perhaps not being adequately nourished, clothed and educated (2005:5). Sen also criticises 
utilitarian approaches to well-being for not adequately recognising the diversity of human beings. 
He explains that equal marginal utilities and equal total utilities can pull in opposite directions. 
Using an example of a “cripple” [sic] with marginal utility disadvantage, Sen highlights how an 
understanding of well-being according to utilitarianism would do nothing for him or her, giving 
them less income than the physically fit (Sen 1979:212). He elaborates,  
                                                
16 For Sen, the third objective of the approach is for it to provide a formula to make interpersonal comparisons of 
welfare (Robeyns 2000:3). However this is beyond the scope of this thesis. This objective entails an expectation that the 
approach is a quantitative algorithm or formulaic assessment of welfare and well-being (Robeyns 2000:3) and relates to 
Sen’s early work on welfare economics, characterising the CA and the evaluation of living standards in terms of 
capability sets in terms of functioning n-tuples representing the various alternative combinations of beings and doings 
any one (combination) of which a person can choose (1993a:38). It also involves the ranking of commodity vectors, the 
identification of value objects and a reduction of the CA in terms of economic language, an explanation of which also 
goes beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the main point to be made here is as Robeyns (2000) highlights, that, ‘it 
is quite likely that a number of economists have tried to read Sen’s writings on the capability approach looking for such 
a formula, and have consequently been disappointed when they discovered that this has not been Sen’s primary focus’ 
(2000:3). Instead, and for Robeyns in particular, the CA emerges as a framework for thinking about normative issues 
and to make evaluations to analyse ‘a variety of social issues, such as well-being, poverty, liberty, freedom, 
development, gender bias and inequalities, justice and social ethics’ (Sen 1993a:30 cited in Robeyns 2000:3-4). 
17 See Rawls (1971). 
37 
 
if person A as a cripple [sic] gets half the utility that the pleasure-wizard person B does 
from any given level of income, then in the pure distribution problem between A and B 
the utilitarian would end up giving pleasure-wizard B more income than the cripple [sic] 
A. The cripple [sic] would then be doubly worse off: both since he [sic] gets less utility 
from the same level of income, and since he [sic] will also get less income. 
Utilitarianism must lead to this thanks to its single-minded concern with maximising the 
utility sum. The pleasure-wizard’s superior efficiency in producing utility would pull 
income away from the less efficient cripple [sic] (1979:203).  
With the traditional utilitarian approach drawing on interpersonal, comparable descriptive content, 
Sen argues that moral importance should be attached to these descriptive conditions (1979:201), 
explaining that, ‘even when utility is accepted as the only basis of moral importance, utilitarianism 
fails to capture the relevance of overall advantage for the requirements of equality’ (1979:204). 
Utilitarianism therefore, according to Sen, entails a lack of concern with distributional questions, 
‘except at the entirely marginal level’ (1979:204-205).  
According to Rawlsian equality, well-being is assessed through an index of primary goods (the 
Rawlsian Difference Principle (1979:215)) or commodities. Sen argues that this approach is also 
insufficient in accounting for human diversity (1979:215), explaining, ‘if people were basically very 
similar, then an index of primary goods might be quite a good way of judging advantage. But, in 
fact, people seem to have very different needs varying with health, longevity, climatic conditions, 
location, work conditions, temperament, and even body size (affecting food and clothing 
requirements)’ (1979:215-216). Rawlsian equality therefore overlooks ‘very widespread and real 
differences’ and judging advantage in terms of primary goods leads to ‘a partially blind morality’ 
(1979:216). Sen concludes that, ‘Rawls takes primary goods as the embodiment of advantage, rather 
than taking advantage to be a relationship between persons and goods’ (1979:216).  
For Sen, theories of utility or primary goods do not therefore capture the urgency related to human 
needs. Utility, although concerned with what these things do to human beings, ‘uses a metric that 
focuses not on the person’s capabilities but on his mental reaction’ (1979:218). A primary goods 
approach entails a ‘fetish handicap’ by being concerned with goods, and even though a list of goods 
may be specified in a, ‘broad and inclusive way, encompassing rights, liberties, opportunities 
income, wealth and the social basis of self-respect,’ according to Sen, it is, ‘still concerned with 
good things rather than what these good things do to human beings’ (1979:218). Something is 
therefore overlooked if these two theories are combined. He explains, ‘if it is argued that resources 
should be devoted to remove or substantially reduce the handicap of the cripple [sic] despite there 
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being no marginal utility argument (because it is expensive), despite there being no total utility 
argument (because he [sic] is so contented), and despite there being no primary goods deprivation 
(because he [sic] has the goods that others have) the case must rest on something else’ (1979:218).  
In response, Sen (1990) asserts that interpersonal comparisons cannot be provided by comparisons 
of holdings of means to freedom such as primary goods, resources and incomes that they assess 
(1990:112), and that the presence of interpersonal variability involved in converting primary goods 
into freedom and the advantages of different persons can be a source of, ‘unjustified inequality and 
unfairness’ (1990:112). This provides further justification of his CA, with Sen highlighting that 
assessment based on an index of the holding of primary goods in terms of means omits an analysis 
of equality that involves asking what people can obtain from those means (1990:115). Instead, he 
presents ‘basic capability equality,’ a principle of equality entailing fundamental aspects of the CA, 
such as the notion of capabilities as a ‘natural extension’ of Rawls’ concern with primary goods. 
This approach shifts focus from the presence of goods themselves to what goods actually do for 
people (Sen 1979:218-219), and is formulated upon the major shortcoming of dominant approaches 
– the absence of ‘basic capabilities’ or the notion of a person being able to do certain basic things 
and having the freedom to do so (1979:218). These include the ability to move around, meet 
nutritional requirements, and the power to participate in a social life and the community  
(1979:218). Basic capability equality therefore relates to the ability to achieve certain crucial 
functionings to minimally adequate levels for well-being. This more adequate principle of equality 
therefore entails an appreciation of individual needs for the assessment of well-being (1979:217). 
Individual needs should be interpreted in the form of individual basic capabilities, which Sen argues 
are often implicit in the demand for equality (1979:218). 
Sen therefore recognises that the individual ability to convert primary goods and resources into 
freedom to choose a particular life and to achieve certain functionings will vary from person to 
person, and that equality in the holding of primary goods or resources can also exist concomitantly 
with inequalities in actual freedoms enjoyed by different persons (Sen 1990:115).18 Giving an 
example within the context of poverty, he argues that a person with more income and more 
nutritional intake than another person, ‘may have less freedom to live a well-nourished existence 
because of a higher basal metabolic rate, greater vulnerability to parasitic diseases, larger body size 
or pregnancy’ (1990:116). This highlights that those who may be relatively disadvantaged in terms 
of income or primary goods may also have characteristics such as disability or age that make it 
more difficult for them to convert those primary goods into basic capabilities such as the ability to 
                                                
18 Again, this is discussed in more detail later in this chapter with regards to this variation that Sen makes provision for 
and describes as ‘capability handicap.’ 
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move about or the ability to live a healthy life (1990:116) He states, ‘neither primary goods, nor 
resources, more broadly defined, can represent the capability a person actually enjoys’ 
(1990:116).19 Therefore, the versatility of primary goods to contribute to their general-purpose of a 
means to freedom, influencing the set of alternative lives from which a person can choose, is very 
low (1990:115).  
As an alternative, within a capability-based assessment of justice, Sen argues that, ‘individual 
claims are not to be assessed in terms of the resources or primary goods the persons respectively 
hold, but in terms of the freedoms they actually enjoy to choose between different ways of living 
that they can have reason to value. It is this actual freedom that is represented by the person’s 
‘capability’ to achieve various alternative combinations of functionings, that is, doings and beings’ 
(1990:115-116). He also considers the versatility of primary goods to contribute to their general-
purpose of a means to freedom, influencing the set of alternative lives from which a person can 
choose (1990:115) and states, 
 in the capability-based assessment of justice, individual claims are not to be assessed in 
terms of the resources or primary goods the persons respectively hold, but in terms of 
the freedoms they actually enjoy to choose between different ways of living that they 
can have reason to value. It is this actual freedom that is represented by the person’s 
‘capability’ to achieve various alternative combinations of functionings, that is, doings 
and beings (1990:115-116).  
Sen’s critical claims that utility and Rawlsian based assessments of welfare that focus on means 
(income and primary goods) are insufficient, provide the basis upon which the inclusion of 
additional information for the evaluation of well-being can be justified. Consequently, the CA asks 
us to look at what means do for people in making different kinds of freedoms possible in terms of 
capabilities and functionings (Qizilbash 2012:4). The role of the approach as a universal framework 
and as a critique of other approaches to welfare is perceived as constituting a ‘thin view’ (Qizilbash 
2012:4). This ‘thin view’ can be perceived as the ‘core motivational base’ of the CA. 
Broadly speaking, qualitative applications of the CA have resulted in ‘thickenings’ of the approach 
(2012:13). When people conceptualise the approach as concerning issues of gender inequality, 
                                                
19 This notion is particularly important when addressing the differences in conversion rates of primary goods between 
men and women. Biological and social characteristics such as pregnancy and neonatal care can place a woman at 
disadvantage even when the level of her primary goods equals that of a man’s. Sen argues, ‘the issue of gender cannot 
be properly addressed if advantage and disadvantage are seen merely in terms of holdings of primary goods, rather than 
the actual freedoms to lead different types of lives that women and men can respectively enjoy’ (1990:116).  
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justice, and the context of development, Qizilbash argues that they have in mind this ‘thick view’ 
(2012:7).20  
Although not a quantitative application of the CA or a ‘thickening’ of the approach as Qizilbash 
would see it, I suggest that Sen’s further development of the approach – presenting an outline of 
Development as Freedom in terms of capabilities – constitutes a deepening of the conceptualisation 
of the CA in the context of human development.21 In this context the CA contrasts with dominant 
analyses of social and economic development in terms of GNP and individual income. Although 
Sen does give an instrumental value to GDP and individual income, he provides a means to evaluate 
well-being based on freedoms, social and economic arrangements (such as the facilities for 
education and health-care) and political and civil rights, such as the liberty to participate in public 
discussion (Sen 1999:3). The next section of this chapter will reconstruct Sen’s use of the CA in 
line with this ‘deepening’ through his conceptualisation of the approach in the context of human 
development. In doing so, this section will assert the importance of Sen’s notion of ‘freedom’ and 
identify the responsibility that Sen assigns to government for providing the conditions for the 
realisation of particular types of freedom.  
An Outline of Development as Freedom in Terms of Capability  
The CA emerged as part of a broader field of human development in the 1990s that suggested 
alternative measures and standards to the predominant economic development characteristic of the 
1940s and 1950s. In 1983 Sen questioned the relevance of economic development standards for the 
1960s and 1970s (Sen 1983:748). This was in response to the failure of international financial and 
development policy to produce a sustainable reduction in global development poverty (Okin 
2003:286). In line with his critiques of traditional utilitarian approaches to well-being, Sen 
explained that a traditional development economics approach is limited and an inadequate 
understanding of economic development (Sen 1983:745). Although he acknowledges that economic 
growth is an important aspect of economic development (1983:748), Sen argued that, ‘I believe the 
real limitations of traditional development economics arose not from the choice of means to the end 
of economic growth, but in the insufficient recognition that economic growth was no more than a 
means to some other objectives’ (1983:753).  
                                                
20 It is worth noting here that although the CA has been discussed as constituent to a theory of justice in terms of 
providing an evaluative framework with which to improve human well-being, Sen has argued that although it specifies 
an evaluative framework it does not solely amount to a theory of justice, which must include aggregative and 
distributive considerations. The CA does not specify an aggregative principle (Sen 1995:268 cited in Robeyns 2000:4). 
21 I acknowledge that Sen	may reject	the version of the CA I advance in this chapter, as his more recent work The Idea 
of Justice (2011[2009]) indicates that he views the CA as a more general approach, and as only part of his view of 
development. However, Noel Pearson’s deployment of the CA occurred in 2005, so within the confines of the extant 
literature at this time, I have not included the content of Sen’s The Idea of Justice. 
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As previously explained, Sen argues that it is not that economic growth does not matter, rather, if it 
does it is because of its associated benefits (1983:753). Therefore, he saw the most important 
deficiency of traditional development economic approaches as the concentration on GNP, income 
and total supply of goods rather than on the ‘entitlements of people and the ‘capabilities’ that these 
entitlements generate’ (1983:754).22 In the 1990s, Sen’s Development as Freedom therefore 
challenged economists that were proponents of traditional economic development standards and 
offered a critique of the World Bank’s and the International Monetary Fund’s policies (Okin 
2003:289). Okin argues that, ‘(Sen’s) rethinking of development has done far more to advance 
development theory and policies that the work of any other scholar’ (2003:293). 
 
Sen’s CA and Development as Freedom is also a step beyond the widely accepted basic needs 
approach of the 1970s and 1980s. This approach towards social justice was popular because instead 
of prioritising economic growth it prioritised people’s basic needs and the distribution of goods. 
These were needs such as water, food, schools and infrastructure (Reader 2006:338). However, 
upon implementation the basic needs approach was problematic. For example, its measurement of 
commodity-requirements was problematic in that different groups needed different amounts of the 
same goods to achieve the same outcome. Therefore the distribution of commodities was ‘poorly 
judged’ or insufficient. Recipients also had little opportunity to define their own needs according to 
this framework (2006:338). The approach was subsequently regarded a conceptually inadequate 
theoretical framework for action in addressing deprivation (2006:339). With its ‘philosophically 
richer’ framework, the CA was and is currently widely accepted as a better theory in terms of 
human development (2006:337).  
 
Conceptualising the CA in the context of development, Sen begins with a conceptualisation of 
poverty as capability deprivation (Sen 1999:87). As a partial account of social justice, the CA 
assesses individual advantage in terms of the capabilities individuals have – the substantive 
freedoms they enjoy in order to, ‘lead the kind of life her or she has reason to value’ (1999:87). 
Perceiving poverty as the deprivation of basic capabilities enables him to define development as, ‘a 
process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy’ (1999:3). Identifying poverty in terms of 
                                                
22 For Sen, ‘entitlements’ are, ‘the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using 
the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces’ (1983:754). He argues that processes of economic 
development can instead be seen in terms of the expansion of these entitlements and that, ‘income itself provides an 
inadequate basic for analysing a person’s entitlements,’ because income is a means of buying things. Sen continues to 
state that, ‘(a) rise in income may not be able to deal at all adequately for (a person’s) entitlement to education, medical 
treatment, since the rise in come as such guarantees no such thing’ (1983:756). Therefore, a focus on what commodity 
bundles a person can command is helpful for characterising economic development and taking into account the 
necessary political arrangements needed to improve well-being in a development context (1983:760).  
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low income and development in terms of growth of GNP and industralisation is inadequate 
(1999:3). Therefore, the key aim of the CA is to expand people’s capabilities – ‘their freedom to 
promote or achieve what they value doing or being’ (Alkire & Deneulin 2009:31). An essential 
measurement of development is subsequently whether individuals enjoy greater freedoms than they 
did in the past (2009:31). The enhancement of individual freedoms is for Sen both the ends and the 
means of the development process. Individual freedoms play an evaluative role in assessing 
development progress in this way. Substantive freedoms (the freedoms people enjoy (Sen 1999:4)) 
take the form of individual capabilities that inform an individual’s capability set, given their social 
and personal circumstances (1999:17). 
 
With a view to securing these individual freedoms, Sen introduces instrumental freedoms as a 
means to the development process. These are the responsibility of government and include the 
adequate provision of healthcare, education and social democratic principles. Therefore, there exists 
an intrinsic relationship between instrumental and substantive freedoms. Instrumental freedoms that 
are enabled through the adequate provision of social opportunities by government create the 
conditions within which substantive freedoms can be secured and enjoyed. Limiting capability 
deprivation and ensuring individual substantive freedoms depend on social and economic 
arrangements such as education, healthcare, and securing political and civil rights through public 
policy (1999:3). The provision of adequate social opportunities through public policy initiatives 
ensures good health and basic education for example, which in turn aids the generation of individual 
substantive freedoms. Basic capability deprivation (poverty) is therefore overcome by governments 
providing adequate social and economic arrangements and ensuring maximum possible 
instrumental freedoms (1999:3). By default, securing these substantive freedoms involves removing 
‘sources of ‘unfreedom,’’ which Sen explains includes poverty, tyranny, poor economic 
opportunities, systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities, and the activity of 
repressive states (1999:3). 
 
Sen acknowledges ‘unfreedom’ as linked to a lack of public facilities and social care, such as the 
absence of organisational arrangements for healthcare and education (1999:4). He states, 
‘unfreedom can arise either through inadequate processes (such as the violation of voting privileges 
or other political or civil rights) or through inadequate social opportunities that some people have 
for achieving what they minimally would like to achieve (including the absence of such elementary 
opportunities as the capability to escape premature mortality or preventable morbidity or 
involuntary starvation)’ (1999:17). In removing these sources of ‘unfreedom,’ and providing 
adequate social opportunities, Sen attributes responsibility to government to, ‘foster human 
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capabilities and substantive freedoms in general’ (1999:10). The specific instrumental freedoms that 
Sen endorses will be discussed in the next section.  
 
Instrumental Freedoms & the Role of the State 
 
According to Sen, public policy should promote five types of instrumental freedom – distinct 
(although related) opportunities that will enhance the capability of a person (1999:10) and, 
‘contribute directly or indirectly to the overall freedom people have to live how they would like to 
live’ (1999:38). Although he acknowledges that the range of freedoms available to an individual 
can be very wide (1999:24), the specific instrumental freedoms he endorses are; political freedoms; 
economic facilities; social opportunities; transparency guarantees; and protective security 
(1999:38). The fact that these are the responsibility of the government to ensure is indicative of a 
social democratic model underpinning Sen’s approach. When conceiving of political freedoms (and 
including civil rights within this concept), Sen refers to these as, ‘the opportunities that people have 
to determine who should govern and on what principles … the possibility to scrutinise and criticise 
authorities, to have freedom of political expression and an uncensored press, to enjoy the freedom 
to choose between political parties and so on’ (1999:38). He broadly encompasses the political 
freedoms associated with democracy in this sense (1999:38). Referring to economic facilities, Sen 
is concerned with the freedom for individuals to use economic resources for consumption, 
production or exchange (1999:39), highlighting as an example that, ‘the availability and access to 
finance can be a crucial influence on the economic entitlements that economic agents are practically 
able to secure’ (1999:39). He states, ‘the economic entitlements that a person has will depend on the 
resources owned or available for use as well as on conditions of exchange, such as relative prices 
and the working of markets. Insofar as the process of economic development increases the income 
and wealth of a country, they are reflected in corresponding enhancement of economic entitlements 
of the population’ (1999:39).  
 
Also concerned with resources, instrumental freedoms signify societal arrangements for services 
like healthcare and education in the form of ‘social opportunities,’ which subsequently improve 
substantive freedoms for a better quality of life (1999:39). Facilities such as these are key to 
influencing substantive freedoms, such as avoiding preventable mortality and morbidity as well as 
aforementioned political freedoms. Social opportunities also influence economic freedom. For 
example, illiteracy may be a barrier to participation in economic activities such as the production 
associated with labour (1999:39). In order to prevent corruption or financial irresponsibility within 
the context of economic freedom, transparency guarantees entail, ‘the freedom to deal with one 
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another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity’ (1999:39). Despite this ensuring that economic 
freedom should operate successfully, Sen acknowledges that, ‘no matter how well a financial 
system operates, some people can be typically on the verge of vulnerability and can actually 
succumb to great deprivation as a result of material changes that adversely affect their lives’ 
(1999:40). The freedom of protective security ensures a ‘social safety net’ for those who have 
succumbed to great deprivation, which Sen argues would, ‘(prevent) the affected population from 
being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even starvation and death’ (1999:40). This 
instrumental freedom entails fixed institutional arrangements such as unemployment benefits as a 
means of income and aligns with a welfare-state oriented model of development.  
 
Moreover, these instrumental freedoms are interrelated – facilitating, supplementing and reinforcing 
one another. For example, the relationship between economic growth and social opportunity 
becomes mutual, with both processes facilitating one another. Emphasising the enhancement of 
economic growth through social opportunity (1999:41), Sen highlights the obvious contribution of 
economic growth to securing the instrumental freedom of economic facilities. In turn, economic 
growth will raise private income and increase state finance. This will then provide the opportunity 
to increase social opportunities and protective security. The creation of social opportunities such as 
healthcare and education will reduce mortality rates and again increase economic growth (1999:40). 
These linkages between instrumental freedoms highlight exactly how freedoms are not just the 
primary objective of development, but also its means (1999:38). For Sen, they are, ‘particularly 
important to seize in considering development policies’ (1999:40). 
The central role of freedom that Sen argues should be ensured and facilitated through development 
policy in this way further demonstrates his emphasis on securing social opportunities for the 
enhancement of individual capability. He argues that substantial attention must be paid to social 
influences – including state actions that are integral to influencing individual freedoms (1999:41). 
He states,  
social arrangements may be decisively important in securing and expanding the freedom 
of the individual. Individual freedoms are influenced, on one side, by the social 
safeguarding of liberties, tolerance, and the possibility of exchange and transactions. 
They are also influenced, on the other side, by substantive public support in the 
provision of those facilities (such as basic healthcare or essential education) that are 
crucial for the formation and use of human capabilities. There is need to pay attention to 
both types of determinants of individual freedoms (1999:41-42).  
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The state therefore has an extensive role in strengthening and safeguarding human capabilities.23 
For Sen, the state’s role in safeguarding human capabilities and ensuring instrumental freedoms 
such as political freedoms strengthens his commitment to democratic deliberation. This is important 
for the selection of valuable capabilities, which he leaves for societies and communities to decide 
for themselves. As such, Sen refuses to endorse a specific list of capabilities and/or functionings. 
This is discussed in the next section.  
The Absence of a List of Capabilities or Functionings  
Sen recognises that when the CA is implemented in different contexts, some functionings will be 
regarded as more important than others, different weights will be attached to each substantive 
freedom (and therefore a person’s capability set) and issues will arise surrounding how much 
weight should be placed on some capabilities compared to others (Sen 1999:76-77). Sen’s refusal to 
endorse a list is in contrast to other advocates of the CA such as Martha Nussbaum, who has 
endorsed a specific list of fundamental human capabilities (see Nussbaum 2011:33-34) and has 
received criticism for doing so because it overrides a process of negotiation that requires internal 
criticism of local values and practices by external standards (Clark 2005:7). With the endorsement 
of a list of capabilities being controversial, Sen has discussed some basic capabilities that would 
demand attention for social assessment, such as individuals having the ability to meet nutritional 
requirements and having access to shelter and clothing (Sen 1979; 1987). However, early on in his 
work, he admits difficulty in selecting these capabilities, detailing that any ‘partial ordering’ of 
capabilities can be carried out according to the, ‘broad uniformity of personal preference,’ but can 
be supplemented by important conventions that are conditional based on the nature of the society 
(Sen 1979:219).  
Sen argues that the CA’s application should be, ‘rather culturally dependent’ (1979:219), and in 
only providing a notion of basic capabilities (such as adequate nourishment, clothing, shelter), the 
CA is therefore a ‘partial guide’ to the good, ‘with virtues that the other characteristics of equality 
do not possess’ (1979:220). His approach leaves space for what constitutes additional and valuable 
capabilities to be decided by societies themselves. It is clear that Sen does not select a complete and 
final list of capabilities. He states, ‘I have nothing against the listing of capabilities but must stand 
up against a grand mausoleum to one fixed and final list of capabilities’ (Sen 2004b:80) and admits 
that it is useful to narrow down integral capabilities for a specific purpose such as assessing the 
extent of poverty. He argues, ‘lists can and have to be used for various purposes, and so long as we 
                                                
23 However, Sen insists that this is a supporting role (1999:53), concomitant with public policy securing political 
freedom that enables the individual to have the capability to politically participate. This is discussed in more detail in 
this chapter as the third condition integral to the realisation of Sen’s CA through Development as Freedom.  
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understand what we are doing, (and in particular that we are getting a list for a particular reason, 
related to a particular assessment, evaluation or critique), we do not put ourselves against other lists 
that may be relevant or useful for other purposes’ (2004b:79).24 Moreover, deciding on a list of final 
capabilities is to inadvertently imply that a capability will not figure in the list, which attributes no 
sensitivity to particular social considerations (including cultural considerations) or what the list is 
being used for. Capabilities therefore emerge as assessment tools that can be used for different 
purposes, but cannot be independent of ‘what for’ and ‘why’ (2004b:79). In summary, Sen explains 
that,  
 what I am against is the fixing of a cemented list of capabilities, which is absolutely 
complete (nothing could be added to it) and notably fixed (it could not respond to public 
reasoning and the formation of social values) … pure theory cannot “freeze” a list of 
capabilities for all societies for all time to come, irrespective of what the citizens come 
to understand and value. That would be not only a denial of the reach of democracy but 
also a misunderstanding of what pure theory can do, completely divorced from the 
particular social reality that any particular society faces (2004b:78).   
Sen (2004b) therefore asserts that the central problem is not with listing important capabilities, but, 
‘insisting on one predetermined canonical list of capabilities … without any general social 
discussion or public reasoning’ (2004b:77). He states, ‘to have such a fixed list, emanating entirely 
from pure theory, is to deny the possibility of fruitful public participation on what should be 
included and why’ (2004b:77). He recognises that the social conditions and priorities that 
capabilities suggest, may vary (2004b:79) (including cultural conditions and priorities). According 
to Sen, the consideration of social conditions and the incorporation of public discussion and 
reasoning can lead to a better understanding of the role, reach and significance of particular 
capabilities (2004b:80). He argues, ‘to insist on a fixed forever list of capabilities would deny the 
possibility of progress in social understanding and also go against the productive role of public 
discussion, social agitation and open debates’ (2004b:80). 
The objection of Sen’s that is of most concern to this thesis is that a list of capabilities formulated 
without public discussion and debate will be problematic due to it representing a perspective devoid 
of a specific consideration of social conditions. These social conditions would include the values 
and norms generated by ‘tradition’ and culture that would influence the consideration of particular 
cultural freedoms in the form of capabilities. Although Stewart (2001) recognises that Sen leaves 
capabilities to be defined through democratic deliberation and individual choice, Stewart describes 
                                                
24 For example, a list of capabilities can serve as dialogue for what constitutes a good life (White 2009:255).   
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this as a ‘laissez-faire’ attitude to values, subject to the critique that this is an imposition of values 
from an outsider (2001:1192).25 However, Sen explicitly states that cultural issues are critically 
important for development (Sen 2001:1), and that if development involves the expansion of 
freedoms as his version of the CA entails, these cultural freedoms need to be among those against 
which development should be assessed (2001:1-2).26 I discuss this in more detail later in the 
chapter. 
So far, this chapter has established the ‘thin’ view of Sen’s CA – the approach as a framework of 
thought and critique of other approaches to welfare and economism. It has also established Sen’s 
deepening of the approach in conceptualising Development as Freedom in terms of capability and 
how the approach is intrinsically associated with the notion of freedom. The next section of this 
chapter will outline three necessary conditions of Sen’s CA within which the approach is to be 
realised according to Development as Freedom. The first of these is the way in which Sen 
conceptualises the development subject and accounts for inter-individual variation of the conversion 
of resources into capability. 
Condition 1: Sen’s Development Subject: Agency, Sources of Variation & ‘Capability 
Handicap’ 
Sen conceptualises his development subject as having ‘free and sustainable’ agency, which emerges 
as, ‘a major engine of development’ and a constitutive part of the development process (1999:4). 
For Sen, human agency represents an individual’s ability to act on behalf of goals that matter to 
them, and corresponds to ‘agency freedom,’ which he argues is, ‘what a person is free to do and 
achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important’ (Sen 1985a:203). 
Agency freedom is not tied to any one particular type of aim, but is seen as the freedom of an 
individual acting responsibly, according to Sen (1985a:204). Development subjects should therefore 
be seen as ‘agents’ rather than ‘motionless patients,’ and it is necessary to see the beneficiaries of 
development in this way (Sen 1999:137). As a result of this positive, free and sustainable agency, 
Sen argues that individuals can ‘shape their own destiny,’ and not be seen as, ‘passive recipients of 
cunning development programs’ (1999:11). In line with this conceptualisation, it has been 
established that as part of his critique of other approaches to welfare, Sen recognises that the 
individual ability to convert primary goods and resources into freedom will vary from person to 
person, and that equality in the holding of primary goods or resources can also exist concomitantly 
                                                
25 Instead, Stewart suggests Alkire’s (1999) approach, to consult people concerned with participatory techniques via 
representative groups. Although this may suffer from some form of adaptive preference formation, Stewart argues that 
this offers a degree of legitimacy, rather than an imposition of values from an outsider (Stewart 2001:1192). 
26 There are those who argue against Sen’s refusal to endorse a list of capabilities and/or functionings. This will be 
discussed in Chapter Two.	
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with inequalities in actual freedoms enjoyed by different persons (Sen 1990:115). A consideration 
of capability and agency freedom to pursue goals and values a person regards as important within 
the various conditions and states of being they may experience requires explication of how these 
conditions and states affect their ability to convert resources into substantive freedoms. 
In a step towards incorporating the diversity of everyday lived experience into the approach, Sen 
recognises that individual ability in converting personal income and resources into well-being and 
quality of life will vary. The use of income and commodities is the material basis of well-being, but 
what a person can make of a given income is dependent on their personal and social circumstances 
(Sen 1999:70), and Sen argues that five vital factors are overlooked when dominant approaches to 
welfare focus on income and resources. These five ‘distinct’ sources of variation influence this 
conversion of real income into well-being and freedom, and Sen recognises these as the factors that 
may influence the development subject realising capabilities and substantive freedoms. The first of 
these sources of variation are ‘personal heterogeneities,’ encompassing the fact that individuals 
have differing physical characteristics associated with disability, illness, age or gender. Their needs 
are therefore diverse. For example, a pregnant woman will need more nutritional intake than a non-
pregnant woman (1999:70). In recognising personal heterogeneities, Sen argues that, ‘the 
compensation needed for disadvantages will vary, and furthermore some disadvantages may not be 
fully “correctable” even with income transfer’ (1999:70). 
Secondly, ‘environmental diversities’ include variations in environmental conditions such as 
climate, temperature, rainfall and flooding that could influence the freedoms and well-being a 
person achieves from a given income. Heating and clothing requirements for example will differ 
according to these variations (1999:70). The influence of disease and pollution also falls under this 
variation. Thirdly, ‘variations in social climate’ include the social conditions such as public 
educational arrangements, the prevalence or absence of crime and the nature of community 
relationships that may influence the conversion process (1999:70-71). The source of variation Sen 
terms as, ‘differences in relational perspectives,’ incorporates an appreciation of the influence of 
poverty being relative within a given context. He states,  
the commodity requirements of established patterns of behaviour may vary between 
communities, depending on conventions and customs. For example, being relatively rich 
in a poor country can prevent a person from achieving some elementary “functionings” 
(such as taking part in the life of the community) even though her income, in absolute 
terms may be higher than the level of income at which the members of the poorer 
communities can function with great ease and success … (for example) to be able to 
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“appear in public without shame” may require higher standards of clothing and other 
visible consumption in a richer society than in a poorer one … the same parametric 
variability may apply to the personal resources needed for the fulfillment of self-respect 
(1999:71). 
Lastly, ‘distribution within the family’ as a source of variation denotes the fact that non-income 
earners within a family may share income earned by another member of a family. The family 
therefore becomes the unit of consideration of that income use, and Sen states that, ‘the well-being 
freedom of individuals in a family will depend on how the family income is used in furtherance of 
the interests and objectives of different members of the family’ (1999:71). Family distribution rules 
according to gender or perceived need will therefore affect ‘attainments and predicaments’ of the 
individual members (1999:71). These variations inform Sen’s aim to broaden the informational 
focus of an evaluation of well-being, and to move beyond the dominant paradigm of a focus on 
income and resources (primary goods) to the use of these resources (1999:72). Sen recognises that 
the use of these resources to generate the ability to do valuable things is subject to variation, and 
according to him, provides an adequate consideration of the actual living people manage to achieve 
and have reason to value in terms of freedoms (1999:73).  
By focusing on this ‘actual living,’ Sen identifies that the impact of income on capabilities is 
‘contingent and conditional’ (1999:88). He argues that this issue is particularly important when 
considering policy with the aim of reducing inequality and poverty (1999:88) and identification of a 
‘capability handicap,’ such as being ill or illiterate is an important aspect of public provisioning 
(1999:138). Sen asserts that in the context of practical policy-making, it is useful to emphasis some 
of the five variations specifically (1999:88). With income and capability being strongly affected by 
the age of the person (with young and older people having different needs), gender, social roles, 
flooding, drought, insecurity and violence, he argues that, ‘making contrasts of population groups 
according to age, gender, location and so on, these parametric variations are particularly important’ 
(1999:88). There can also be some “coupling” of disadvantages between income deprivation and 
adversity in converting income into functionings. Sen recognises that illness and disability reduce 
an individual’s ability to earn income, therefore making it harder to convert income into capability. 
He states that, ‘this entails that “real poverty” (in terms of capability deprivation) may be, in a 
significant sense, more intense than that which appears in the income space. This can be a crucial 
concern in assessing public action to assist the elderly and other groups with “conversion” 
difficulties in addition to lowness of income’ (1999:88). He also argues that intra-family divisions 
are important when thinking about relevant public policy and unrecognised labour that may be 
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unaccounted for. Public policy should consider the extent of the deprivation of neglected members 
that is not adequately reflected in income (1999:88-89).  
Expanding on ‘relational perspectives,’ Sen emphasises that, ‘in a generally opulent country, more 
income is needed to buy enough commodities to achieve the same social functioning’ (1999:89). He 
therefore encourages public policy to consider the relationship between ‘income-earning ability’ 
and ‘income-using ability’ (1999:119) and argues that, ‘the right approach would have to be 
sensitive to the circumstances involved – both the nature of the public services to be offered and the 
characteristics of the society to which they are to be offered. The latter must include the hold of 
behavioural values of different kinds, which influence individual choices and incentives’ 
(1999:127). As ‘agents,’ Sen’s development subjects should be targeted within the public policy 
process, and are to be considered as ‘active’ in the sense that their individual choices and activities 
could challenge what public policy sets out to achieve (1999:137).  
The next section will identify the role Sen attributes to economic growth and its redistribution as the 
second condition that he incorporates into his deepening of the approach, in order to identify the 
ultimate embedding of the CA and Development as Freedom within the liberal political economy.  
Condition 2: Sen’s Role for the Liberal Political Economy: Economic Growth & 
Redistribution 
The fact that instrumental freedoms are to be supported through social and political institutions and 
the notion of government responsibility means that there is a fundamental role for redistribution 
within Sen’s work. Consistent with his commitment to providing the CA as a critique of 
economism, for Sen, economic growth cannot be treated as an end in itself, and an adequate 
conception of development must go beyond the idea of the accumulation of wealth, the growth of 
GNP and income-related variables (1999:14). Instead of accepting economic growth as the 
dominant neoliberal indicator of development and this as the ends of the development process, Sen 
stresses that income and GDP are important as a means to expanding freedoms (1999:3). As a 
component of the liberal political economy, income is therefore ‘instrumentally significant’ in terms 
of being useful for the things it allows individuals to do, or the substantive freedoms it allows them 
to achieve (1999:14). As an instrumental factor to development, Sen stresses that an increase in 
GNP or individual income can be important as a means to expanding freedoms (1999:3). He argues 
that, ‘without ignoring the importance of economic growth, we must look well beyond it’ 
(1999:14), and perceives wealth as useful in terms of the things it allows individuals to do, or the 
substantive freedoms it allows them to achieve (1999:14). It is therefore not enough for the basic 
objective of development to be an increase in wealth, as Sen demonstrates through the CA and the 
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notion of Development as Freedom. There are other influences on capability deprivation other than 
low income such as social and economic arrangements (1999:87).27 The approach therefore 
concentrates on deprivations that are ‘intrinsically important,’ unlike low income, which is only 
‘instrumentally significant’ (1999:87).28 
 
Sen illustrates the instrumental significance of economic redistribution for development through 
examples that demonstrate the relationship between GNP and life expectancy. This asserts the 
importance of economic redistribution for securing social arrangements and ensuring freedom. He 
explains that Brazil has a high level of income and a low level of life expectancy compared to 
China, which has a low level of income and a high level of life expectancy. An income centered 
view to explain this is therefore inadequate. Instead, variations in life expectancy relate to social 
opportunities such as access to healthcare and educational facilities within each country (1999:46). 
Life expectancy is not improved by the growth of GNP per head, but the connection lies in public 
expenditure on healthcare and through poverty removal (1999:44). Sen argues, ‘the basic point is 
that the impact of economic growth depends much on how the fruits of economic growth are used’ 
(1999:44). In Brazil, India and Pakistan, the creation of social opportunities due to a history of 
severe inequality, unemployment and neglect of public healthcare has been slower, acting as a 
barrier to economic development. In contrast, in East Asia and South East Asia, an expansion of 
social opportunities has facilitated high employment and economic development, leading to a 
reduction of mortality rates and a higher life expectancy (1999:45).  
In addition, the substantive freedoms that the redistribution of economic growth generates through 
securing instrumental freedoms are, according to Sen, among the ‘constituent components’ of 
development and are effective in contributing to economic progress (1999:5). That is, these 
freedoms, such as the ability to be educated and be free from disease, if enjoyed, will lead to 
subjects functioning so as to facilitate economic growth. The role of the liberal market economy is 
therefore still significant for Sen, who perceives economic growth as following on from enabling 
freedoms. He argues,  
it is hard to think that any process of substantial development can do without very 
extensive use of markets, but that does not preclude the role of social support, public 
                                                
27 This is cogent with Sen’s critique of utilitarian and Rawlsian approaches to welfare, which informs his critique of 
economism in a development context. Instead, through the CA, Sen chooses to focus on what resources (can) do for 
people. 
28 This is not to say that Sen’s perception of poverty denies the view that a lack of income can be a cause of capability 
deprivation (1999:87). He does conceptualise this in relation to freedom in describing economic poverty (being unable 
to acquire the relevant commodities/primary goods in order to convert these into capability) as resulting in a lack of 
freedom to satisfy hunger or the need for shelter (1999:4). 
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regulation or statecraft when they can enrich – rather than impoverish – human lives. 
The approach used here provides a broader and more inclusive perspective on markets 
than is frequently invoked in either defending or chastising the market mechanism 
(1999:9).  
Sen considers the CA in the context of development with this instrumental role of economic growth 
in mind. This is part of the ‘support-led process’ that, ‘works through a program of skilful social 
support of healthcare, education and other relevant social arrangements’ by government (1999:46) 
and is exemplified in countries where mortality rates have decreased with an enhancement of living 
conditions (instrumental freedoms) without much economic growth (1999:46). This ‘support-led 
process’ is in contrast to a ‘growth-mediated’ process, which is dependent on economic progress, 
fast economic growth and the utilisation of economic prosperity to expand social opportunity such 
as healthcare and education (1999:46).  
Having justified his incorporation of an instrumental role for economic redistribution within his 
approach as a means to expanding freedoms, Sen evaluates whether the market mechanism 
facilitates individual freedoms. In doing so, he makes the important distinction between two 
different types of freedom: the ‘opportunity-aspect’ of freedom and the ‘process aspect’ of freedom 
and argues that both need to be considered for a valid assessment of freedom (Sen 1993b:522). The 
opportunity-aspect of freedom refers to the real opportunities an individual has to achieve things 
that they can do and value. In order words, this refers to the actual capability one has in order to 
achieve objectives and the things one has reason to value (1993b:522). This aspect of freedom is 
central to social evaluation (1993b:527).  
The process-aspect of freedom refers to the procedure of free decision-making and concerns 
autonomous choice and individual liberty in two ways. Firstly, it accounts for the decisional 
autonomy of the choices to be made – being free to do a particular thing (even if one is unlikely to 
use that freedom) (1993b:523). Secondly, it accounts for the immunity from interference by others 
(a negative freedom) (1993b:524). Sen argues that the market mechanism does well in terms of 
process-aspect freedom (1993b:527) by protecting the ‘autonomy of decisions’ and ‘immunity from 
encroachment.’ He states, ‘in a competitive market, the levers of decision and control are in the 
hands of the respective individuals, and in the absence of particular types of “externalities” (dealing 
with the control of decisions), they are left free to operate as they choose. Thus, decisional 
autonomy as well as encroachment immunity is constitutive of the competitive market mechanism 
without externalities’ (1993b:527). He infers that, rather than an evaluation of freedom focusing on 
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process-aspect freedom, specific concentration should be on the market’s performance in terms of 
opportunity freedom (1993b:527). 
As established, for Sen the primary goal of human development is the expansion of freedoms with a 
view to reducing capability deprivation. Economic growth therefore emerges as a secondary goal 
within this process, which eventually supports the facilitation of instrumental freedoms through 
investment in social opportunities. This redistribution of economic growth in the form of social 
opportunities (instrumental freedoms) as a ‘support led’ process, contributes to the conditions 
within which Sen’s CA is to be realised. It is therefore reasonable to argue that Sen’s CA and 
Development as Freedom are ultimately embedded within the liberal political economy. This is to 
say that Sen emphasises the importance of the individual development subject having ‘free and 
sustainable agency’ to choose a life they have reason to value, however their choice is embedded 
within a liberal political economy (with provisions for welfare). An emphasis on individual decision 
making, the state retaining a role in providing public goods and services, and providing welfare for 
the severely deprived is characteristic of this economy.29 The market is for Sen, a means through 
which income can be redistributed in such a way as to contribute to the expansion of human 
freedoms. Although his primary development goal is the expansion of human freedoms, Sen still 
retains this role for the liberal market economy within his framework. 
The next condition of Sen’s approach to be explained is his commitment to public participation and 
political freedoms.  
Condition 3: Sen’s Commitment to Democratic Participation: Public Policy & Political 
Freedoms 
It has been established that Sen insists on government securing adequate social opportunities for the 
enhancement of individual capability and that state actions are integral to influencing individual 
freedoms in this way (Sen 1999:41). However, the provisioning of these social arrangements (such 
as basic healthcare and education) is a supporting role. According to Sen, public participation is 
also crucial for the formation and use of human capabilities, and therefore sits alongside public 
policy in determining freedom. The adequate provision of social opportunities must be influenced 
by substantive public support, so there is a need to pay attention to both these determinants of 
individual freedom. (1999:41-42). Sen states that institutional arrangements must be influenced by 
individuals exercising freedoms through, ‘the liberty to participate in social choice and in the 
                                                
29 A neoliberal approach would not include such provisions for welfare.  
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making of public decisions that impel the progress of these opportunities’ (1999:5). This is 
concomitant with him arguing for the importance of social choice and democracy in evaluating 
quality of life, so as to generate acceptable judgments (Sen 1999:76-81 cited in Qizilbash 2012:6)30 
and presenting the CA as a social democratic model. As previously mentioned, a two-way 
relationship therefore exists where the capabilities of a person can be enhanced by public policy and 
public policy can be enhanced by the political and social participatory capabilities of individuals 
(Sen 1999:18). In line with the first condition within which Sen’s approach is to be realised (the 
development subject to be conceptualised as an autonomous agent) public policy is to secure 
political freedom, so that the individual emerges as an agent with the capability to politically 
participate – an expression of the expansion of capabilities of persons to lead the lives they have 
reason to value. Through this democratic deliberation, the expansion of freedoms human beings 
have reason to value according to Sen, ‘makes our lives richer and more unfettered, but also allows 
us to be fuller social persons, exercising our own volitions and interacting with – and influencing – 
the world in which we live’ (1999:14-15). 
Here, we see Sen theoretically asserting that agency freedom, when realised in this way is a 
constitutive part of development that also contributes to strengthening free agencies of other kinds 
(1999:4). In a cross-cultural context, the social democratic conditions within which Sen’s CA is to 
be realised and agency freedom secured become even more important for securing non-liberal 
capabilities and alternative functionings in the face of the CA’s liberal prescriptions. The 
democratic participation that is able to be achieved through government securing political freedoms 
is according to Sen, of upmost importance in ensuring that culture is both a means and ends of 
development, in order for development subjects to lead the life they have reason to value. This is 
explained in the next section as a ‘thickening’ of Sen’s commitment to a social democratic model of 
development, and exemplary of his commitment to pluralism. These commitments are substantiated 
by his refusal to endorse a specific list of capabilities or functionings. 
Sen’s Thickening of Democratic Participation: Culture as a Means and Ends to Development  
Sen has described the CA as ‘inescapably pluralist’ (1999:76) and upon the cross-cultural 
application of the approach for the evaluation of well-being, this becomes important. The CA is a 
particular, liberal (perfectionist) framework of thought with which to evaluate and strategically 
develop societies with contrasting value systems, social structures and thought. Tensions 
concerning alternative value systems are broadly addressed by Sen in his work on ‘culture’ within 
                                                
30 In particular, this is a response to the capability approach receiving criticism for not being complete due to an absence 
of a list of specific functionings or capabilities, which allows more room for disagreement (Qizilbash 2012:6-7) and will 
be discussed later. 
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the context of development, which entails him trying to incorporate an understanding of social 
structures. Although he does not define his use of the term ‘culture’ in this context, it can be 
understood as encompassing what he terms ‘traditional’ ways of living – specific societal ways of 
life that have been historically constructed.31 Despite controversy and debate concerning the 
meaning of ‘culture’ in general (particularly in anthropology, see for example, Rapport & Overing 
2000:93), Sen’s use of the term implies his understanding as referring to societal groups that 
embody alternative social structures and value systems from which the CA is a product. Therefore, 
‘culture’ is best understood in Sen’s work to incorporate a diversity of ways in which human beings 
establish and live social lives in groups (a typical twentieth century understanding (2000:92)). 
Sen (2004a) states that regardless of culture, within the context of development the ultimate test is, 
‘the freedom of citizens to exercise free agency and choose in an informal and participatory way’ 
(2004a:56). If this view has priority, Sen argues that cultural concerns are inevitably integrated into 
this way of thinking (2004a:56). Participatory freedom becomes significant in the context of 
development when, as Sen argues, a choice will inevitably arise as to whether some parts of 
‘tradition’ can be maintained along with economic and social changes that are needed in order for 
development to occur. He acknowledges that development may lead to the elimination of cultural 
traditions and heritage, but argues that, ‘objections of this kind are often quickly dismissed on the 
ground that it is better to be rich and happy than to be impoverished and traditional’ (Sen 1999:31). 
Labeling these objections as inadequate (1999:31), he asserts that there lies conflict between, ‘the 
basic value that the people must be allowed to decide freely what traditions they wish or not wish to 
follow’ and ‘the insistence that established traditions be followed (no matter what), or, alternatively, 
people must obey the decisions by religious or secular authorities who enforce traditions - real or 
imagined’ (1999:32). For Sen, this choice is to be resolved through democratic deliberation. He 
argues,  
if a traditional way of life is to be sacrificed to escape grinding poverty or minuscule 
longevity (as many traditional societies have had for thousands of years), then it is the 
people directly involved who must have the opportunity to participate in deciding what 
should be chosen … the pointer to any real conflict between the preservation of tradition 
and the advantages of modernity calls for a participatory resolution, not for a unilateral 
rejection of modernity in favour of tradition by political ruler, or religious authorities, or 
anthropological admirers of the legacy of the past. The question is not only closed, it 
                                                
31 Although Sen’s understanding and use of the term ‘traditional’ in this sense could itself be critiqued as embodying 
social evolutionary thought linked to western imperialism – a discredited understanding of ‘culture.’ This will be 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
56 
 
must be wide open for people in the society to address and join in deciding (1999:31-
32). 
With a view to overcoming conflict between the necessary changes needed for development to 
occur and which cultural ‘traditions’ to maintain, Sen and Nussbaum (1989) suggest that, 
Scientific and technological change can modify and even undermine tradition. But it is 
difficult not to feel that some of these changes are beneficial to the societies that 
undergo them. In fact, the very concept of “development,” as it is most often used in the 
discourse that surrounds it, has an evaluative dimension. A change that is not thought to 
be in some way beneficial would not usually be described as a part of “development.” 
But in order to know which changes count as development, that is, as beneficial 
alterations, we need to have not only a description of the practices and values of a 
culture, but also some sort of evaluation of those practices and values: which ones are in 
fact that most valuable? Which are central – the ones that it would be especially unwise 
to undermine? Which accepted values and practices, on the other hand, might well be 
modified, and on what grounds? (1989:14).   
Both Sen and Nussbaum argue that through involvement of the societies themselves, a rich, broad 
and deep description of their culture should be ascertained that is not limited to economic values 
(1989:14). They argue that then, cultural values become an essential point of reference for internal 
criticism and rational assessment of cultural values within development (1989:1). However, the real 
issue for Sen is one of authority and legitimacy (1999:31). He argues that ‘tradition’ does not 
provide grounds for the repression of basic freedoms, and he states that, ‘the liberty of all 
individuals to participate in deciding what traditions to observe cannot be ruled out by national or 
local “guardians,” religious authorities, political rulers, government dictators, or domestic or foreign 
“cultural experts”’ (1999:32). Participation requires knowledge and basic educational skills and 
denying these negates the basic conditions of participatory freedom itself (1999: 32-33). If 
participatory freedoms are overlooked on the grounds of ‘tradition,’ legitimacy is also overlooked, 
as well as the need for people affected to participate in deciding ‘what they want and have reason to 
accept’ (1999:32). According to Sen,  
“tradition” does not give anyone an adequate ground for practicing authoritarianism 
through censorship or political restriction, since the legitimacy of adhering today to the 
views enunciated in the sixth century B.C. has to be decided by those today. Once the 
basic importance of human freedom is accepted, this will have strong implications for 
what can and cannot be done in the name of “tradition” (1999:32). 
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Having identified cultural freedoms as an integral part of the assessment of development, for Sen it 
is therefore not a matter of whether culture matters, but how culture matters, which entails a 
consideration of the different ways in which culture influences development (Sen 2004a:37-38). He 
states, ‘cultural matters are integral parts of the lives we lead. If development can be seen as 
enhancement of our living standards, then efforts geared to development can hardly ignore the 
world of culture’ (Sen 2001:1). Culture should therefore be taken into account as both the ends and 
the means of development (2001:2). As an ends of development, cultural freedoms will be secured 
by enabling individual capability to decide what ‘traditions’ and values they wish to or do not wish 
to follow. Culture as a means of development however, requires closer scrutiny. Sen argues, ‘it is 
important to investigate the different ways – and they can be very diverse – in which culture should 
be taken into account in examining the challenges of development, and in assessing the demands of 
sound economic strategies’ (Sen 2004a:37). In doing so, Sen warns that formulating simplistic 
views of the impact of culture on the process of development is inadequate, and states,  
there seem to be many supporters of the belief – held explicitly or by implication – that 
the fates of countries are effectively sealed by the nature of their respective cultures. 
This would be not only a heroic oversimplification, but it would also entail some 
assignment of hopelessness to countries that are seen as having the “wrong” kind of 
culture. This is not just politically and ethically repulsive, but … also epistemic 
nonsense (2004a:38).  
As a means of development then, Sen perceives culture as a constitutive part, informing lives, 
desires, frustrations, ambitions and the freedoms that individuals seek (2004a:39). He states, ‘the 
freedom and opportunity for cultural activities are among the basic freedoms, the enhancement of 
which can be seen as constitutive of development’ (2004a:39). Cultural concerns are therefore seen 
as having a strong influence on human behaviour, and in turn affecting individual choices and social 
and political behaviour (Sen 2001:2). Sen argues, ‘our cultural identity is only one of many aspects 
of our self-realisation and is only one influence among a great many that can inspire and influence 
what we do and how we do it … ’ (Sen 2004a:43). He recognises that within a context of 
development, these cultural factors influence economic behaviour, making a difference to work 
ethics, responsible conduct, spirited motivation, dynamic management, entrepreneurial initiatives 
and willingness to take risks among other behaviours that contribute to economic success 
(2004a:40). He argues that if the implicit norms that contribute to the successful operation of an 
exchange economy have to be cultivated, or introduced to a society over time, this will be a barrier 
to economic success, and that the underdevelopment of basic virtues of commerce and business has, 
according to Sen, contributed to problems faced in pre-capitalist societies (2004a:40). However, he 
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also recognises that economic behaviour depends not only on values and predispositions but also on 
the presence or absence of relevant institutions and on the moral or prudential incentives that they 
generate (2004a:43). Although not addressing this issue explicitly, by implication, Sen perceives 
some cultural factors as something to be overcome in favour of progressive economic behaviour 
and economic success that are inherent to development. This can be attributed to the role of the 
liberal political economy within his approach, and his commitment to a liberal framework more 
broadly.32 
With regards to norms and values, for Sen, culture is also a means to development in the sense that 
participation in political activities and civil interactions is influenced by cultural conditions. This is 
crucial to the process of democratic deliberation and securing political freedoms that are key to 
development progress (2004a:40). Culture will therefore affect value formation and in turn valued 
capabilities, individual choice and relevant instrumental freedoms. Sen recognises that culture is 
central to the formation of values which will impact on the identification of ends, possible means 
and the use of acceptable instruments to achieve these ends (2004a:42-43). In recognising this as a 
democratic and interactive process, he again emphasises the importance of political participation in 
the form of talking and listening through public discussion, with values being influenced by free 
discussion and public debate without barriers or social suppression (2004a:43). Sen also recognises 
that culture can influence social solidarity, association and mutual support within a society or 
community. This contributes to the ‘success of social living’ and whether barriers or the social 
suppression of political participation are absent within a society or community (2004a:41). In turn, 
this is dependent on what people may spontaneously do for one another, which will in turn 
influence how a society works. Sen argues that similar community-centered thinking is essential to 
intra-community relations as a form of ‘social capital’ for development progress (2004a:41). 
For Sen, a consideration of culture within like-minded communities must however entail the 
acknowledgement that culture is not homogenous, with great variations potentially existing within 
the same cultural milieu. Culture is also non static and susceptible to large variations and 
‘evolution’ over time, with cultures interacting with one another that cannot be seen as ‘insulated 
structures’ (2004a:43-44). Assuming culture as something independent, unchanging and 
unchangeable is therefore problematic. Identifying culture as non-homogenous, non-static and 
interactive means that for Sen, it can play a constructive part in understanding human behaviour and 
in social and economic development (2004a:44). He states, 
                                                
32 This is established further in Chapter Two. 
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what is needed is not the privileging of culture as something that works on its own, but 
the integration of culture in a wider picture, in which culture, seen in a dynamic and 
interactive way, is one important influence among many others. Attempts of integration 
have to pay particular attention to heterogeneity of each broadly defined culture, the 
interdependence between different cultures and the vibrant name of cultural evolutions 
(2004a:55). 
According to Sen, a consideration of culture within the context of development can therefore lead to 
the recognition of the importance of securing cultural freedoms that exist as both an end and means 
to development. Cultural freedoms are theoretically secured by the approach both as a means to 
development via existing norms and values and an end to development via their presence as an 
indicator of successful development. Culture emerges as a freedom inextricably linked to 
participatory freedoms, an absolute requirement of public participation and democratic deliberation 
for the selection of important and relevant capabilities that should be open to change and individual 
consideration. Choice and participatory freedoms are therefore integral to this process and to the 
cross-cultural application of the CA in the context of development. 
Theoretically, Sen enables these cultural freedoms to be secured by not specifying capabilities or 
functionings and leaving valuable capabilities and/or functionings for societies and communities to 
decide, through a medium of individual choice and participation. In an effort for these societies to 
decide between ‘tradition’ and social and economic development themselves through democratic 
deliberation and political participation, refusing to endorse a specific list of capabilities and or 
functionings, according to Sen’s thinking, should successfully enable individuals to live the life 
they have reason to value. His commitment to pluralism is further substantiated by this refusal. 
However, it is worth nothing that both Sen and Nussbaum (1989) recognise that there exists a risk 
of ‘traditional’ values being undermined as a result of the process of change associated with 
development (1989:2). They argue that, ‘it could be the case that the objects of valuation that a 
particular traditional value system treasures – such as a particular lifestyle – may become more 
difficult to obtain and sustain as a result of material change. The other way that the values may be 
“undermined” is a weakening of the hold of those values themselves on the subjects’ (1989:2). 
Conclusion: Sen’s Ideal-typical Development Framework  
This chapter has reconstructed Sen’s core theoretical framework of the CA, firstly according to the 
‘thin view:’ as a framework for the evaluation of well-being and as a critique of dominant and 
economically focused approaches to welfare. This was followed by an explanation of Sen’s 
deepening of the CA – how the appraoch is to be realised in terms of Development as Freedom. 
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Three fundamental conditions of how capability is to be realised as freedom in the context of human 
development according to Sen were presented. These were that firstly, the subject of development is 
to be conceptualised so as to leave sufficient room to consider variable individual needs and 
inclinations in the process of selecting and utilising capability bundles. Secondly, the expansion of 
the liberal political economy in the form of economic growth is to be a secondary goal in the 
development process, only instrumental to the realisation of Development as Freedom. Thirdly, 
democratic participation is to inform public policy for securing political and cultural freedoms. 
These conditions are underpinned by Sen’s presentation of the CA as a social democratic model and 
as a universal framework. Despite Sen being criticised for not specifying policy recommendations 
for the operationalisation of the approach (Chiappero-Martineti and Roche 2009; Jensen, Clary and 
Dolfsma 2010; Shanmugaratnam 2001),33 from this reconstruction, an ideal-typical development 
framework of Sen’s approach can be established. This is presented next as a consideration of the 
conditions of its operationalisation. 
According to my interpretation of Sens' core principles I suggest that the ideal-type I proposed 
would be cogent to his framework in the context of implementation. Given that for Sen, 
development policy must respond to poverty in terms of capability deprivation and to ensure the 
expansion of freedoms, he asserts a particular role for government. This role would see basic 
capabilities secured through the state providing adequate ‘social opportunities’ according to Sen’s 
conception of instrumental freedoms, including free education, healthcare and employment 
opportunities. Along the lines of ‘economic facilities’ and ‘protective security,’ welfare payments 
would be given to the severely deprived to secure additional basic capabilities such as access to 
adequate shelter, clothing and basic nutrition. The state would have to guarantee a means of public 
participation for the selection of additional, valued capabilities and for members of society to 
inform public policy according to Sen’s conception of ‘political freedom’ and ‘transparency 
guarantees.’ In addition, Sen is clear that, ‘modernity is not to be rejected in favour of tradition’ 
(Sen 1999:32), and that democratic decisions are to be made on what aspects of ‘traditional’ life are 
to be maintained alongside the prescriptions of the CA (1999:32). Central to my interpretation of 
Sen’s ideal-type is his conception of agency freedom. For Sen, the achievement of this freedom is 
integral to the development process. This is evident through him insisting on a role for democratic 
deliberation within his approach, refusing to endorse a list of capabilities and/or functionings and 
focusing on capabilities (what people are able to do or be) rather than functionings.  
From this ideal-type, Sen can be credited for providing a framework that goes beyond mainstream 
economic approaches to development. He provides an alternative means to and ends of 
                                                
33 This will be further explained in the next chapter. 
61 
 
development by prioritising human freedoms over economic growth. His focus is on the extent to 
which the development subject has the potential to live a life of their choosing. Sen presents his 
approach as a universal framework, and makes fair provision for this in refusing to specify a list of 
fundamental capabilities and insisting on democratic deliberation for the selection of capabilities. 
However, with closer investigation, it becomes apparent that the agency freedom that is central to 
Sen’s approach has the potential to be compromised upon its cross-cultural application (even when 
working with a generous reading of his ideal-type). Specifically, despite Sen’s provisions for the 
CA’s universal application and economic growth posited as a secondary development goal, his 
preference is by implication, for some aspects of ‘tradition’ to be rejected in favour of economic 
progress and development in terms of modernity. The social and economic development that Sen 
proposes being given preference in this way, is despite him arguing that ‘culture’ should be 
considered as an ends and means of development. This preference is implicit, as is Sen’s overall 
commitment to a (perfectionist) liberal framework.  
Therefore, this framework also suggests that although there are sufficient provisions that allow for 
some deliberation regarding the role of ‘tradition’ within Sen’s approach, Sen implies that this 
deliberation is to occur within a liberal framework and within the constraints of a liberal political 
economy, whilst agency freedom is maintained. Despite Sen’s best intentions, his framework may 
be incompatible with alternative conceptions of well-being outside of a liberal framework.34 This 
has the potential to limit agency freedom according to Sen’s theorisation; preventing development 
subjects from choosing the life they have reason to value autonomously. For example, firstly, the 
functioning implicitly valued by the CA may be that which is conducive to facilitating the liberal 
political economy: education, healthcare and other instrumental freedoms that Sen suggests may be 
mutually supportive to produce a functioning, employable development subject. This has the 
potential to be incompatible with subsistence economies and alternative conceptions of labour and 
exchange.35 It may also assume a development subject who wants to realise capability and freedom 
according to Sen’s approach. Secondly, as a condition within which Development as Freedom is to 
be realised, the global liberal political economy may substantively limit individual choice to the 
realm of choice afforded within this economy. It may become a source of unfreedom in the sense 
that the preferences available to development subjects are those goods, services and practices that 
                                                
34 For example in the case of Indigenous communities and subsistence economies (see Altman 2010). This may be 
exceptional but still poses a challenge. Some Indigenous communities may be part of a liberal framework or a 
combination of a liberal framework and particular cosmologies (see Povinelli 1995). 
35 What constitutes appropriate and valuable education and healthcare according to these instrumental freedoms also 
needs to be culturally relevant, and how culturally relevant capabilities and/or functionings are to be selected within a 
culturally diverse society with multiple social values would also be challenging. The importance of the inclusion of 
Aboriginal conceptions of well-being is emphasised by Povinelli (1995), discussed later. 
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are indicative of liberal preferences, rather than those independent of this influence and based on 
autonomous preferences.  
This reasoning will be further explained and problematised in Chapter Two, where I will identify 
and establish this argument as a fundamental tension within Sen’s work. Ultimately, I will suggest 
that the CA has the potential to be substantively more restrictive of choice than it theoretically 
allows for, especially when conceived as a universal approach. In relation to this tension and from 
further theoretical analysis, I will also establish that there are possible theoretical ‘spaces’ within 
Sen’s approach that allow for it to be open to alteration. I argue that both these spaces and the 
tension I identify exist because Sen insufficiently appreciates the substantive social and political 
relations within which his CA and Development as Freedom are to be realised more broadly 
(particularly within a cross-cultural context). Here, I am referring to the particular social and 
political relations that exist as part of the lived experience of the development process (and 
ultimately, the liberal political economy). For example, although Sen does recognise some 
limitations of the liberal political economy (demonstrated by him including welfare provisions for 
the severely deprived within his approach), he does not theoretically amend the CA or Development 
as Freedom to fully account for contemporary social and political contexts that (for example) 
include the rise of neoliberalism globally, together with a broad move away from welfare provision. 
It is in this sense that his approach is invested in problematic abstractions, rather than focused on a 
sufficient engagement with substantive issues and trends that affect inequality and well-being.  The 
next chapter will engage with critical debates on the CA most relevant to this thesis in order to 
substantiate these concerns. 
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Chapter Two 
Sen’s Capability Approach: A Critical Examination of Debates 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses and evaluates critical engagements with Sen’s CA, drawing on debates that 
are most relevant to this thesis.36 The chapter will identify and assesses the implications of these 
critical discussions for Sen’s approach. Having examined the critical debates and where relevant, 
considered Sen’s responses, this chapter will determine whether the three fundamental conditions I 
identified in Chapter One37 still prevail for an operationalisation of the CA framework according to 
my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type. This chapter will also identify limitations of Sen’s approach, 
as well as where Sen leaves room for its alteration. The extent to which Sen’s framework can be 
altered and with what implications will also be determined. The latter is important for rendering a 
political analysis of the substantive social and political relations within which Sen’s CA and 
Development as Freedom are to be realised. It is also relevant for a consideration of whether 
Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen can be attributed to the theoretical shortcomings 
of the CA. This chapter argues that Sen’s approach is limited in its political analysis and 
understanding of the substantive social and political relations through which development is 
realised.38 In particular, this has important implications for its cross-cultural application that may be 
significant for the examination of the use of the CA in Indigenous Australia. 
The chapter begins with an examination of some specific debates on the CA and then moves on to 
broader critical discussions of the approach. The first part of this chapter begins with critiques that 
engage with the issue of weighting capabilities and functionings and Sen’s ultimate focus on 
capabilities rather than functionings. The chapter then identifies and engages with critical debates 
that focus on some broader aspects of the approach. These include Sen’s insufficient engagement 
with substantive political realities and Sen’s privileging of a liberal individual (conceptually and 
methodologically) in his approach. Literature that critiques Sen for his individualistic focus and 
additional literature that brings to light the substantive social context within which development 
subjects actually function problematises Sen’s conception of the development subject as 
                                                
36 These debates consider the substantive and political experience of Sen’s CA. Therefore, I deliberately avoid engaging 
with debates that concern elements of its theoretical specification such as the selection or weighting of capabilities.  
37 Firstly, the development subject is to be conceptualised inclusive of a consideration of individual variation in the 
utilisation of capability bundles. Secondly, the expansion of the liberal political economy in the form of economic 
growth is to be a secondary goal in the development process. Thirdly, democratic participation is to inform public 
policy for securing political and cultural freedoms. 
38 This is despite Sen’s more recent work on India that contextualises his approach (see Sen 2005, The Argumentative 
Indian). Despite this more recent work, the fundamental prescriptions of the CA and Development as Freedom remain 
unchanged and a reference point for Pearson writing in the early 2000s.	
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autonomous in line with the premises of methodological individualism. I argue that Sen’s 
methodological focus on the individual is cogent with a liberal approach more broadly. I therefore 
argue that Sen’s approach is limited in its appreciation of the (social) processes through which 
agency freedom is experienced and achieved. For example, as Evans (2002) argues, Sen misses a 
full appreciation of the social conditions through which preferences for capabilities are formed, 
capabilities selected and functioning achieved. The approach therefore insufficiently accounts for 
modes of collective political action39 for securing well-being. As will be established in this chapter, 
this is significant for marginalised groups being able to democratically select and achieve culturally 
valued capabilities through Sen’s approach, in order to ‘live a life they have reason to value.’ 
I argue further that this insufficient provision for collective action is the means through which 
culturally valued capabilities have a greater chance of not being selected democratically. I therefore 
engage with literature that further substantiates the argument that Sen insufficiently appreciates 
substantive social and political relations. These critical arguments are in regard to Sen’s implied 
commitment to a liberal political economy framework, even though economic growth is a 
secondary development goal of his approach. Following these critiques, I argue that as a feature 
within which subjects of the CA are embedded; the liberal political economy has the potential to 
constrain individual choice by placing value and individual benefit on processes and choices that 
benefit economic progress. I identify this as a fundamental tension within Sen’s work and consider 
the potential cross-cultural implications of Sen’s role for the economy, broadly using literature 
relevant to Indigenous Australian socio-economics. 
In this context, Sen’s individualistic focus would potentially mean that an operationalisation of his 
approach entails a limited conception of the development subject. This would mean that significant 
socio-historical conditions such as colonialism, the legacies of which are crucial to understanding 
and evaluating well-being, may be overlooked. Further, the importance of community and kinship 
relations that characterise these communities (Glaskin 2012:297) may also be overlooked in terms 
of their significance for the achievement of agency freedom in order for people to live the lives they 
have reason to value. The absence of an incorporation of all possible political modes of action, 
specifically collective action for securing well-being, means that capabilities corresponding to 
Aboriginal culture may be compromised in favour of those that instead encourage capabilities 
conducive to facilitating and maintaining the liberal political economy. I argue that this therefore 
has the potential to restrict the agency freedom of Indigenous development subjects to choose the 
life they have reason to value in two ways: by limiting the selection of capabilities relevant for 
                                                
39 I make the distinction between collective political action and public action in this section, explaining that collective 
action accounts for marginalised groups that are less privileged in attaining development in terms of freedom (Evans 
2002:56). 
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valuable cultural practices and secondly by predominantly offering goods, products and services40 
afforded by the global political economy.  
Indigenous development subjects who do not necessarily privilege a liberal political economy 
through which to realise freedom (who may function within a pre-existing subsistence economy) 
are according to this account, not viewed as potentially formulating their own development 
responses. Further potential restrictions are entailed in the fact that the approach does not 
adequately consider modes of collective political action, whether in the form of acts of resistance or 
collective action more generally. This is important for providing a means for development subjects 
to voice their own development preferences, especially given the rise of neoliberal principles within 
Australian Indigenous policy more broadly.41 
Penultimately, this chapter presents literature that critically engages with Sen’s conception of 
freedom. Through this literature I demonstrate that Sen’s conception of ‘freedom’ can be interpreted 
and applied in ways that are limited to the freedom afforded by a liberal political economy. This has 
the potential to restrict the independent autonomy and agency freedom of development subjects. In 
spite of these criticisms, this chapter also acknowledges that Sen’s provision of welfare is the means 
through which he attempts to correct inequality generated through the liberal political economy. 
However, Sen assumes that the CA facilitates the expansion of human freedoms, and that this 
expansion is development. By overlooking whether ‘real’ opportunities are present to apply and 
achieve one’s capabilities and thus realise ‘freedom’ (as Sen conceives it), critics argue that the 
approach is premised upon idealised abstractions. Specifically, Sen’s conception of freedom is 
therefore problematic insofar as it is ‘over-extended and elaborate’ (Gasper & Staveren 2003:156-
157). 
Finally I argue that despite these criticisms and debates, the fundamental conditions that ought to 
prevail for an operationalisation of the CA framework according to my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-
type are threefold, as noted in the previous chapter.42 While these conditions ought to prevail at a 
general level, there is a fundamental tension through, and specific contexts within which Sen leaves 
open some theoretical spaces for the approach to be altered. I elaborate on these. Firstly, Sen’s 
approach entails limited flexibility regarding his role for the liberal political economy – it can be 
interpreted that this role is non-negotiable and is indicative of Sen’s implicit commitment to a 
liberal approach that assumes freedom and participation will ensure equality, but is essentially still 
based on a commitment to modernisation and economic progress. Secondly, Sen’s approach, as 
                                                
40 I acknowledge that Sen would argue that his approach is not just about securing goods and services. 
41 See Altman (2010).  
42 These are firstly, a role for democratic deliberation and the protection of agency freedom, secondly, a role for the 
liberal political economy and thirdly the provision of welfare for the severely deprived. 
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noted above and as his critics argue, does not provide the conceptual means necessary for 
incorporating all modes of relevant (and specifically collective) action, which may be necessary for 
the achievement of agency freedom and for securing culturally valued capabilities (although he 
does not intend that his approach be restrictive in this way). 
Although Sen places emphasis on economic growth as a secondary development goal, his 
commitment to democratic participation and the deliberation of capabilities must occur within the 
parameters of a pre-established acceptance of a (perfectionist) liberal framework. However, it is 
plausible to assume that Sen would not endorse undemocratic means of rule, therefore his implied 
commitment to modernisation and a liberal political economy could potentially co-exist with ‘other’ 
cultural practices and values as long as they still facilitate the achievement of agency freedom as he 
conceives of it. Reflection is required on whether cultural practices inhibit agency freedom and the 
achievement of capabilities. Practices could not inhibit development as the expansion of capabilities 
according to his approach. 
The Weighting of Capabilities and Functionings: Sen’s Emphasis on Capabilities  
Similarly to the selection of relevant capabilities, according to Sen the weighting of capabilities and 
functionings (in a qualitative sense) requires individual collective and democratic processes and 
practical reason. However, in the absence of a specified list, he does acknowledge that there may be 
disagreement on the weighting of functionings; which weights are chosen and on the actual weights 
used in evaluation, while there can nonetheless be, ‘reasoned agreement on the general nature of 
value-objects’ (Sen 1993:48 cited in Qizilbash 2012:8). Qizilbash (2012) argues that different 
approaches to the weighting of capabilities and functionings have been used for measuring well-
being.43 As such, he argues,  
the question is less likely to be whether one can compare or weigh functionings or 
capabilities. It is more likely that some decision has been made about comparability. 
Some decide that there is non-comparability and adopt a disaggregated approach. For 
others who are involved in an exercise involving weighting the question is more likely 
to be about what specific approach to weighting to use. In an application to the 
measurement of progress or poverty, for example, should one use equal weights? 
Weighting based on principal-component analysis? Or weights based on questionnaire 
responses? (2012:12-13). 
 
                                                
43 Robeyns (2006) looks at proposals for and actual practice in the weighting of capabilities and/or functionings 
developed in the capabilities literature (2006:357-358). 
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Qizilbash acknowledges that people may differ in the functionings they value or the weights given 
to these functionings. He argues that if people agree on a number of functionings but disagree on 
the weights to be given to these, there can be an agreement on ‘a range of judgements’ (2012:6). 
Typically, one option will dominate or rank higher if it has more of the relevant functionings 
(2012:6).44 There may be some functionings that are non-controversial such as being adequately 
nourished, and in this sense, during an evaluation of poverty, ‘one might be able to go quite far’ 
(Sen 1993:31;48-49 cited in Qizilbash 2012:6). He argues, 
 
 ‘even if there is disagreement on weights, the possibility of some agreed judgments is 
not out of reach: if there is a range of weights on which people can agree, then even if 
they disagree on the precise weights to give to specific functionings, they may agree on 
a range of judgements’ (2012:6). 
 
With Sen’s approach being oriented towards positive freedom; he places emphasis on capabilities, 
the ability to do various things more so than functionings (what things are actually done) (Gasper 
2002:25). Within the literature on capabilities, this focus on capabilities instead of functionings is 
generally presented as a theoretical shortcoming of his approach, with for example, Robeyns (2006) 
arguing that this focus means that the CA is ‘radically underspecified’ (2006:354).45 Although this 
is a reasonable criticism, Sen’s resistance to a focus on functionings is clear according to two lines 
of reasoning. Firstly, Sen would argue that by focusing on capabilities, the CA is not imposing a 
particular way of living the good life. Instead, the approach provides a range of possible ways of 
living, conducive to a universal approach. In this way, each person can have the same real 
opportunity through capability and is responsible for their own choices. In order to implement this 
principle, the approach must focus on capabilities, rather than functionings (2006:353). In this 
sense, capability is closely related to enhancing agency freedom. A focus on capability allows Sen 
to pay attention to the ability of a person to achieve the things they have reason to value, as well as 
the process through which this takes place. This process is the personal process of freedom: agency 
freedom (Deneulin 2000:37) and is central to Sen’s approach. 
Despite Sen’s reasoning, others such as Gasper (2002) argue that, ‘a theory of human development 
must attend to functionings – how people actually spend their lives. This should include how people 
are influenced by institutions, groups and cultures and how they are affected by their consumption. 
Such a consideration should also involve attention on how they rationally could live with the 
                                                
44 Sen refers to this as, ‘the dominant partial order’ (Sen 1992:46-49 cited in Qizilbash 2012:6).  
45 Although this contrasts with the critique that Sen’s conception of freedom is ‘elaborate and over-extended (Gasper 
and Staveren 2003:156-157), both arguments are convincing. 
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information, technology and products available to them’ (2002:25).46 Where Sen does attend to 
functionings through a conception of well-being, it is complex: understood as the fulfillment of 
whatever personal functionings one has reason to value. Scholars also contest that without a list of 
specified functionings in particular, the CA may be perceived to be not (yet) operational (Robeyns 
2000:21; Roemer 1996).  
In defense of Sen, Alkrie & Deneulin (2000) argue that if his focus was on expanding functionings, 
this rather negatively could be done by force: ‘coercion, domination or colonialism’ (2000:36). A 
focus on freedom instead, ‘draws attention to social development and the value of empowerment, 
responsibility and informed public action’ (2000:36). This therefore ensures that capabilities are 
decided according to democratic deliberation, in line with Sen’s commitment to a liberal approach 
and his refusal to endorse a list of capabilities (beyond basic capabilities) or functionings. However, 
Deneulin (2002) later suggests that substantive information about the lives people have reason to 
choose and value would be revealed by a focus on functionings. Subsequently, the opportunities 
that are necessary for government to provide (in order for people to be able to choose a life they 
have reason to value) would also be revealed. This is substantive information that capabilities 
cannot provide. She asks,    
If no content can be given to what people have reason to choose and value, if one 
refuses to take any position regarding the ends that are to be promoted, how can we 
know which opportunities have to be given to people in order to improve their quality of 
life? How can we give people conditions for a better human life, without knowing what 
that better life consists of? (2002:501).  
Moreover, if selecting the relevant functionings and capabilities remains unsolved, and no real 
‘content’ is given to the lives that people have reason to value, Deneulin argues, ‘we may wonder 
how Sen’s capability approach can offer a relevant framework for evaluating whether people have 
really been given the opportunities to exercise the capabilities they have reason to value’ 
(2002:501). This is cogent with Gasper’s argument that a focus on functionings would be more 
indicative of well-being achievement (2002:440). This would therefore tell us more about actual 
well-being than a focus on capability. Gasper further asserts that capabilities are only sufficient as 
‘policy principle or rule’ [emphasis added], justified by his argument that well-being freedom 
(capability) is seen as a measure of advantage rather than well-being achievement (actual 
functioning) (2002:440). He states,  
                                                
46 This is explored further later in this chapter in relation to the choices of products, goods and services afforded to 
development subjects by the liberal political economy. 
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The prioritising in Sen’s capability approach of capabilities over functionings can … be 
understood as a proposed policy principle rather than as a theory of well-being: a 
principle that we should leave people to decide for themselves about if and how to use a 
capability, whether or not their choices bring them well-being or goal fulfillment 
(2002:455-456).  
Despite Sen’s theoretical justification for his focus on capabilities instead of functionings, these 
critiques shed light on important shortcomings in his thesis, revealing in the process potentially 
crucial limits of the CA. By retaining his commitment to democratic deliberation and refusing to 
endorse a list of capabilities and to prioritise functionings over capabilities, he also intends to 
preserve his commitment to agency freedom. It is for these reasons that Sen resists prescribing 
functioning (actual living) that could result in the expansion of freedoms by force or domination. 
However, Sen’s focus on capabilities rather than functionings means that he insufficiently 
appreciates the substantive social and political relations through which development is realised. 
Arguably, a focus on capabilities instead of functionings reduces the attention paid to actual living. 
This lack of focus on actual living (such as participation in the community), would suggest that for 
some critics, Sen fails to consider whether ‘real’ opportunities would prevail for the CA to be 
realised. This conceptual approach removes from the scope of the theory any approximation of a 
more complete conception of what opportunities would have to be provided by public policy in 
order for freedoms to be achieved. It also impairs the ability for the approach to evaluate whether 
functioning has actually been achieved, once capabilities have been selected through the 
achievement of agency freedom. 
These limitations of Sen’s approach – in so far as he does not really consider whether or not 
opportunities prevail (beyond the basic welfare conditions he specifies for when they do not) – 
reveal significant potential challenges should Sen’s approach be applied in an ideal-typical fashion, 
but also in a human development context. Firstly, while Sen’s focus on capabilities instead of 
functionings is defensible, the sidelining of more comprehensive approaches to considering the 
conditions that may constrain or support the successful utilisation of capability sets is not. Instead, 
this potentially denies a means of knowing what opportunities development policy should provide 
exactly for the achievement of freedom and well-being. Secondly, without a focus on the social and 
political conditions affecting the scope for the application of capabilities, there are potentially 
limited means of evaluating whether functioning is actually achieved and subsequently, whether 
well-being is substantively improved through a development policy that is informed by Sen’s CA 
framework.  
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However, as already noted, some authors endorse the focus on capabilities rather than functionings 
because of the overriding importance they assign to the ability of the individual to achieve the 
things they have reason to value (Alkrie & Deneulin 2000:37). Others however, argue that the CA 
should focus on functionings, with capabilities only sufficient as a policy principle or rule as an 
indicator of advantage rather than well-being actually achieved (Gasper 2002:440). These 
disagreements at the very least raise concern about whether a focus on capabilities may have the 
effect of denying the means of knowing fully what opportunities development policy should 
provide; and whether this focus leaves adequate means of evaluating if actual functioning and well-
being have been achieved and improved by the CA. In sum, a reconstruction of the main issues in 
the critical literature on Sen’s work effectively substantiates the importance of functionings, and 
stresses the problems entailed in Sen’s lack of focus on real opportunities. He assumes that these 
opportunities are present and therefore that a majority of appropriate conditions prevail for the 
achievement of freedom and therefore human flourishing. Though this should not lead to a 
prioritisation of functionings over capabilities, the lesson to take away from engaging with critiques 
of Sen’s approach is that the latter does not sufficiently take into account the substantive social and 
political relations necessary for realising capability. This limits his understanding of the substantive 
social and political relations through which development is realised, more broadly.47 
Similarly to the selection of relevant capabilities, according to Sen the weighting of capabilities and 
functionings (in a qualitative sense) requires individual collective and democratic processes and 
practical reason. However, in the absence of a specified list, he does acknowledge that there may be 
disagreement on the weighting of functionings; which weights are chosen and on the actual weights 
used in evaluation, while there can nonetheless be, ‘reasoned agreement on the general nature of 
value-objects’ (Sen 1993:48 cited in Qizilbash 2012:8). 
Overall, Sen’s emphasis on opportunity freedom, process freedom and choice rather than actual 
achievements inhibits a focus on functionings that would be reflective of how people actually live 
(Gasper 2002:25) or, the everyday lived experience.48 The next section will therefore present 
critical literature that further substantiates this concern, continuing to assert that Sen’s approach is 
limited in its political analysis and understanding of the substantive social and political relations 
through which development is realised. The next section will also begin to consider the associated 
                                                
47 Sen’s potential response to this would be that his provisions for welfare correct these inequalities. However, he 
assumes that human flourishing will ensue from very basic provisions. 
48 Gasper argues that, ‘freedom should also be assessed by looking directly at functionings. Freedom does not mean 
only the ability to be healthy, but actually being healthy, not mentally and physically infirm, free of infirmity. And how 
sufficient would a conception of freedom that ranks highly an educated, well-paid, still physically healthy person, 
habituated, perhaps even addicted to thirty to forty hours of television and video-viewing per week?’ (2001:26). 
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implications of this limitation, the first of which concerns the liberal, individual development 
subject at the centre of Sen’s approach. 
The Liberal Individual  
The touchpoint of Sen’s CA and Development as Freedom remains the subject of development – an 
individual conceived as a sole, autonomous agent, making choices from their capability set derived 
from opportunity freedoms provided by public policy. This has been explained and elaborated in 
Chapter One as the first condition within which Sen’s approach is to be realised according to my 
interpretation of his ideal-type. Critiques of individualism underlying the CA are concerned that the 
approach assumes individuals act and make choices alone. Sen’s focus on the individual is 
regardless of philosophers long acknowledging that human agency and freedom are not able to be 
considered independently from structures of living together (Mulhall & Swift 1992 cited in 
Deneulin 2008:119). His conception of agent oriented development and emphasis on the individual 
have been critiqued for being too individualistic, underestimating the influence of community 
engagement, including socially constructed meaning systems and values due to an emphasis on 
individual capabilities and the absence of collective agency. Substantively, for critics of 
individualism, a shifting incomplete self operates within the constraints of the market, social 
institutions, values and communities. Specifically, Sen’s approach has been criticised for being 
methodologically, ethically and ontologically individualistic. Scholars have defined these different 
types of individualism in order to evaluate what the CA does or does not account for (Alkire & 
Deneulin 2009; Robeyns 2000; 2005).  
Scholars explain that ethical individualism is concerned with ‘who or what should count in our 
evaluative exercises and decisions,’ and that individuals are the only units of moral concern. 
(Robeyns 2000:16; Alkire & Deneulin 2009:35). Methodological individualism claims that ‘all 
social phenomena are to be explained wholly and exclusively in terms of individuals and their 
properties’ (Bhargava 1992:19 cited in Robeyns 2000:17); Alkire & Deneulin 2009:35), and 
ontological individualism denotes that ‘only individuals and their properties exist, and that all social 
entities and properties can be identified by reducing them to individuals and their properties.’ 
(Robeyns 2000:17; Alkire & Deneulin 2009:35). Robeyns argues that this ontological individualism 
puts a claim on the nature of human beings, their lives and relationship to society and that, ‘in this 
view society is built up from only individuals and nothing than individuals, and hence is nothing 
more than the sum of individuals and their properties’ (2000:17). 
Robeyns (2008) further argues that Sen’s CA is an ethically and normatively individualistic 
approach but is neither ontologically nor methodologically individualistic (2008:90). She states that 
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this ethically individualistic approach is not incompatible with recognising social connections and 
embedding, arguing that, 
On the theoretical level, the CA accounts for social relations and the constraints and 
opportunities of societal structures and institutions on individuals in at least two ways. 
First, by recognising the social and environmental factors which influence the 
conversions of commodities into functionings … the second way in which the CA can 
account for the societal structures and constraints is by theoretically distinguishing 
functionings from capabilities and postulating capabilities as normatively more 
important than achieved functionings (2008:91). 
However, Robeyns also acknowledges that although Sen’s CA does allow structures and constraints 
to be taken into account, it does not offer a full account of this (2008:91). Concomitantly, Stewart 
and Deneulin (2002) argue that Sen’s approach is exemplary of methodological individualism, 
stating that, ‘the CA shares the individualism of the utilitarian approach, where individuals are 
assumed to be atoms who come together for instrumental reasons only, and not as an intrinsic 
aspect of their way of life’ (2002:66). 
In response to Stewart and Deneulin, Sen (2002) disagrees that his approach is methodologically 
individualistic because it includes provision for democratic deliberation – a ‘group-based 
phenomenon.’ He argues that therefore, the CA cannot be based merely on ‘what individuals think, 
choose and do’ (2002:28-29). Understanding methodological individualism as where individuals are 
‘separated or detached from their social surroundings, Sen acknowledges that no individual can 
choose without being influenced by the society in which they find themselves (2002:80; 2009:244-
245). He acknowledges that human beings have, ‘various plural identities, multiple affiliations and 
are quintessentially social creatures, ‘ with their own thoughts, choices an actions being important 
aspects of the societies in which they live (2002:81). Sen further argues that,  
to note the role of, “thinking, choosing and doing” by individuals is just the beginning of 
a manifest reality, but we cannot end there without an appreciation of the deep and 
pervasive society on such “thinking, choosing and doing” … the presence of individuals 
who think, choose, and act does not make an approach methodologically individualist; 
rather, the postulation that the individuals are separated and detached from each other 
would do that (2002:81).  
Despite Sen’s argument that the CA is not methodologically individualistic, and drawing on critical 
debates around approaches conceived mainly in terms of methodological individualism (that ‘all 
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social phenomena are to be explained wholly and exclusively in terms of individuals and their 
properties’ (Bhargava 1992:19 cited in Robeyns 2000:17); Alkire & Deneulin 2009:35)), I argue 
that Sen’s individualistic focus is methodological and cogent with his implicit commitment to a 
liberal approach more broadly.49 This version of liberalism is cogent with Sandel’s (1984) 
description of the ‘liberal vision.’ Sandel describes liberalism’s core thesis as the following: 
a just society seeks not to promote any particular ends, but enables citizens to pursue 
their own ends, consistent with a similar liberty for all; it therefore must govern by 
principles that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good … the just 
society seeks to provide a framework within which its citizens can pursue their own 
values and ends, consistent with a similar liberty for others (1984:82). 
Sen’s conception of the development subject is consistent with this liberal vision. This vision 
presupposes a certain conception of the person – what Sandel describes as ‘the unencumbered self,’ 
necessary for a ‘just society.’ This is an independent, autonomous, self-functioning agent who is 
‘independent of purposes and ends’ (1984:86). That is to say, people are conceived as free from 
social roles and sovereign over their own lives (1984:87), with the capacity to choose their own 
ends (the lives they have reason to value) if they reach a capabilities threshold. This capacity for 
choice is more important than these ends (1984:86). Sandel explains that in accordance with 
liberalism, ‘as actual, individual selves, we are free to choose our purposes and ends unbound ... by 
custom or tradition or by inherited status. So long as they are not unjust, our conceptions of the 
good carry weight, whatever they are, simply in virtue of our having chosen them’ (1984:87). 
However, this conception is not without its problems.  
Sandel argues that liberalism rejects the notion of community (1984:91) even though we cannot 
view ourselves as independent selves. The allegiances and obligations from the relationships we 
have as family members, from communities and as citizens are inseparable from understanding who 
we are (1984:90). These partly define us as persons, therefore he argues,  
to imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to 
conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without 
                                                
49 There are however those that would disagree with this reading of Sen’s approach, arguing that this is a common 
misunderstanding of Sen’s CA. These authors insist that identification of this individualism presumes that persons act 
alone through the CA, rather than as members of groups (Alkire & Deneulin 2002:35). Instead, they argue that the 
approach is ‘ethically individualistic,’ with individuals as the ultimate units of concern, and social structures and 
institutions considered in terms of the causal importance they have for individual well-being (2002:35). However, I find 
this argument unconvincing. The majority of the literature on capabilities indicates that the approach is insufficient in 
accounting for the significance of human social life for a sufficient conception of the development subject. It is 
therefore reasonable to argue that the CA’s conception of the development subject can be closely aligned with western, 
liberal individualism, particularly when one also considers Sen’s role for the liberal political economy. This is discussed 
in more detail later on in the chapter. 
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character, without moral depth. For to have a character is to know that I move in a 
history I neither summon nor command, which carries consequences nonetheless for my 
choices and conduct (1984:90). 
Concerns of methodological individualism informing the CA are substantiated by literature on 
capabilities from authors who have expressed concern that Sen’s prioritisation of capabilities over 
functionings provides an insufficiently informed appreciation of the influences or contexts within 
which the development subject actually functions. In particular, a wider concern is that the approach 
is informed by an inadequate appreciation of socio-historical contexts (Deneulin 2008) and 
intersubjective, social context (Gore 1997; Evans 2002; Gasper 2002; Ibrahim 2006; Deneulin 
2008). Moreover, Gore (1997) has argued that the CA excludes the institutional contexts within 
which individual actions are embedded (1997:247) and Ibrahim (2006) has argued that with a focus 
on the individual, the CA ‘fails to explore the interaction between capabilities and social 
structures’50 (2006:401).  
In particular, the importance of social context for the selection of additional capabilities is asserted 
by Stewart (2005) who explains that,  
society – and indeed particular groups within society – shapes every individual, 
influencing preferences and consequent choices. For example, families, schools, ethnic 
groups, the media, political leaders, social networks, all play a large role in determining 
individual choices. Hence what is chosen … depends not only on the individual, but on 
the nature of these groups and the influences they affect (2005:189).51 
In this sense, Stewart argues that groups influence individual preferences and behaviour in contrast 
to the CA assuming an autonomous individual: 
all individuals live in groups, from cradle to grave – in families, communities, villages, 
neighbourhoods, regions, countries. Individuals also have multiple affiliations; that is, 
they are members of numerous other groups ... groups then are defined here as ways of 
categorising people in ways that represent common affiliations or identities. These 
                                                
50 This will be explained in further detail later in this chapter. 
51 Stewart also asserts the importance of groups on individual well-being as a mechanism for enhancing individual 
capabilities (2005:185). She argues that direct impact on individual well-being such as an increase in self-respect or 
empowerment may be enhanced by a person being part of a group51 (2005:187-188). Individual well-being is also 
affected by how well the groups they identify with are doing, with people who closely identify with particular ethnic or 
national identities displaying dignity and pride at good performance of their group or depression from poor 
achievements (2005:188). Groups can affect individual capabilities through instrumental means in this way, with 
Stewart emphasising that ‘given that improvements in the position of the poor rarely happen solely through the 
benevolence of governments, and are more likely to occur because of political and economic pressures, organisation or 
groups among the poor is important – even essential – to achieve significant improvements’ (2005:189). 
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affiliations may be more or less strong (i.e. matter more or less to members); may be 
more or less well defined; and may be more or less enduring – some may be very 
temporary (e.g. people going on an organised outing) while others (such as families, 
ethnicities, race) may even be lifelong, although the importance of the connections may 
vary over a person’s life (2005:186).  
Similarly, Gore (1997) argues that valuable capabilities and functionings actually emerge as the 
properties of societies as features of the institutional contexts within which people’s lives are 
embedded (1997:243).52 
These arguments are substantiated by Deneulin (2008) who argues that individual value judgments 
rely on a collective framework that creates and sustains them and there is a need to acknowledge 
that the subject of development is constituted and influenced by everyday social life. Therefore, 
Sen’s conception of development needs to move beyond a conception of the individual subject 
(2008:106). In addition, if individual agency is central to Sen’s approach, ensuing ideas of 
development cannot ignore the specific socio-historical conditions that have made individual 
agency possible within a particular context. A potential implication of Sen ignoring specific socio-
historical contexts in his CA is that although his approach includes a provision for welfare, he does 
not address the changing politics of welfare and the CA in relation to potential political 
transformations and ideological shifts. This is important given the socio-historical context of 
Indigenous Australia and the socio-economic conditions of Indigenous peoples as a result of 
colonisation. Understanding whether these conditions truly allow individual agency to be possible 
given resulting power structures is important for a consideration of well-being.  
Deneulin asserts that what is needed is an understanding of structures of living together, defined as 
‘structures which belong to a particular historical community, which provide the conditions for 
individual lives to flourish and which are irreducible to interpersonal relations and yet bound up 
with these’ (2008:110). These structures are themselves autonomous and cannot be reduced to the 
capabilities of individuals within them (2008:111). Subsequently, she argues that it is inadequate to 
assess development in terms of only the capabilities that individuals have reason to value 
(2008:106). The need for structures of living together to be acknowledged is due to them 
transcending individual human actions – as Deneulin argues, ‘they are properties of collectivity 
rather than a property of individuals and these collective capabilities provide the conditions for 
individual lives to flourish’ (2008:115). 
                                                
52 Also, see Taylor (1990:54-55). 
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If structures of living together are not integrated with an understanding of Sen’s approach to 
development, Deneulin argues that fundamental elements of development are omitted:  
assessing development on the basis of individual capabilities, or irreducibly social goods 
that are of intrinsic value to individual lives such as the capability to maintain one’s 
language and culture or the capability to participate in political life, would miss an 
important part of the development process itself. It would miss out certain structures of 
living together that make the whole process of development and expansion of individual 
capabilities possible (2008:113).  
Deneulin’s theory therefore goes beyond Sen’s underlying individualism that posits the individual 
as the unit of moral concern. In this way, the roles of structures of living together would be assessed 
by looking at their negative or positive effects on the individual and their impact on individual 
freedoms. However, Deneulin’s position suggests that as well as the individual subject, the 
structures of living together are themselves also units of moral concern (2008:113-114). She argues,  
if the capability approach is to say something about the success of development policies 
in bringing out certain outcomes, the informational basis for assessing development 
cannot only remain at the level of its individual outcomes but has to include the 
(collective) processes that are responsible for these outcomes, such as, for example, the 
power structure of a particular country, its existing social norms, its particular national 
identity or its particular political and democratic history (2008:115).   
A consideration of structures of living together therefore has fundamental implications for 
understanding individual choice within the CA, in addition to its implications for Sen’s conception 
of the development subject. Due to individual choice being so affected by structures of living 
together, Deneulin argues that, ‘one cannot assume that their choices, including what they value, are 
independent of these structures’ (2008:116). In this sense, the approach needs to be able to assess to 
what extent individual choices and lives are affected by structures of living together, or the extent to 
which an individual is free to exercise a capability and to what extent this capability is constrained 
by social norms (2008:116).  
The absence of such an assessment within the CA is problematic, with Deneulin asking ‘how, then 
can one judge, for example, the underlying social concerns of a society, as exemplified in 
consumerism, through which people will choose certain valuable capabilities?’ (2008:118). She 
calls for the acceptance that the so called ‘free’ individual at the centre of the approach is actually 
subject to restraints and conditioning which affect how they exercise choices’ (2008:117). This 
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suggests that the CA is limited in its understanding of the processes of achieving agency freedom 
and the significance of social influence for the negotiation and selection of capabilities. I 
acknowledge this argument despite Sen’s identification of capability handicaps and despite Sen 
acknowledging the problem of adaptive preference formation in assessments of utility. He 
acknowledges that these assessments do not provide an adequate indication of a person’s real 
deprivation, despite them perhaps not being adequately nourished, clothed and educated (Sen 
2005:5). Sen attempts to address this through his notion of capability handicap, but as I argue in this 
paragraph, this notion is limited in its appreciation of (social) constraints on choice. 
I explained in Chapter One that Sen recognises that what a person can make of a given income and 
capability is dependent on their personal and social circumstances (Sen 1999:70). However, I argue 
that Sen provides a limited appreciation of the social variations or capability handicaps that can 
affect a person achieving agency freedom and subsequently realising capability. Although he 
includes an appreciation of some social influences, these are at far too general a level and are 
incomprehensive – discounting specific social and cognitive limitations on development subjects 
achieving agency freedom and converting income into capability. Without identification of the 
limiting factors that may be generated through a full appreciation of social and cognitive 
epistemologies, Sen misses a consideration of the processes that form a sense of purpose to care 
about, commit and action capabilities (Gasper 2002:20) and achieve agency freedom. This has 
important implications for the cross-cultural application of the approach and potential modes of 
action in relation to Sen’s role for democratic deliberation, political freedoms and agency freedom 
(discussed in the next section). 
Even though in defence of his focus on the individual Sen explicitly acknowledges that ‘human 
beings live and interact in societies, and are in fact, societal creatures … our understanding of what 
our own needs are and what values and priorities we have reason to espouse may themselves 
depend on our interactions with others …’ (Sen 2002:79), he also recognises individual 
commitment and sympathy with regards to others – concern that affects a person’s own welfare and 
concern for others, even if a person’s welfare is not threatened (Sen 1982:92-93; Gasper 2002:19; 
Gore 1997:238). However, despite this acknowledgement of the social and arguing that individuals 
have ‘various plural identities, multiple affiliations … diverse associations … (and) different types 
of social interactions,’ Sen assertion is that focusing on individuals and the role of ‘thinking, 
choosing and doing’ does not create an approach that is individualistic, but merely recognises that 
individuals are separate and detached from one another (Sen 2002:81). In this sense, Gasper (2002) 
argues that full membership of a community appears to have a secondary status for Sen, stating, ‘he 
focuses on impacts, if any, of relational processes and community membership, upon the range of 
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valued choices open to an individual. Community membership is taken as instrumental not central 
to human being’ (2002:21). Moreover, Gasper argues that, 
Though he refers … to rule-led behaviour and the constraints set by socially constructed 
meaning systems, and to individuals within families, the dominant impression is of 
people as chooser, their formation only lightly treated, rather than as actors more 
broadly. Yet a way of life is more than a set of private choices; and personality and 
identity have a psychic and social grounding (2002:20-21). 
Sen therefore recognises the implications of individuality for evaluation (Gore 1997:241), which 
Ibrahim (2006) highlights as the CA acknowledging the importance of social structures in so far as 
they influence individual well-being and freedom (2006:402). This is despite some scholars 
identifying that the use and exercise of human capabilities in developing countries occurs 
collectively (Ibrahim 2006:397; Deneulin 2008).53  
Moreover, Sen’s justification for a lack of focus on social groups within the CA would be to argue 
that if a group were the smallest unit of concern in social evaluation then this would overlook any 
existing or potential inequalities within these units (Alkire & Deneulin 2000:35). However, some 
perceive collective action and individuals within a group as more than ‘a sum total of individual 
lives’ that cannot be reduced to individual characteristics. Therefore, evaluating situations 
according to the individual can be insufficient (2000:36). In particular, Gasper (2002) highlights 
critiques of the CA that argue that it focuses on the ‘generalised human’ and avoids discussing the 
‘situated social’ (2002:21). He summarises Kurien’s (1995) argument that ‘the lack of a social 
framework in Sen’s analysis – his abstracted sense of individualism – diverts him into trying to 
upgrade the details of mainstream economics and renders his work unreliable as policy advice’ 
(Gasper 2002:21).  
In summary, the critical arguments presented in this section are on the whole convincing (as per the 
reconstruction above.) In practice, shared social goods and values are important for the 
consideration of the appropriate selection of capabilities for the improvement of well-being. This 
has the potential to be overlooked upon the CA’s operationalisation. It is therefore reasonable to 
argue that Sen’s CA is informed by an insufficient conception of the development subject as 
autonomous. This conception does not sufficiently account for the social context within which the 
development subject functions. It is important to note however, that Sen does acknowledge the 
importance of social context in his work, stating that, ‘no individual can think, choose or act without 
being influenced in one way or another by the nature and working of the society around him or her’ 
                                                
53 This is discussed in detail later in this section.  
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(Sen 2002:80). He also considers the conversion of income, primary goods and commodities into 
functionings as dependent on social factors such as ‘the nature of the social conventions in force in 
the society in which the person lives’ (capability handicap, as stated as condition one in Chapter 
One) (Sen 1985a:26 cited in Gore 1997:242). Nonetheless, the extent to which Sen theoretically 
accounts for this social context is limited. 
A consideration of human social life is highly important for an appreciation of the substantive social 
and political relations through which the CA is to be realised. Therefore, Sen is limited in fully 
appreciating the processes of achieving agency freedom for the selection of capabilities. This is 
potentially problematic for his approach in two ways: firstly, in terms of social context influencing 
the selection of capabilities that are considered valuable (including culturally valued capabilities) 
and secondly, in terms of collective modes of action in the selection of capabilities and achievement 
of subsequent functionings. Both are relevant to ensuring agency freedom is upheld according to my 
interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type. Again, I argue that is indicative of the approach having a limited 
conception of the social context within which the development subject is actually situated. An 
inadequate appreciation of social context for the selection of valuable capabilities omits fundamental 
aspects of development – the underling social concerns of a society (such as not wanting to be part 
of a liberal conception of development) and the substantive social process through which agency 
freedom is achieved. The literature discussed in the next section substantiates these limitations, 
considering the importance of social context for collective modes of action and the achievement of 
agency freedom according to Sen’s role for democratic deliberation and political freedoms. 
The Importance of Collective Action as a Political Dynamic in Development  
This section will deepen the discussion of critical scholars who explore the interaction between 
capabilities and social structures (a failure of the approach according to Ibrahim (2006:401)). It is 
argued that (with regard to social structures, groups and institutions) collective action is in fact 
significant to realising well-being within a context of development. In the previous section it was 
established by Ibrahim that, ‘... the poor can … locally initiate their own self-help projects to 
improve their individual and communal lives’ (2006:404). Ibrahim discusses this in terms of 
collective capabilities, and although I acknowledge that the notion of collective capabilities is 
conceived to congeal with Sen’s notion of capability, it is Ibrahim’s recognition of the significance 
of what should really rather be understood as collective action and collective agency that I wish to 
emphasise here.54 To recognise this is to accept that Sen does not incorporate a sufficient 
                                                
54 Sen (2002) has criticised Evans (2002) for the notion of ‘collective capability’ arguing that this should be seen as 
‘socially dependent individual capabilities.’ He argues that collective capabilities refer more to the collective capability 
of humanity as a whole (2002:85).  
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appreciation of this into his work and argues that a full consideration of human social life and social 
processes is necessary to incorporate all modes of action into the approach. This would ensure that 
Sen’s commitment to democratic deliberation and the achievement of agency freedom are upheld, 
particularly in a cross-cultural context where notions of community and cultural groups may be 
valued more than the notion of the individual subject. It would also enable a better understanding of 
the ‘inevitable choice’ that Sen states will occur, between ‘tradition’ and the economic and social 
changes necessary for development.55 
Although one may equate the notion of collective action with public action, the distinction to be 
made here is that collective action is particularly important for (and can therefore be used to refer 
to) marginalised groups than a wider ‘collective public’ – in the form of those less privileged in 
attaining development as freedom, as Evans (2002) argues. He states that, ‘organised collectivities – 
unions, political parties, village councils, women’s groups etc. – are fundamental to people’s 
capabilities to choose the lives they have reason to value’ (2002:56). Joining others in collective 
action is therefore valuable intrinsically and instrumentally in being effective to promote other 
forms of freedom. (2002:56). Moreover, what is insufficiently theoretically accounted for within the 
CA is how exactly public action – in the form of the democratic deliberation that Sen refers to – is 
to take place in order for all collectives to be able to choose a life they have reason to value. This is 
particularly important given that scholars have raised concern for the way in which, due to its 
liberal, individualist concept the CA neglects the ‘problematic nature of the public realm’ (Dean 
2009:261). This is to say that the approach assumes citizens as formally free and equal and, ‘that 
participation in the public sphere is open upon the same terms to everybody’ (2009:270-271). 
The liberal ‘ideal’ of the CA, therefore ‘assumes the existence of a single, undifferentiated public,’ 
whereas in reality there are many ‘publics’ with competing and overlapping interests. Commonly, 
the interests of the elite are advanced in the name of common interest, whilst subordinate groups are 
ignored (2009:271). Dean argues that, ‘it is impossible to ignore the effects of systematic 
inequalities in liberal societies that effectively exclude or compromise participation by, a variety of 
social classes or groups, including women’ (2009:271). He states,  
Consensual agreements achieved in the process of public deliberation – whether in the 
course of participative poverty assessments or through citizens’ juries or focus groups – 
may elide fundamental conflicts and hidden oppression. They may do nothing more than 
reflect prevailing hegemonic assumptions. What is more, the scope for public reasoning 
is inhibited by the dominant liberal notion of what constitutes ‘the public’ (2009:270).  
                                                
55 This is in line with the tension I identify later in this chapter. 
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For example, Stewart and Deneulin (2002) argue that market forces – such as the influence of large 
corporations on political decision-making – result in a system that increasingly favours global 
capitalism. Countering these market forces is only achieved by some form of collective action by 
trade unions and communities. They state that, ‘the individual who is aiming to make valuable 
choices about capabilities, or the state which is trying to enhance the conditions that promote 
valuable capabilities, will be ineffective unless each is underpinned and supported by collective 
action’ (2002:68-69).  
Whilst central to the development of individual identities, values and goals, opportunities for 
collective action also secure the types of freedom that Sen himself advocates, such as social 
opportunity and protective security (2002:57). In this way, although Sen’s political freedoms such 
as democratic elections and civil rights may be secured, Evans argues that ‘dense, diverse, 
organised collective action is necessary to exploit the opportunities created by elections and civil 
rights, and complement the dispersed efforts of groups and individuals’ (2002:57). Therefore, as 
Ibrahim (2006) highlights, there is a two way relationship between individual capabilities and social 
structures: ‘while social structures are instrumentally and intrinsically important for human 
capabilities, capabilities can also alter the pre-existing social structures rendering them more 
conducive to individual and communal well-beings’ (2006:402).56 
In demonstrating how this two-way relationship is possible, Ibrahim explains how through self-
initiative among low socio-economic communities in Egypt, individuals were able to build 
collective capabilities that promoted their individual and communal well-beings (2006:398).57 
Through grassroots initiatives, communities were able to expand their capabilities as well as use 
them more effectively (2006:399). These self-help-initiatives were also dependent on and 
generative of Sen’s instrumental freedoms – transparency guarantees as they were built on trust and 
reciprocity and protective security was enabled by individuals mutually helping one another 
(2006:400). In turn, individual well-being freedom was enhanced and individual agency freedom 
was enhanced (2006:400). This example therefore asserts the importance of a consideration of 
community for understanding how actual functioning is achieved and well-being improved. This is 
significant for a cross-cultural application of the approach in Indigenous Australia, given the 
Aboriginal focus on community and, ‘intense kinship relations that characterise life in remote 
Indigenous communities’ (Glaskin 2012:297). 
                                                
56 One could also argue along these lines that collective political action is important for securing unconditional welfare.  
57 Here I wish to emphasise the importance of collective action in improving well-being, rather than collective 
capabilities.		
82 
 
In emphasising how collective capabilities can be incorporated into an understanding of the CA by 
enhancing a person’s well-being freedom and agency freedom, Ibrahim introduces the notions of 
collective freedom and collective agency. She defines collective or group freedom as ‘the freedom 
of a group of individual agents to perform a set of agentially distinct actions […] in combination’ 
(Carter 1999:248 cited in Ibrahim 2006:404). By default, collective unfreedom means ‘the lack of 
freedom of that group to perform that set of actions in combination’ (Carter 1999:248 cited in 
Ibrahim 2006:404). This is closely related to collective capabilities as the new range of choices that 
individuals as a group gain as a result of collective action. In order to expand collective freedoms 
and capabilities, collective agency needs to be used. This agency will be affected by a group’s pre-
existing social structure and values (Ibrahim 2006:404). Ibrahim argues,  
in contrast to individual agency where a person pursues ‘individually’ his/her own 
perception of the good, through acts of collective agency the individual can pursue this 
perception of the good collectively by joining or participating in a group with similar 
goals. Collective agency is thus not only instrumentally valuable for generating new 
capabilities, but also intrinsically important in shaping and pursuing the individual’s 
perception of the good (2006:404).  
A notion of collective agency therefore emerges that can conceptualise reinforcements and 
contributions to maintaining or altering social structures, the achievement of agency freedom, 
relevant functioning and improved well-being. 
Moreover, it has been found that collective action initiated from collective agency can aid low 
socio-economic groups where limited human, financial and physical capital restricts individual 
agency (2006:405). At a primary level, collective action is instrumental in promoting income 
generation, resource sharing, creating a sense of self-esteem and local decision making (2006:406). 
It is also intrinsically effective in informing the formulation of values and beliefs for one to live the 
life that he/she has reason to value. This ‘value’ is not just influenced by individual preferences but 
also by social context (2006:406). Importantly, the ability to engage in collective action can itself be 
viewed as a capability (Stewart 2005:199 cited in Ibrahim 2006:406).58 
However, collective action is not enough on its own to reinforce or enhance capabilities. Both 
Evans (2002) and Ibrahim (2006) emphasise the importance of institutional support in facilitating 
the enhancement of capabilities and collective agency. Ibrahim states, ‘to reap these benefits, 
policy-makers need to create a supportive environment to facilitate collective action among the 
                                                
58 Ibrahim (2006) and Stewart (2005) both acknowledge that group affiliation does entail limitations and problems. Not 
all forms of collective action will enhance human capabilities (Ibrahim 2006:406). 
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poor, thus helping them overcome the social, economic and political constraints on group 
formation’ (2006:408). Public policy generated on the basis of the CA facilitating individuals to 
lead the lives they have reason to value must therefore account for and enable this collective action. 
In an Australian Indigenous context, this would have to include provisions for family and 
community action for the achievement of agency freedom and cultural values. This would also 
facilitate the agency freedom of multiple cultural groups within one cultural milieu. Evans (2002) 
argues that public policy that, ‘explicitly acknowledges the importance of collective action, public 
mores that are open to contestation and collective struggles, and focused efforts to stimulate and 
sustain organisations that transcend primordial and parochial interests’ are necessary to expand 
individual freedoms in the name of development (2002:57).  
So far it has been established through a presentation of critical debates, that there have been calls 
for a notion of non-individual or collective capabilities within the CA to account for particular 
collective modes of action that inevitably occur as a product of social life.59 Further, it has been 
acknowledged that collective structures affect an individual’s perception of the good in terms of 
what constitutes valuable capabilities as well as his or her ability to achieve these capabilities 
(Ibrahim 2006:404). By not providing a list of capabilities or functionings, Sen leaves valuable 
capabilities and functionings for societies to decide upon through democratic deliberation and 
public political participation. However, the CA arguably does not make sufficient provision for 
collective action and/or agency in the achievement of or deliberation about capabilities and/or 
functionings. Therefore, the approach can be seen as insufficient in accounting for collective action 
as a political dynamic of the development process.  
The lack of this provision is problematic when societies or cultural groups decide on shared, valued 
actions, in order to choose the life that they have reason to value. This has the potential to 
compromise the two way relationship (public participation informing public policy and public 
policy enabling public participatory freedoms) that Sen encourages (Sen 1999:18). The agency 
freedom of the development subject is potentially restricted by the absence of the incorporation of 
all possible modes of action for political participation. This agency freedom is important for them to 
achieve freedom of political participation in deciding valuable capabilities and functionings. An 
individual or a collective can then choose from their capability set which functionings to achieve in 
order to live a life they have reason to value. Here, Gasper (2002) has validity in emphasising the 
importance for Sen to focus on how people actually live (2002:25), especially for a more sufficient 
consideration of the presence or absence of real opportunities to apply capabilities. 
                                                
59 This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.	
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I have also established that the CA can be interpreted as not adequately accounting for an evaluation 
of the different structures that cause individuals to endorse certain values over others (Deneulin 
2008:118) This is of particular significance cross-culturally when, according to my interpretation of 
Sen’s ideal-type, cultural groups are to decide whether ‘traditions’ are to be maintained alongside 
the social and economic development that he proposes – this according to Sen is, ‘an inevitable 
choice’ (Sen 1999:31). Without adequately accounting for the collective action of groups, a 
potential limitation of the approach is whether it can sufficiently account for the modes of action 
necessary to achieve agency freedom and political freedoms as per Sen’s commitment for 
democratic deliberation for the selection of culturally valued capabilities. Whether or not cultural 
freedoms can be secured as a means and ends to development and can be substantively achieved 
when the CA is operationalised according to this ideal-type, is therefore a potential limitation of the 
approach.60 Further, I argue that insufficient provision for collective action and communal goals is a 
means through which theoretically (and unintentionally), Sen’s approach implies that ‘tradition’ is 
able to be overcome in favour of a liberal political economy. 
Without a full theorisation of all possible means through which agency freedom can be achieved 
(including collectively), an account of the autonomy of any group is compromised in terms of them 
being able to choose a life they have reason to value. Arguably, culturally valued capabilities have 
greater chance of not being selected democratically, in favour of the capabilities necessary to 
uphold and facilitate the liberal political economy. I argue that this creates a fundamental tension in 
Sen’s approach: having secured basic capabilities and in order to choose additional valuable 
capabilities, it is implied that ‘tradition’ is to be overcome in favour of the liberal political economy. 
Therefore, some existing notions of ‘tradition’ – in particular those incompatible with a liberal 
political economy – would by implication, have to be ultimately overlooked in favour of the social 
and economic changes necessary for development to occur according to the CA’s prescriptions 
(although deliberated). The result of these changes is what Sen refers to as ‘modernity.’ This 
language is consistent with a liberal approach and in addition to referring to the expansion of 
freedoms, also refers to Sen’s implied role for the liberal political economy within his approach. It 
is implied that the underlying premises of the CA are to be prioritised over ‘tradition’ and pre-
existing cultural values that may be incompatible with the notion of freedom and/or well-being in 
favour of this secondary development goal. Although Sen prioritises freedom over economic 
growth, this is a type of freedom that is compatible with a liberal political economy – and therefore 
                                                
60 This is also of fundamental issue if the subjects of development are of low socio-economic status, as these freedoms 
allow individuals of this status to respond to and inform policy as a collective in particular (Ibrahim 2006), and ensure 
other individual and collective capabilities and functionings to be achieved and generated. 
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a freedom that can be interpreted and applied in ways that are confined to a liberal framework.61 
Subsequently, the ability for subjects of the approach to lead the lives they have reason to value can 
be compromised (this is explained further in the next section).  
So far this chapter has discussed literature that engages with critical debates on the CA that reveal 
its potential problems and limitations. It has been established that Sen’s conception of a liberal 
individual development subject is potentially inadequate in accounting for the extent to which the 
process of achieving agency freedom is influenced by a person’s social context (moreover, this 
conception assumes a development subject who is interested in realising freedom through Sen’s 
liberal framework). Further, this conception means that the approach can be limited in accounting 
for all potential collective modes of action necessary for the achievement of agency freedom, 
political freedom and democratic deliberation. This infers that the CA does not account for all 
potential modes of (collective) political action that are important for groups to secure welfare and 
formulate their own development responses. 
Because of these limitations, the CA has the potential to restrict agency freedom, political freedom 
and participation in democratic deliberation by denying all potential modes of action to 
development subjects in order to secure culturally valued capabilities. The next section of this 
chapter therefore engages with literature that further problematises Sen’s role for this economy in 
relation to him not considering the substantive experience of this economy and the potential 
generation of unfreedoms. 
Sen’s Role for the Liberal Political Economy  
As argued in Chapter One, Sen presents a reasoned argument for the role of economic growth as a 
secondary objective of development. However, critical debates exist within the literature over 
whether Sen insufficiently appreciates the substantive experience of this economy. These debates 
are presented in terms of whether Sen’s approach is informed by a sufficient conception of 
personhood and what it is to be human. Although Sen’s approach has increased attention to ‘being 
human’ or a consideration of the development subject experiencing development (in terms of 
freedoms and capability) compared to mainstream economic theories, criticism of the commitment 
to economic growth that it retains as well as being informed by an ‘abstracted sense of ‘human,’’ 
still exists. Gasper (2002) reasons that with the CA, in practice, human development emerges as ‘a 
school of “humaner” economic development, rather than of development of and by humans’ 
(2002:14). He argues that this is typical of mainstream economic theories that are not based upon 
                                                
61 Although Sen does recognise some limitations of the liberal political economy by including protective security – a 
role for welfare for severe deprivation – within his instrumental freedoms. 
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evidence or a theory of being (2002:13). Gasper, quoting Cameron, asserts that critics have doubted 
whether Sen’s CA diverges enough from mainstream economics and consumerism: ‘the unending 
addictive quest for fulfillment – or at least novelty and distraction – through commodities’ 
(Cameron 2000 cited in Gasper 2002:19). 
According to Gasper, mainstream economic theories do not deal with ‘recognisable human beings’ 
and work with a conception of welfare that focuses on the investor and consumer of commodities 
(2002:13). He states, ‘the whole of life (is) viewed as a stock exchange or supermarket. It is weak 
even on the satisfactions from work and typically presumes, like a capitalist employer, that work is 
always a cost’ (2002:13). Gasper argues that the commoditisation of the liberal political economy 
‘dehumanises’ and, ‘generates concentrations of wealth, which may come to dominate all spheres of 
life’ (2002:21-22). In this context the liberal political economy (referred to as the ‘market 
mechanism’ by Gasper) emerges as, ‘a basic arrangement through which people can interact with 
each other and undertake mutually advantageous activities’ (2002:21). As a feature within which 
subjects of the CA are embedded, this economy therefore has the potential to act as an external 
pressure – constraining and conditioning individual choice by placing value and individual benefit 
on processes and choices that in turn benefit economic progress. Despite Sen’s provision for 
democratic deliberation, in order to retain his secondary development goal of economic growth 
according to my interpretation of his ideal-type when implementing the CA, a society would have to 
select a set of capabilities that were also conducive to these processes and choices. It can therefore 
be interpreted that if the development subject is limited to choosing from capabilities that only 
result in the achievement of functioning that improves economic growth, the freedom they have to 
choose the life they have reason to value according to the CA and Development as Freedom, is 
compromised. This contradiction is sustained because of the approach being constructed on a 
conception of what it is to be human that is linked to the liberal individual whom, by implication, 
functions to contribute to economic progress having acquired the relevant substantive freedoms. 
The subsequent ways in which development subjects’ freedom to choose the life they have reason 
to value are compromised can be explained in more detail according to the tension that I identify– 
that the freedom of choice that they are granted through Sen’s approach can be interpreted as one 
that is limited to the realm of choice afforded within a liberal political economy. This liberal 
economy is a source of unfreedom in the sense that it can limit the preferences available to 
development subjects to those goods, services and practices that are indicative of global liberalism, 
rather than those independent of this influence. This is an argument supported by Evans (2002), 
who is concerned with how the global political economy undermines Sen’s Development as 
Freedom. He asserts the significance of modern distributions of economic power that influence 
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preference formations through a kind of “mental conditioning” – that is to say the power of various 
marketing enterprises (which Evans refers to as ‘empires’ such as Coca-Cola), promoting 
preferences and priorities to people that are different from those that arise from individuals 
autonomously deciding what they have reason to value (2002:58). Evans describes this as the 
‘centralisation of power over cultural flows that shape preferences,’ (2002:59) which causes 
‘homogenised tastes.’ Preferences resulting from diverse everyday lived experiences are therefore 
unlikely to be reflected in what goods, services and practices are available globally (2002:59).62 Sen 
(2002) agrees with Evans on this point – that the centralisation of power over the cultural flows that 
shape preferences is a subtle form of unfreedom and that he should have said more regarding 
modern market processes as a potential impediment to capability expansion (2002:84). 
Moreover, Evans argues that these global consumption patterns particularly affect the level of 
poverty that Sen aims to combat the most; third world poverty characteristic of the ‘global south.’ 
This poverty is likely to become worse through engaging with global consumption patterns than it 
would be if people had the ability to shape consumption standards based on their own experience 
and resources (2002:59). This is despite Sen recognising that being relatively poor matters 
(preventing elementary functionings such as self-respect and taking part in the community) within 
his consideration of capability handicaps (2002:59). Evans suggests that an important 
‘counterweight’ to the inevitable presence of global liberalism should be, ‘the promotion of a 
vibrant associational life that enables the less privileged to develop their own distinctive preferences 
and priorities based on their shared economic positions and life circumstances, and to develop 
shared strategies for pursuing those preferences’ (2002:59). Therefore for Evans, Sen does not 
sufficiently recognise the ‘economic “clout”’ and political power exerted by market enterprises or 
the influence this has on inhibiting choice. He states that what is missing from Sen’s analysis is, 
‘the extent to which modern market processes might constitute an impediment to the kind of 
deliberative preference formation that is essential to the expansion of capabilities’ (2002:58). 
Evans’ perspective is indicative of Sen insufficiently engaging with the social and political 
implications of the liberal political economy more broadly.63 This is substantiated, for example, by 
Shilliam (2012), who highlights that Sen has been criticised for, ‘not recognising the ways in which 
the capitalist market constrains the types of freedoms possible to develop, and for assuming that the 
                                                
62 As explained in Chapter One, this is indicative of adaptive preference formation – when personal desires are reduced 
to ‘modest “realistic” proportions’ (Sen 2005:5). This informs Sen’s critique that an assessment of utility (pleasure and 
desire fulfillment), does not provide an adequate indication of a person’s real deprivation, despite them perhaps not 
being adequately nourished, clothed and educated (2005:5). However, given Evans’ argument; one could argue that 
because of the CA’s role for the liberal political economy, Sen’s approach does not ultimately solve the issue of 
adaptive preference formation.	
63 This has prompted Navarro (2004) to state her surprise at the lack of this analysis given that for Sen, freedom and 
democracy play a key role (2004:17). 
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enhancement of opportunities to exercise freedoms can take place without fundamentally 
challenging the status quo’ (2012:131-132). Further, he asserts the importance of this because of a, 
‘prevailing climate of entrenched neoliberal rule and financial crisis’ (2012:332). Shilliam critiques 
Sen’s political economic approach for, ‘working with an episteme that makes subjects and actions 
intelligible only through a profane developmentalist imaginary wherein the market constitutes a 
paradoxically providential – and therefore sublime – arena for the growth of freedoms’ (2012:332).  
From another similar perspective, directly critiquing Development as Freedom, Navarro (2004) 
states that she is surprised by the lack of analysis of the political context of development; she also 
recognises that for Sen, the market is,  
the major motor for change and improvement – subject … to the active intervention and 
regulation of the state, which must correct the imperfections of the market and invest in 
people to enrich human capital and increase the power and ability to succeed in the 
market. But issues of power and how that power is reproduced are rarely, if ever, 
touched upon (2004:17).   
I concur with Navarro’s concern, which substantiates critical arguments that Sen insufficiently 
appreciates the politics of development in terms of the substantive relations of power that are a part 
of the development process and implicit within the CA and Development as Freedom (of which the 
market is a part). By not engaging with the potential unfreedoms generated by the liberal political 
economy, Sen assumes that the maintenance and facilitation of the liberal political economy will in 
turn facilitate the expansion of human freedom. However, as established, as a feature within which 
subjects of the CA are embedded, this economy has the potential to be restrictive of autonomous 
agency freedom. The next section considers the significance and potential implications of this 
limitation in a cross-cultural context – specifically an Australian Indigenous context. This is 
important for a consideration, in turn, of the implications of the facilitation of a liberal political 
economy64 in Cape York by Pearson, the CYI and CYP in later chapters of this thesis.  
Sen’s Role for the Liberal Political Economy: Cross-Cultural Considerations  
Reflecting on how Sen’s insufficient engagement with the politics of development may be 
problematic in an Australian Indigenous context prompts notice of a similarity between Sen and 
Pearson. On the surface, Pearson is similar to Sen in so far as he has been criticised for 
insufficiently appreciating the substantive social and political relations through which development 
is realised. Specifically, Pearson has in fact been criticised for an ahistorical, decontextualised and 
                                                
64 I later establish that the facilitation of a ‘real economy’ in Cape York is in fact neoliberal and an amplification of 
these liberal economic implications. 
89 
 
‘one size fits all’ approach to Indigenous policy. Brigg and Murphy (2011) argue that Pearson’s 
contribution to policy debate regularly discounts historical relations between Indigenous people and 
settlers, which appear irrelevant for Pearson in understanding contemporary social dysfunction 
(2011:21). They argue that for Pearson, issues concerning welfare dependency, alcohol and drug 
abuse, violence and child abuse are ‘isolated’ and ‘placed in a type of political and historical 
vacuum’ (2011:21). They have also criticised him for putting aside Indigenous-settler relations and 
attributing problems within Indigenous communities to individual choice, thus placing Indigenous 
social life into policy areas that are to be managed by facilitating individual behaviours (2011:21).  
 
Brigg and Murphy argue that culture and identity are also thought of in the same way: separated 
from social and political relationships (2011:21). They state that according to Pearson, ‘individual 
preferences and desires, culture and identity are to be played out in the private realm.’ Further, 
‘cultural tensions that have informed historical and structural processes (especially government 
policies) in the Indigenous-settler relationship are thus severed and made irrelevant’ (2011:21). 
Pearson therefore places emphasis on the individual (as Sen emphasises) and her or his relationship 
with the state, instead of with any other values and institutions (2011:21).65 For Sen and Pearson, a 
more holistic engagement with the politics of development that incorporates a more sufficient 
appreciation of ‘culture,’ would have to involve a consideration and understanding of socio-
economic systems pre-existing an application of the CA framework. This is especially relevant for 
considering the cross-cultural application of the CA and Development as Freedom in this thesis – in 
particular with regards to Aboriginal conceptions of socio-economics, Dreaming and ‘traditional’ 
cultural practice.  
 
Substantively, in contrast to a western liberal economic system, alternative conceptions of labour in 
an Australian Indigenous context involve a particular understanding of the value produced by 
human action in the environment. This conception is based on Dreaming and cultural beliefs and 
practices (Povinelli 1995:506). There is in fact a range of ways in which the Dreaming environment 
interacts with human social and economic action (1995:509). However, Povinelli argues that 
western cultural notions of production, value, leisure, labour remain dominant in Australian policy 
making because, 
 
As Baudrillard (1975) noted, subaltern perspectives on labour, political economy, and 
the nature of human environmental interactions are subordinate to the dominant 
                                                
65	Martin (2008) argues that Pearson has missed key social work literature that demonstrates that policy interventions 
that focus on individual goals rather than agreed intersubjective goals are unsuccessful (2008:13).	
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perspective not only because they are popularly imagined as preceding it in social 
evolutionary time but also because they are represented as beliefs rather than as a 
method for ascertaining truth (1995:505-506).  
Therefore, Povinelli further argues that, ‘because political-economic approaches still privilege 
western forms of assessment, a reevaluation of hunter-gatherer subjectivity has done little to 
increase the worth of hunter-gatherer productivity in a comparative economic framework’ 
(1995:515). 
Instead, Aboriginal beliefs about what happens when humans work in the environment are relegated 
to the broad category of ‘traditions’ (1995:508). Contemporary Aboriginal social and cultural 
practices are categorised into the ‘traditional’ (valuable) and non-‘traditional’ (valueless) 
(1995:516). This is the dominant conception of Aboriginal socio-economics and is indicative of 
how their labour action is valued and evaluated in national and legal economic realms (1995:508). 
Moreover, although the Australian government expresses remorse and a language of reconciliation 
with Indigenous Australians, Povinelli argues that, ‘in no-way has the non-Aboriginal Australian 
government or public altered its understanding of the factual grounds of work, labour, human 
subjectivity or environmental insentience’ (1995:516). This therefore sends a double message. She 
asserts that, ‘it tells Indigenous persons, “Your beliefs are absolutely essential to your economic 
well-being; your beliefs make no rational sense in the assessment of your economic well-being”’ 
(1995:516). Povinelli subsequently considers the limits of political-economic approaches when 
considering specific cultural constructions of economics (1995:506), stating that, 
 the culture of progress, productivity and political economy … remains in the policy 
world, an unassailable totem … Belief may be part and parcel of society and culture, but 
labour, ecology and economic value refer to material conditions most accurately 
approached through a scientific paradigm (1995:505).  
These cultural assumptions are therefore problematic, and Povinelli draws attention to the 
consideration that this may be a means of reinscribing dominant power over local minority 
communities (1995:506). 
In direct relation to the points that Povinelli raises, Altman and Hinkson (2009) and Altman (2010; 
2011) have raised concern for the integration of Indigenous Australians into the mainstream 
economy and specifically Noel Pearson’s welfare reform trials (Altman 2011). Altman and Hinkson 
(2009) argue that these trials have involved Indigenous Australians who are represented as having a 
refusal to conform to mainstream values (2009:185). Further, this is indicative of government 
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Indigenous development policy involving the ‘mainstreaming action’ of integrating Indigenous 
Australians into the mainstream economy (rather than acknowledging their existing economies). As 
such they state that, ‘government policy is increasingly geared towards producing mobile, formally 
educated, individualised Aboriginal citizens who will embrace the values of the free market’ 
(2009:185). Altman (2010) therefore challenges the economic future of Aboriginal Australians as 
part of the Australian mainstream that is encouraged by development policy according to 
increasingly neoliberal principles (2010:266).  
When operationalised in an Australian Indigenous context through policies championed by Pearson, 
the CA may therefore be intrinsically implicated in ‘development as a method of rule’ (McMichael 
2012:50); that is, positing development as a tool with which to legitimise power in the pursuit of 
increasing the consumption of goods, services and desired behaviours conducive to economic 
growth. This is contrary to Sen’s theoretical, non-negotiable commitment to democratic 
deliberation, the facilitation of agency freedom and a focus on capabilities according to my 
interpretation of his ideal-type. This (as above), is in order to avoid development by force. 
However, the CA being intrinsically implicated in ‘development as a method of rule’ would be to 
the detriment of upholding Aboriginal conceptions of socio-economics as well as cultural traditional 
practice.66 This reinforces the need for the CA to identify the liberal political economy as a source 
of unfreedom – fundamental to an appreciation of a realistic conception of the development subject 
that may be influenced by global capitalism when selecting valuable capabilities and functionings.67  
Through this critical literature on Indigenous Australia and capabilities, as well as the tension I have 
identified, it emerges that Sen’s approach may even be incompatible with his own conception of 
‘freedom.’ This prompts engagement with literature that argues that Sen’s notion of freedom is 
problematic.68 
 
 
                                                
66 Within the literature on capabilities there are authors who argue that Sen’s approach is inevitably paternalistic 
because human development policies informed by the CA are informed by a perfectionist conception of the good. That 
is, some fundamental choices are necessary to live a life of respect and value, such as literacy and gender equality 
(Deneulin 2002:1). These choices are naturally more privileged than others. Human development policies therefore 
inevitably leave little room for the freedom of each human being to pursue their own conception of the good, even when 
their aim is to expand the possibilities of choice and opportunity so that people can choose a life they have reason to 
value. However, Deneulin further argues that this perfectionism and its ensuing paternalism is not restrictive, but 
necessary to ensure the conditions for people to be free to live as dignified human beings (2002:16). 
67 Sen’s failure to deal with the presence of political economy as an inevitable influence on subjects of development 
leads Stewart & Deneulin (2002) to conclude that his discussions are ‘well removed from making substantial changes in 
the world’ (2002:70). 
68 Robeyns (2000) has argued that an application of the CA should be supplemented with a normative theory of choice 
(See Robeyns 2000:18-19). 
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Sen’s Conception of ‘Freedom’ 
Sen’s conception of freedom is problematised by multiple authors (Qizilbash 2008:154; Nussbaum 
2003:44-49; Gasper and Staveren 2003:143-157). Most notably, Nussbaum (2003) argues that 
without more precise specification (most notably in terms of a list of capabilities), Sen’s approach 
and its general endorsement of freedom shows a lack of respect for those who do not regard 
freedom and autonomy as central human values. Therefore, Sen’s commitment to pluralism and 
argument that different conceptions of the good life are possible through the CA’s prescriptions, are 
insufficient (2003:49). Moreover, as previously noted, Gasper and Staveren (2003) argue that Sen’s 
conception of freedom is both ‘overextended’ and ‘unelaborated.’ His overextension of freedom 
means that all capabilities persons are expected to acquire are described as freedoms, regardless of 
their specific content.69 Values associated with friendship, respect and care for example, cannot be 
understood in terms of individual freedom (2003:156-157). 
Further, the approach is ‘unelaborated’ because, ‘it does not distinguish between autonomous 
agency and the variety of values that may be promoted through such agency or between capability 
as a set of opportunities and capabilities as skills and capacities that can be nurtured’ (2003:156-
157). All goods such as knowledge (freedom from illiteracy or ignorance) or health (freedom from 
illness) and all capabilities are to be understood as freedoms, making the notion of freedom, ‘broad, 
vague and potentially confusing’ (2003:143). Gasper & Staveren call for an alternative language use 
that stresses other values that are as important as freedom, but could also be considered as the 
means and ends of development.70 They state, ‘ … we do not get a clear picture of the content of 
freedom itself, including the varieties, skills, dispositions and preconditions involved; it is instead 
an abstracted umbrella category’ (2003:143).71 Further, Gasper & Staveren caution that the degree 
to which Sen emphasises freedom – particularly in Development as Freedom poses a risk:  
The degree of emphasis on freedom in development as freedom risks leading some 
people to ignore contributions to well-being that are not parts of one’s autonomy and 
independence, but rather of their opposite. The intense focus on freedom may neglect 
evaluations of well-being in terms of social relations and personal relationships … 
(Gasper & Staveren 2003:145). 
                                                
69	This is related to literature that argues that Sen’s notion of ‘capability’ is also problematic (see Qizilbash 2012:5; 
Gasper 2007a:350-352; Brandolini & D’Alessio 2000:14).  
70 They argue that this needs recognition of capabilities in their own right, not just as examples of freedom (2003:157).  
71 This call for an improved differentiation of the term ‘freedom’ is supported by Qizilbash (2008:156). 
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The abstract sense of freedom that Sen so widely utilises in his work is therefore problematic, 
especially in relation to the constraints of the liberal political economy. As Gasper (2007b) argues, 
Sen attempts to integrate ideas from a very wide range of topics in human development 
by using “freedom” as a connecting focus. A danger exists that a perspective – of the 
accumulation of options, which can be waived, as part of one’s freedom – that originally 
derived from one sphere of life, the market economy, is extended to all of life … A 
theoretical basis for human development requires a richer conceptual system, including 
a richer conception of persons and personhood as opposed to thinking about only one 
type of social relations … A rhetoric of freedom not counter balanced by other 
conceptual frames typically leads in a neoliberal direction (Gasper 2007b:77). 
The problematisation of Sen’s concept of freedom by these authors reinforces the point that Sen can 
be interpreted as insufficiently appreciating the substantive social and political implications of his 
approach and role for the liberal political economy. According to my interpretation of his ideal-
type, Sen assumes that the CA facilitates the expansion of human freedoms, and that this expansion 
is development. However, as previously argued, he underestimates the extent to which ‘real’ 
opportunities are present to achieve the functionings conducive to this freedom. In addition, Sen’s 
assumption that his liberal vision of development is subscribed to by all persons and communities 
also translates into a problematic conception of freedom when we consider that alternative 
cosmologies and visions of development exist.  
As established, ultimately the CA and Development as Freedom can be interpreted as facilitating 
choices afforded by a liberal political economy rather than alternative cosmologies. This therefore 
restricts the potential for development subjects to uphold choices that maintain ‘tradition’ and to 
choose a life they have reason to value. By impliedly privileging the liberal political economy over 
‘tradition,’ the approach potentially restricts the choice of development subjects who do not want 
pursue a conception of freedom or development according to the CA’s prescriptions. This is cogent 
with Shilliam (2012) who problematises Sen’s approach through engagement with the Rastafari 
faith that views development subjects not as individuals seeking freedom, but as a collective group 
of ‘sufferers’ also seeking redemption from the market system. This complicates Sen’s notion of 
Development as Freedom by suggesting an alternative means through which the relationship 
between the market, development and freedom can be experienced and interpreted (2012:332). 
Sen’s implication that his (perfectionist) liberal vision of development is subscribed to by all 
persons and communities means that his approach is informed by an insufficient consideration of 
alternative, subjective expressions and means and ends of development. It is therefore reasonable to 
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argue that the CA and Development as Freedom are informed by a limited conception of freedom as 
part of Sen’s vision of development, potentially restricting the agency freedom of development 
subjects to ‘choose a life they have reason to value.’ 
A consideration of Sen’s assumption that the CA is universally applicable together with his 
conception of ‘freedom’ therefore further substantiates the argument that the CA may be 
intrinsically implicated in ‘development as a method of rule.’ As Philips (2001) reflects,  
The other reservation about autonomy is that the compulsion to be in control of one’s 
life can itself be viewed as a trap. One of the lessons I have drawn … from Foucault is 
that processes previously conceived of as liberation – working to get clearer about who 
and what you are, working to ensure that choices made really are your own choices and 
not just subservience to external pressures – might themselves operate as regimes of 
power (2001:257). 
When considering power relations generated by development, DaCosta and McMichael (2007) 
argue that Sen’s approach is typical of approaches that are presented as ‘new solutions’ to 
inequality as an effort to ‘humanise’ development. In fact, these liberal approaches are more 
accurately perceived as ‘methods of social control’ that ultimately reproduce dominant (economic) 
visions of development – those based on the institutionalisation of the market episteme (2007:588). 
These approaches therefore may actually reproduce inequality (2007:593).72  
Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter has critically engaged with literature and debates on Sen’s CA that are 
most relevant to this thesis. Firstly, this chapter engaged with critical debates concerning the 
weighting of capabilities and functionings and Sen’s choice to focus on capabilities instead of 
functionings. His theoretical justification of this is that a focus on capabilities ensures attention on 
the ability of a person to achieve what they have reason to value and the process through which this 
takes place – agency freedom and democratic deliberation. However through engagement with 
critical literature, it was argued that without a focus on functioning, Sen overlooks a consideration 
of whether the right conditions prevail for ‘real’ opportunities to be present to realise capabilities. 
He assumes the conditions for human flourishing will be present if the CA is followed. I have 
argued that Sen can be interpreted as insufficiently appreciating the substantive social and political 
relations of human well-being and development – and that his political analysis of the substantive 
social and political relations through which development is realised can be limited. This chapter has 
                                                
72 This is indicative of Sen not sufficiently engaging with the social and political implications of liberalism as a whole. 
He does not address any potential inequality generated by the liberal political economy as problematic. 
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therefore also presented critical debates on the CA that have substantiated this argument, and 
presented critical literature that does in fact enable a consideration of the substantive social and 
political relations through which Sen’s CA and Development as Freedom are to be realised. This is 
cogent with a political analysis of development and is important for considering potential 
implications of Sen’s approach being operationalised in a cross-cultural context. 
Firstly, regarding the liberal and independently autonomous individual at the centre of Sen’s 
approach, it was argued that this is an insufficient conception of the development subject, as 
individualist critiques of the CA reveal that individuals are always located in social contexts. Sen’s 
limited inclusion of some important aspects of social relations in his theoretical framework was 
established. Further, a full appreciation of human social life is important for the consideration of the 
ways in which capabilities are selected, valued and in order to account for all modes of action in the 
pursuit of agency freedom. This is supplemented by literature that calls for a notion of ‘collective 
capabilities’ (and that which acknowledges the importance of collective action) to be included in the 
approach, to account for the interaction between capabilities and social structures (Ibrahim 
2006:401). I have argued that the tension I identify – that ‘tradition’ is to be overcome in favour of 
ways of being that conform to the liberal political economy – is enabled by the fact that the 
approach does not include a notion of collective action and/or agency in its theorisation. This then 
restricts accounts of the political and cultural freedoms of cultural and social groups (as well as 
individuals) with shared values who wish to engage in collective political action, compromising 
Sen’s two-way relationship between the public and government policy. Therefore, culturally 
relevant and valuable capabilities are less likely to be included or recognised in favour of the 
capabilities and/or functionings that facilitate the liberal political economy directly. This is relevant 
when (according to Sen 1999:31) the ‘inevitable choice’ occurs between which ‘traditions’ are to be 
maintained alongside the social and economic changes necessary for development.  
The second set of critical literature this chapter has presented concerned Sen’s role for the liberal 
political economy. He assumes that the maintenance and facilitation of this economy will in turn 
facilitate the expansion of human freedom. Instead, value and individual benefit are placed upon 
processes and choices that, in turn, benefit economic progress. This argument can be sustained 
because of an inadequate conception of being human underlying the approach and the functioning 
individual produced by the CA being one that by implication must contribute to economic growth 
having achieved relevant substantive freedoms. Drawing on this literature I have therefore argued 
that this liberal political economy has the potential to substantively limit the autonomous choice of 
development subjects to the realm of choice afforded within this economy. This potentially 
compromises the ability for people to be able to lead the lives they have reason to value, restricting 
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agency freedom. Sen’s very general conception of freedom can be interpreted as being limited in 
understanding the social and political constraints of the liberal political economy. Therefore, there 
exists a real risk that for Sen, the market’s influence is extended to all life, causing his approach to 
go in a neoliberal direction (Gasper 2007b:77; Altman 2010:266). Thus, his vision for development 
can overlook pre-existing socio-economic conditions and related cultural conceptions of labour and 
productivity. This intrinsically implicates the CA in ‘development as a method of rule’ (McMichael 
2012:50). Here, I have in mind Australian Indigenous conceptions of socio-economics and 
‘traditional’ cultural practice. 
Finally, this chapter considered Sen’s problematic notion of ‘freedom’ in line with his assumption 
that the CA is universally applicable. I established that Sen’s conception of freedom is problematic 
because his approach has the potential to restrict development subjects in choosing the lives they 
have reason to value. This is to say that Sen’s approach can be interpreted and applied in ways that 
limit choices to that afforded by a liberal political economy and is therefore potentially restrictive of 
choices made by development subjects to uphold ‘tradition.’ Further, Sen’s assumption that his 
liberal vision of development is subscribed to by all persons and communities means that his 
approach is limited in its consideration of alternative, subjective expressions and means and ends of 
development. Sen’s approach and his inclusion of the liberal political economy leave little room for 
the development of distinct preferences and priorities based on life circumstances (Evans 2002:59). 
This includes provision for those who do not wish to realise freedom according to the CA, or have 
alternative conceptions of the ends and means of development. Without these provisions, the CA 
could be further implicated in positing development as a tool with which to legitimise power in the 
pursuit of increasing the consumption of goods, services and desired behaviours conducive to 
economic growth, according to ‘development as a method of rule’ (McMichael 2012:50). 
Despite these criticisms and debates, the three fundamental conditions I established in Chapter One 
still ought to prevail for an operationalisation of Sen’s CA according to my interpretation of his 
ideal-type. These conditions are related to agency freedom, economic growth and redistribution, 
and democratic participation. This ideal-typical operationalisation of the approach would see basic 
capabilities secured, the protection of agency freedom, a role for democratic deliberation, and the 
provision for welfare for the severely deprived. While these conditions ought to prevail at a general 
level, the critical debates I have presented in this chapter indicate that Sen leaves open some 
theoretical spaces within his approach that can be altered upon its operationalisation. 
Firstly, Sen has limited flexibility on his role for the economy. This would not be problematic if his 
approach is applied in a liberal democracy, but Sen’s approach is presented as universal. It would 
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substantively be problematic in contexts where people’s lives were not centred on liberal principles. 
In this sense, alternative cosmologies are not accounted for. As previously mentioned, this is 
indicative of Sen’s implicit commitment to a liberal approach more broadly and the assumption that 
freedom and participation will ensure equality, but is essentially still based on a commitment to 
modernisation and economic progress. Although Sen reduces the focus on economic growth that is 
typical of predominant approaches to development, his commitment to democratic participation and 
the deliberation of capabilities must occur within the parameters of a pre-established acceptance of 
a liberal framework. 
Secondly, Sen’s ideal-typical approach lacks a consideration of all possible modes of action 
necessary for the achievement of agency freedom. This has the potential to deny agency freedom of 
communities and kinship networks that have particular significance in cross-cultural contexts such 
as Indigenous Australia. Alongside the tension in his ideal-type that some aspects of ‘tradition’ 
would ultimately have to be overlooked, this would also potentially prevent culturally valued 
capabilities being selected as the means through which relevant cultural practices are maintained. 
Instead, capabilities conducive to the facilitation of the liberal political economy would prevail 
(such as the ability to be literate, the ability to gain employment), producing development subjects 
that would function to facilitate and maintain this economy. This also means that pre-existing 
economies and practices73 would have to be overlooked in favour of functioning that expands this 
economy (such as increasing the consumption of goods, services and desired behaviours conducive 
to economic growth), in favour of engagement with the mainstream economy and the realisation of 
freedom according to the goods, services and practices indicative of global liberalism. Collective 
political action as a means of formulating development responses that may challenge the social and 
economic development premises put forward by the CA, is, in such a context, potentially 
compromised.  
Even with a generous reading of Sen’s ideal-type, he does not intend for his approach to be 
restrictive in this way or an imposition. This can be established through the non-negotiable 
conditions that he insists upon and those must prevail if my interpretation of his ideal-type is 
operationalised. However, despite Sen’s commitment to agency freedom and deliberation, his 
approach is ultimately informed by a (perfectionist) liberal conception of development and an 
impliedly non-negotiable role for the liberal political economy. Because of his clear preferences, the 
two spaces I identify here (Sen’s limited flexibility on his role for the liberal political economy and 
his insufficient provision for collective modes of political action) have the potential to be 
                                                
73 These, according to Sen would fall under ’tradition,’ and could be maintained through the selection of relevant 
culturally valued capabilities through democratic deliberation. However as established in the precious paragraph, this is 
unlikely due to his role for the political economy.  
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problematic, with significant implications. Despite him positing freedom as the primary 
development goal, arguably, Sen’s implicit but implied commitment to modernisation and 
economic progress is problematic upon a cross-cultural application of the approach. Whilst Sen’s 
approach could be helpfully applied to ‘liberal’ societies, an ideal-typical operationalisation of the 
CA according to my interpretation (the ‘deepening’ of the CA I advance in Chapter One) may 
disfavor those not holding relevant forms of ‘liberal’ views. Though the conditions that must prevail 
according to my interpretation of his ideal-type dictate that some cultural practices in the private 
sphere can be upheld (for example ritual or language), it can be interpreted that according to Sen, 
the ordering of public spaces has to be through the liberal political economy. He assumes that any 
problems generated by this can be overcome by leaving a democratic space within which cultural 
practice can be ensured to be upheld, but not at the expense of the liberal political economy and the 
economic and social changes necessary for development to take place. 
Given the tension and critical engagements with Sen I identify in this chapter, it is clear that Sen’s 
approach can be interpreted as not engaging thoroughly enough with the substantive social and 
political relations through which development can be realised. If Sen’s approach were applied in a 
liberal context where people were accepting of liberal principles, the CA could potentially facilitate 
a viable development framework.74 However, when considering non-liberal societies and anyone 
‘opting-out’ of the liberal episteme (such as some Indigenous Australian groups with subsistence 
economies and alternative cosmologies), alternative conceptions of development are not always 
accounted for. Sen’s CA framework remains an approach to development based on abstractions and 
the assumption that the appropriate opportunities and conditions for actual functioning and human 
flourishing will prevail. It does not engage with development as a political process and does not 
account for particular dynamics (such as collective action) that are important as a mode of 
resistance (see DaCosta and McMichael 2007:591). This is particularly significant given the rise of 
neoliberalism globally and within Australian Indigenous policy (as indicated by Altman 2010:266).  
The critical insights of this chapter will inform an examination of the substantive social and 
political implications of the CA being altered and operationalised by Noel Pearson in the cross-
cultural context of Indigenous Australia. After investigating Pearson’s argument that the Cape York 
welfare reform trials are informed by Sen’s CA, these critical insights will help to establish whether 
Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s development approach can be attributed to the 
theoretical shortcomings and problematic spaces established according to my interpretation of the 
conditions that must hold in the context of an implementation of the approach.  
                                                
74 However the criticism regarding a lack of theorisation on collective action would still stand. 
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Chapter Three 
Noel Pearson, the Capability Approach & the Creation of a ‘Real Economy’ in Cape York: 
Operationalising Sen’s Approach? 
Introduction  
This chapter investigates Noel Pearson’s claim that the Cape York welfare reform trials are 
informed by Sen’s CA. Until now, I have focused on arguing that Sen’s approach itself is 
potentially problematic in a cross-cultural context with specific emphasis on the role that he assigns 
for the liberal political economy. This critique is discussed further in the second half of Chapter 
Four and in Chapter Five with regards to Cape York. However, in order to do this, it is necessary to 
engage with and explain Pearson’s claim that Sen’s approach is being operationalised in Indigenous 
Australia first. This will enable me to investigate subsequent Cape York Policy against my 
interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type in Chapter Four and more broadly establish whether the CA 
translates well into a cross-cultural context (despite the fact that Pearson may not be accurately 
drawing on Sen). In order to establish whether Pearson is applying Sen’s approach according to his 
argument, this chapter will evaluate Pearson’s adoption of Sen against the three fundamental 
conditions of Sen’s approach that must be upheld for an operationalisation of his ideal-type.  
Pearson professes to have drawn on Sen’s approach as a framework of thought with which to 
facilitate economic and social development in Cape York, with a view to improving Indigenous 
well-being (Pearson 2007c:1). As a founding member of the Cape York Institute (CYI) and Cape 
York Partnerships (CYP), he has maintained that the ongoing welfare reform policy trials in Cape 
York communities are informed by Sen’s CA. According to Pearson, these welfare reform trials aim 
to develop a ‘real economy’ in the region through methods of economic and social development. 
His adoption of Sen’s approach is attributed to its fundamental principle – ‘for people to be able to 
choose a life they have reason to value’ (Sen 1999:87). However, in this chapter I show how 
Pearson reconceptualises Sen’s approach. I argue that this reconceptualisation leads to Pearson 
altering the conditions within which Sen’s approach is to be realised. I establish that although 
Pearson uses the language of capabilities and explicitly attributes his ideas to Sen, there are 
significant differences between the two with considerable social and political implications.75 
                                                
75 These substantive social and political implications will be evaluated in depth in the following chapters of this thesis. 
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In reconceptualising the CA, Pearson firstly places greater emphasis on personal responsibility in 
achieving capability.76 He proposes that this responsibility is the difference between opportunity 
and capability and asserts that people must take responsibility to convert opportunity into capability 
(2007c:1). Although Sen would argue that personal responsibility has a role to play in improving 
well-being so far as individuals are to select functionings from their individual capability set to 
achieve valued functioning, his emphasis is on the responsibility of government to provide social 
opportunities and welfare provisions to improve well-being after social investment by the state. 
Pearson’s notion of personal responsibility is more politically charged, with an individual obligation 
to achieve capability. For Sen, any notion of responsibility sits in relation to a deeper, theoretical 
understanding of the becoming of the self through realising capability, in order for people to ‘lead a 
life they have reason to value.’ Secondly, an understanding of ‘capability’ in Cape York by Pearson, 
the CYI and CYP aligns more with Sen’s conception of instrumental freedoms. Pearson uses these 
to assess the conditions in Cape York, labelling them ‘capabilities,’ instead of using Sen’s 
conception of capability in a substantive way. 
Thirdly, in reconceptualising Sen’s CA, Pearson reorders Sen’s development goals to prioritise 
economic growth and the creation of a ‘real economy’ in Cape York (in order to solve what he 
perceives as the problem of ‘passive welfare’). For Sen, the primary goal of development is the 
expansion of human freedoms in order to reduce capability deprivation. Economic growth is a 
secondary goal within this process, which eventually supports the facilitation of instrumental 
freedoms through investment in social opportunities, including a provision for welfare. The 
redistribution of economic growth and investment in social opportunities is to be a ‘support-led’ 
process that contributes to the conditions within which Sen’s CA must be realised. However, 
Pearson’s reordering of Sen’s development goals relegates the expansion of human freedoms to a 
secondary development goal and unconditional welfare is eliminated. Pearson posits the creation of 
a ‘real economy’ as the primary development goal in Cape York with the expansion of ‘capabilities’ 
as the means.77 This is instead of prioritising the expansion of capabilities and human freedoms as 
the primary ends of development, with the facilitation of the liberal political economy as the means 
(as Sen would conceive it). 
                                                
76I do however acknowledge the significant change in Sen’s emphasis on the relationship between capability, freedom 
and responsibility. He has more recently argued that, ‘Freedom gives us the opportunity to decide what we should do – 
to the extent that they are chosen actions. Since a capability is the power to do something, the accountability that 
emanates from that ability – that power – is a part of the capability perspective, and this can make room for demands of 
duty – what can be broadly called deontological demands’ (Sen 2009:19). 
77However, I argue that the CYI and CYP not only reconceptualise Sen’s concept of capabilities but do not facilitate the 
expansion of capabilities for development subjects as Sen would conceive it.  
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Lastly, Pearson removes the concept of freedom altogether from his understanding of Sen’s 
approach. Pearson omits a provision for political freedoms to be achieved through development in 
Cape York. This inhibits the ability for the people of Cape York to participate in democratic 
deliberation to select the capabilities necessary for them to ‘choose a life they have reason to value,’ 
whereas Sen insists that democratic deliberation is necessary for the selection of these capabilities. 
Consequently, the conditions within which Sen’s CA is to be realised are altered. I argue that 
Pearson’ emphasis on personal responsibility, reconceptualisation of capability, and re-ordering of 
Sen’s development goals means that the Cape York development subject becomes instrumentalised 
in creating a particular type of (neoliberal) economic development.  
This chapter is structured as follows. In order to present Pearson’s argument that development in 
Cape York is informed by Sen’s CA; the first part will explain the specific social conditions within 
Cape York that Pearson identifies as problematic. He describes these conditions as ‘disadvantage 
and dysfunction’ (Pearson 2000b:19), passive behaviour, addiction and the breakdown of social 
order in the region (Cape York Institute 2005:6-7). Although Pearson recognises the economic and 
social history of Indigenous Australia and attributes welfare dependency to colonial history, he 
tends to discount such insights in the context of devising policy responses to the task of altering the 
social context of Indigenous Australians. I explain that Pearson attributes the social problems being 
faced by Cape York communities predominantly if not exclusively to ‘passive welfare’ dependency. 
Secondly, I explain Pearson’s adoption of Sen’s CA in Cape York and outline the political context 
informing Pearson’s position on the Indigenous experience of ‘passive welfare,’ which further 
justifies his use of the CA within the region. This section unpacks Pearson’s conception of ‘passive 
welfare’ and the connection he makes between this and the creation of a ‘passive economy,’ as 
opposed to a ‘real economy.’ He proposes welfare reform in line with Indigenous Australians 
engaging in this ‘real economy’ as a type of moral obligation, as opposed to welfare dependency, 
which he views as a moral failure (Pearson 2000a:11).78 
Thirdly, I explain how Pearson begins to reconceptualise Sen’s CA. Pearson argues that the most 
important right Indigenous Australians have is to take responsibility for themselves (Pearson 
2007a:3). The notion of responsibility becomes central to his alteration of Sen’s approach, as does 
the re-ordering of Sen’s development goals. I explain how Pearson privileges the creation of a ‘real 
economy’ in Cape York (synonymous with a neoliberal economy) rather than the expansion of 
human freedoms. Pearson’s reconceptualisation subsequently informs development thinking in 
Cape York through the CYI. Fourthly, I outline the Cape York welfare reform trials, explain the 
                                                
78 Pearson’s transformation of ‘passive welfare’ in Cape York sees welfare become reconstructed as a social contract 
and moral obligation to facilitate the liberal political economy. I explain how this is problematic in more detail in 
Chapter Five. 
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aims of these trials and present Pearson’s and the Institute’s argument that they based on the work 
of Sen. This section further establishes how the CA is conceptually embedded within the CYI, 
presenting the eleven basic capabilities the Institute has chosen with which to assess well-being in 
the region. According to the CYI, economic and social development must build capabilities through 
engagement with the ‘real economy’ (CYI 2005:6-7). I explain the CYI’s ‘staircase model for 
progress’79 as a conceptual response to their conclusion that capabilities in Cape York are in ‘poor 
condition’ (CYI 2005:1). 
The conclusion of this chapter examines Pearson’s framing of Sen’s approach and establishes the 
extent to which Pearson and Sen share a conception of the CA and Development as Freedom. This 
is established through a consideration of the three fundamental conditions through which Sen’s 
approach should be operationalised, as identified in Chapter One. I establish that there is sufficient 
evidence to argue that Pearson’s use of the CA is a significant reconceptualisation and alteration of 
Sen’s ideal-type, according to my interpretation. 
Cape York Social Conditions 
Primarily, Pearson argues that alcoholism, or ‘the problem of grog,’ is the most pervasive social 
problem facing the people of Cape York. He does also acknowledge that smoking, diet and stress 
are also factors in mortality and health rates for Indigenous people (2000:16). For young people in 
the region, drug dependency and petrol sniffing are just as bad (Pearson 2000b:16-17). Pearson 
argues that substance abuse has led to social and cultural manipulation and distortion (2000b:18) 
and infers that the ‘social and cultural obligations’ as practiced among Indigenous Australians may 
contribute to binge drinking as a dynamic of group identification. He states, 
 
when you look at a drinking circle you see people who are socialising around grog. 
Social and cultural relationships between the drinkers are expressed, reinforced and 
reiterated whilst people are engaged in drinking. Everyone involved in the drinking is 
obliged to contribute resources – money – for the purchase of grog. Everyone is obliged 
to share the money and the grog. These social and cultural obligations are invoked at 
every turn by members of the drinking circle. These invocations are very heavy indeed 
and they most often draw upon real obligations and relationships under Aboriginal laws 
and customs. What – when people are not drinking but hunting – is a cultural obligation 
to share food with countrymen, is turned into a cultural obligation to share grog. In fact 
your fellow drinkers will challenge your Aboriginal identity in order to establish your 
                                                
79 I also acknowledge that this ‘staircase’ is rooted in a neoliberal conception of inequality and is inconsistent with Sen.  
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obligation to contribute money to buy grog: “Come on, don’t be flash! We not white 
fellas! You-me black people!” So – drinkers have a reciprocal obligation to contribute to 
buying alcohol; “When I have money it’s my turn to shout. When your money comes, 
it’s your turn to shout” (2000b:17). 
Outsiders are also caught in these cultural obligations: 
Outside of this drinking circle are the women and the children and old people and the 
non-drinkers. The resources of these non-drinkers are placed under tremendous social 
and cultural pressure to contribute resources to the drinking circle for buying grog. So 
the drinking circle becomes the suction hole for the family’s resources. Wives and 
girlfriends, parents and grandparents, are placed under tremendous pressure – social and 
cultural and ultimately through physical violence: “Why you wanna [sic] stop me from 
having fun with my brothers?” – to contribute to these pathological behaviours 
(2000b:17).  
Pearson explains that since the 1980s, women have also joined these drinking circles and youth 
have taken to drugs and drinking at an earlier age, even to the point where young children are 
forming their own ‘petrol sniffing coteries’ (2000b:17-18). He argues that the ‘corruption’ of 
Aboriginal values is causal, stating,  
by simply assuming that everything we think is “Aboriginal” or “traditional” is good, 
we fail to analyse the deformities that these arrangements and values have undergone. 
Clearly the traditional obligation to share resources has been corrupted. Today this 
defining element of our culture is manifested in an obligation to share the Family 
Allowance Support payment to get drunk with one’s relatives – whilst our children go 
without (2000b:18).  
Pearson therefore argues that the ‘wrong people’ are socialising and engaging in ‘inappropriate 
behaviours.’ According to him, this is not a ‘true expression’ of Aboriginal cultural values and 
relationships but is a ‘corruption’ of them (2000b:19). The role of the economic system that allows 
‘passive welfare’ to be a problem causal to this dysfunction is one that the Indigenous people of 
Cape York did not choose. He states,  
the suction hole of these drinking and gambling coteries, and all of the social and 
cultural pressure that it brings to bear on people is almost impossible to avoid, even 
where people remain sober their resources are drawn upon by these activities. People 
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who manage to get over grog and try to set out in a new direction after spending time in 
prison end up being sucked back (2000b:19). 
However, responsibility is a the key factor for Pearson, and he argues that as individuals, the people 
of Cape York must accept responsibility for the disadvantage and dysfunction they face and for 
respecting and upholding ‘true’ values, relationships, laws and customs (2000b:19). Pearson 
emphasises that ‘passive welfare’ remains the dominant factor in explaining the ‘social crisis’ that 
the people of Cape York face because of the fact that even as their material conditions have 
improved through the receipt of welfare payments, social conditions have deteriorated. He argues 
that there exists a conflict between Aboriginal tradition and the economy, stating, 
invariably, the outcome of the ongoing conflicts between our traditions and the 
economic base of our society, is that our traditions succumb and are eroded daily … the 
traditions that we do follow are in fact distortions conditioned by the pathological social 
situation which ‘passive welfare’ has reduced us to: that we sit around in a drinking 
circle because we are Aboriginal, that you are trying to be a flash white fella when you 
are not giving your brother money for grog (2000b:23). 
A significant point to note is that Pearson recognises the economic and social history of Indigenous 
Australians in understanding their present disadvantage and dysfunction. In particular, he asserts 
that social problems are older than ‘passive welfare’, with the colonial experience forcing 
Indigenous Australians to move between the subsistence economy of institutions and the 
mainstream economy of the outside world: 
The real market economy of the colonists affected Aboriginal people wherever colonial 
society was established. Whilst groups of Aboriginal people continued to cling to their 
traditional economy and it remains today a component of the indigenous livelihood in 
the Cape York Peninsula, the colonial intrusion necessarily engulfed Aboriginal society 
and economy as well … Aboriginal people have therefore participated in the market 
economy for most of Australia’s colonial history and we have done [sic] at the lowest 
end of the scale. Engagement in the market economy was often degrading and involved 
tragic exploitation (2000b:27). 
Pearson argues that welfare dependency is the result of this colonial history, which took away the 
self-sufficiency of Aboriginal people (2000b:29). The economic and the social in this context are 
therefore one and the same, and he asserts that those who are concerned about social problems in 
Cape York must have a clear understanding of this colonial history, ‘because the relationship 
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between economic circumstances and social problems is critical’ (2000b:31). He argues that, ‘the 
fact is, every economic relationship is also necessarily a social relationship and underlying many of 
our social problems are these economic relationships and issues. The relationship between 
government and the community and the government and the individual, is perpetuated and recreated 
by all of the internal relationships of our society’ (2000b:31).  
Pearson also touches upon racism, dispossession80 and trauma as historical legacies that inform 
disadvantage and dysfunction within the region. However, although he acknowledges and 
recognises the economic and social history of Indigenous Australians in understanding their present 
disadvantage and dysfunction, he sets this aside for the purposes of conceptualising practical 
responses. Instead, Pearson focuses on policy concerning the economy of communities (2000b:37). 
He argues that,  
whilst there is general nominal acceptance of the interrelationship between economic 
issues and social problems, in practice economic issues have been regulated to the ‘too 
hard basket’ and attention has been focused on behavioural problems such as domestic 
violence or health problems. But we cannot defer tackling the fundamental issue of the 
economy of our society (2000b:31). 
Therefore, although Pearson insists on the recognition of the historical, colonial legacy of 
Indigenous Australians and clearly outlines the current social conditions and addiction in Cape 
York communities, he does not only attribute the current dysfunction and social problems to these 
factors. He insists that current social problems are not the legacy of racism, dispossession and 
trauma of Indigenous Australia’s colonial history (2000b:38). He argues that pre-1970s, the social 
problems facing Indigenous Australia today did not exist. That is to say, they did not arise before 
‘passive welfare’ dependence. Instead, Pearson asserts that these social problems arose from the 
particular economic condition of ‘passive welfare’ dependence (2000b:38). Racism, dispossession 
and trauma are the ‘ultimate explanations’ for the ‘precarious situation’ of Indigenous people as a 
whole but not for recent and rapid social dysfunction (2000b:38). Altman and Hinkson (2009) 
describe Pearson’s thinking as follows:  
 The urgent need to break the deadlock of hopelessness … is put forward as a rationale 
for a radically new interpretative framework as a basis for policy making – one that 
looks beyond colonial experience and governmental neglect to place the onus on 
Aboriginal people to themselves take responsibility for their actions. Through the 
                                                
80 This dispossession refers to Indigenous Australians being forcibly removed from their traditional homelands as 
outlined in the ‘Bringing Them Home’ Report (Cth 1997). 
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ensuing debate that has emerged, a stark separation has opened up between the 
proponents of a ‘rights’ or ‘culture’-based politics and policy making versus those who 
promote individual responsibility. This debate is ultimately a contestation over the 
reshaping of Aboriginal values (2009:190).  
Pearson’s emphasis on economic relationships and focus on policy concerning the economy of 
Cape York communities conveys his belief that tackling what he perceives as ‘passive welfare 
dependence’ is key to improving Indigenous well-being. This belief causes Pearson to initiate a 
process of economic and social development in Cape York with a view to moving from ‘passive 
welfare’ to engagement in the ‘real economy’ through policy that maintains and facilitates a (neo) 
liberal political economy81 in order for people to ‘choose a life they have reason to value.’ In 
prioritising the creation of a ‘real economy’ as the primary means to improve well-being, Pearson 
re-orders Sen’s development goals. For Sen, the facilitation of the liberal political economy is a 
secondary development goal that is achieved subsequent to the expansion of human freedoms. For 
Pearson, the facilitation and maintenance of a ‘real economy’ is the ends of the development 
process, with the expansion of human ‘capabilities’ as the means (with the removal of unconditional 
welfare). The way in which Pearson prioritises a ‘real economy’ in this way through a notion of 
personal responsibility and capability (his argued use of Sen) will be explained in the following 
sections. 
Noel Pearson & the Capability Approach  
From Hope Vale in Cape York, Noel Pearson has established himself as a public intellectual and 
spokesman for Indigenous issues through his role as a lawyer, land rights activist and social 
reformer. As such, he is a highly influential and prominent figure in Indigenous affairs (Curchin 
2013:257). Curchin (2013) highlights a fundamental idea within Pearson’s work – the ‘quest for a 
radical centre’ and suggests that this idea legitimises the role he plays as an advocate of Indigenous 
responsibility discourse (2013:258). She states, ‘it helps him indirectly address the accusation that 
he has arrogated to himself the role of spokesman for Indigenous Australia’ (2013:258). Therefore, 
it is important to briefly outline Pearson’s concept of the radical centre in order to begin to 
understand his justification of the use of Sen’s CA as a framework of thought for improving 
Indigenous well-being.  
The idea of the radical centre concerns normative policy principles and policy provisions – it is an 
ideal for policy makers to aspire to in providing policy solutions. For Pearson, political problems 
have a series of classic tensions at their source such as rights versus responsibilities; social order 
                                                
81 I explain this policy in more detail in Chapter Four. 
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versus liberty and individual versus community (Pearson 2009a:253 cited in Curchin 2013:258). In 
order to resolve these tensions, a ‘synthesis’ of, ‘competing yet fundamentally important political 
principles’ is required for the creation of a radical centre and therefore optimum policy (Pearson 
2009a:248 cited in Curchin 2013:258). Curchin states that in this way, ‘the best leaders are able to 
generate genuinely new solutions that transcend existing paradigms, only through a deep 
understanding of the strengths of all contending views’ (2013:258).  
For Pearson, the tension between ‘opportunity versus choice’ is particularly significant. By 
‘opportunity’ he refers to social democratic investment in welfare and economic redistribution. By 
‘choice’ he refers to the liberal prioritisation of individual choice (2013:259). For Pearson, Sen 
provides a solution to this tension through his notion of capabilities – by demonstrating that the 
benefits of choice can be experienced only once individuals have received sufficient healthcare and 
education (as part of a basic capability threshold) (2013:259). Pearson argues that the innovative 
social programs developed by the CYI have their intellectual basis in this radical synthesis of 
individual choice, social investment and personal responsibility (Pearson 2010 cited in Curchin 
2013:259). The significance of Sen’s notion of capability informing these social programs is 
justified by Pearson: 
Sen’s starting point is the powerful liberal premise of individual choice. Ultimately it is 
individuals who will determine the kind of life they value. But in order for individuals to 
have choices, Sen argues, they must have capabilities. Health and education are the most 
basic capabilities, but political freedom and economic freedom are also essential 
capabilities. Without capabilities, choice can be a hollow conceit (Pearson 2007b). 
 
Additional justification for the use of Sen’s approach in Cape York is evident within other 
publications by Pearson. Writing in 2007, he stated that reform goals in the Cape York Peninsula 
had been ‘much inspired’ by Amartya Sen, ‘for our people to have the capabilities to choose the life 
they have reason to value’ (2007c:1). The CYI have implemented these reform goals under 
Pearson’s influence, and they state their end goal as, ‘ensuring that Cape York people have the 
capabilities to choose a life they value.’ Pearson adds, ‘it is not about making choices for people, 
but is rather about expanding the range of choices people have available to them’ (Pearson 2005:2). 
In aiming to improve the opportunity for Indigenous Australians to exercise meaningful life 
choices, the Institute argues that the people of Cape York have been denied opportunities to 
exercise substantive freedoms that mainstream Australians take for granted (2005:5). They attribute 
this to constraints on capabilities that are imposed institutionally through general public policy 
measures, to Indigenous peoples’ inability to access public services, and to individual behaviour 
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within the region. The Institute’s role is therefore to build individual capabilities through social and 
economic development, in order to ensure that the people of Cape York have the capabilities to 
choose a life they value (2005:6). 
In order to fully understand the influence of Sen’s approach within Cape York, it is necessary to 
outline the political context informing Pearson’s position on the Indigenous experience of ‘passive 
welfare,’ which he argues contributes to the poor standard of well-being within the region. His 
association of poor standards of living with ‘passive welfare’ further justifies and influences his use 
and implementation of the CA in the region, through the CYI. 
 
Political Context:  Noel Pearson & the Indigenous Experience of ‘Passive Welfare’ 
 
Pearson is concerned with fixing what he perceives as the ‘passive welfare dependency’ of 
Indigenous Australians. By this, he refers to the wider political and economic circumstances that 
social welfare generates within and between Indigenous communities – an economy within which 
money and commodities are used and expected without reciprocity. For Pearson, social or ‘passive’ 
welfare is taken to mean the individual receipt of monetary payments over an individual’s lifetime 
from the Australian government, without any reciprocal action from that individual. He argues, ‘the 
problem of my people in Cape York Peninsula is that we have only experienced the income support 
that is payable to the permanently unemployed and marginalised. I call this ‘passive welfare’ to 
distinguish it from the welfare proper, that is, when working taxpayers collectively finance systems 
aimed at their own and their families’ security and development’ (Pearson 2000a:6). This engenders 
a ‘social passivity’ that manifests in a lack of active response from Indigenous individuals to change 
these circumstances. Pearson states that Indigenous Australians, particularly those of the Cape York 
Peninsula, have not benefitted from the existence of the welfare state. He argues, ‘the welfare state 
has meant security and an opportunity for development for many of your mob. It has been enabling. 
The problem of my people in Cape York Peninsula is that we have only experienced the income 
support that is payable to the permanently unemployed and marginalised’ (Pearson 2000a:6).  
 
According to Pearson, this reliance on ‘passive welfare’ has caused ‘particular social deterioration’ 
and social problems that have had a ‘cancerous effect’ on the relationships and values of families 
and communities, such as intra-community violence (2000a:1). He argues that this is a, ‘poor 
substitute for participation in the real economy, psychologically, socially, and economically’ 
(Pearson 2000b:22). He suggests that rather than providing the opportunity for a ‘proper place’ in 
the wider economy and society, ‘passive welfare’ instead confines the recipient to their ‘stagnant 
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environment’ (2000b:22). In this sense, ‘passive welfare’ ‘kills initiative’ and ‘breeds dependency,’ 
discouraging people from being self-sufficient and, ‘taking their fair share through engagement in 
the real economy’ (2000b:22). Recipients become pacified instead of invigorated in order into 
engage in social, political and economic action, ‘to secure a better deal for themselves or their 
children’ (2000b:22). What Pearson (2007a) is suggesting here is not that the welfare state is a 
negative entity in and of itself, but that Indigenous Australia has primarily experienced one part of 
it, which he sees as, ‘income provisioning for people who are dispossessed82 from the real 
economy’ (Pearson 2000a:7). What is at issue is that Indigenous Australians have largely not 
experienced the positive features of the welfare state; improvements in public health; education; 
infrastructure; and other features that improve the quality of life and opportunities of generations of 
Australians (2000a:7). 
 
Despite the welfare state providing such resources to both Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians, statistically Indigenous Australians remain worse off. According to the 2011 Australian 
census, the mean equivalised gross household income for Indigenous persons was around $475 per 
week – 59 per cent of that for non-Indigenous persons who had a gross household income of around 
$800 per week (Australian Government 2013:14). With regards to public health, from 2009-2011 
infant mortality was higher for Indigenous Australians than non-Indigenous infants and in 2006-
2010, the age-standardised death rate for Indigenous peoples was 1.9 times the rate for non-
Indigenous Australians (2013:8). Statistics also indicate that 29 per cent of Indigenous people report 
year ten as their highest year of school completion and 25 per cent completed year twelve compared 
with 52 per cent of non-Indigenous Australians who completed year twelve (2013:13). Pearson 
argues, ‘the people of my dysfunctional society have struggled to use [social welfare] … resources 
for our development…Our relegation to the dependence on perpetual passive income transfers 
meant that our people’s experience of the welfare state has been negative. Indeed, in the final 
analysis, completely destructive and tragic’ (Pearson 2000a:7). 
Pearson argues that the ‘passive welfare’ mentality has been particularly destructive in Aboriginal 
society, resulting in people thinking that the solutions to their problems lie outside of themselves, 
and people failing to take responsibility for themselves as individuals, families and communities 
(Pearson 2000b:22). What he proposes instead is the reform of welfare, calling for Australia to 
develop a ‘new consensus’ on welfare, built on personal and family empowerment and, ‘investment 
and the utilisation of resources to achieve lasting change’ (Pearson 2000a:11). He also argues that 
welfare reform could reduce government commitments, and decrease taxation of, ‘those who 
                                                
82 By ‘dispossessed,’ Pearson is referring to those receiving passive welfare as not being engaged with the ‘real 
economy’ – those who do not sell their labour or are not contractually employed. 
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already have a place in the economy’ (2000a:11).83 Pearson’s proposal therefore involves a moral 
stance on behalf of those who are employed and pay taxes, (those who have a place in the ‘real 
economy’), in contrast to people whose dependency is seen (according to him) as a moral failure 
(2000a:11). He states, ‘Australians do not have an inalienable right to dependency, they have an 
inalienable right to a fair place in the real economy’ (2000a:11). When discussing the labour 
movement that gave rise to the welfare state in Australia, and the ‘new economy’ that was created 
(the modern economy of developed countries), Pearson argues that those who have ‘important 
functions’ in this economy are those employed on individual contracts, able to find individual 
solutions for their education, healthcare and retirement. Concomitantly, the welfare state is, 
‘increasingly presented as an impediment to economic growth’ (2000a:5). 
 
For Pearson, the ‘real economy’ is therefore one that demands responsibility in the form of a 
rational economic relationship compared to the economic relationship generated by ‘passive 
welfare’. This responsibility aligns with Indigenous Australians acquiring personally earned money, 
being self-sufficient and being able to engage in political, economic and social action (Pearson 
2000b:22). Pearson perceives this economy as an individual’s ‘proper place’ (2000b:22) and labels 
this the ‘white fella market economy’ (2000b:5). In asserting Indigenous Australians’ ‘right’ to have 
a place in the ‘real economy,’ by default Pearson assumes that individuals who are recipients of 
‘passive welfare’ are not already integrated into the global liberal political economy in one way or 
another. In doing so, he also assumes that all Indigenous Australians have a want to be wholly 
integrated into this economy. That is, they will forego any non-liberal socio-economic systems in 
favour of a mainstream liberal political economy.84 
In his Light on the Hill speech (2000),85 Pearson explicitly discusses the social democratic 
principles of the welfare state and uses this as a means to support his own case about the need to 
transform ‘passive welfare.’  It should be noted that in his construction of the conditions within 
which this ‘real economy’ is to be created, he makes the case for public expenditure on healthcare 
and education provisioning as these are, ‘the two main areas of the public sector of the economy’ 
(Pearson 2000b:4). Thus, according to Pearson’s reconstruction of social democracy, healthcare and 
education ‘can’t be reduced to commodities on the market, because healthcare and education are 
about making everybody an able player on the market. In other areas of the economy you can then 
                                                
83 This subtly conveys a neoliberal agenda, which will be further established and explained in Chapter Five. 
84This is not to say they would not want to be, or particularly want to be – rather, this links to the particular conception 
of development that informs Pearson’s approach. Not all community conceptions of what development ought to be are 
the same (for example, see Povinelli 1995). This is especially relevant if Pearson’s work is a pilot project to be rolled 
out across Indigenous Australia.		
85	Pearson made his Light on the Hill Speech in 2000 as part of the Ben Chifley Memorial Lecture Series in Australia.	
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allow competition’ (Pearson 2000b:4). He therefore identifies education and healthcare as important 
sectors that, ‘cannot be reduced to commodities on the market,’ and argues it is the government’s 
responsibility to ensure the provision of these services as public goods. His reasoning for the 
public provision of these services is because they help to facilitate the conditions through which 
individuals ‘can become a player on the market.’ While this indicates the concern with mitigating 
against the detrimental effects of welfare dependency and leaves room for the provision of goods 
and services aside from market mechanisms, it also signals a more general endorsement of the latter 
as the ultimate destination that may be in need for further analysis and critical attention. 
However, in reconstructing welfare in this way, Pearson overlooks important normative (justice and 
rights based) arguments about the provision of social welfare. In these debates, the public provision 
and protection of welfare are conceived as part of the social contract of citizenship as well as a 
means to off-set the inequalities through which liberal political economy is realised.86 Therefore, 
from these perspectives, welfare is a means to correct these unequal distributive outcomes of the 
market itself. Pearson instead reconstructs welfare as a social contract and moral obligation to 
facilitate the market mechanism, without recognition of the potential inequalities created by the 
market economy (additional inequalities apart from the ‘disadvantage and dysfunction’ he already 
identifies as a pre-condition to passive welfare reform). This position is cogent with neoliberal 
approaches to development and the question of welfare within which poverty is conceived not as a 
social relation or outcome of social and political institutions, but as, ‘the moral failure of the 
individual to act responsibly’ (Pearson 2000a:11).87 Thus, Pearson’s understanding of ‘passive 
welfare’ is problematic in overlooking structural inequalities of the market. Sen includes the 
provision of welfare as a form of economic security to ensure an individual’s basic needs, indicative 
of him (partially) recognising that the liberal political economy can generate inequality. However, 
Pearson does not include such provisions within his approach. Rather, he offers welfare on a 
reciprocal basis in return for participation in welfare reform trials and functioning that is valuable to 
the creation of a ‘real economy.’ This is explained further in Chapter Four. The next section 
considers Pearson’s reconceptualisation of Sen’s approach.  
Reconceptualising Sen’s Capability Approach: The Role of Responsibility & Re-Ordering 
Sen’s Development Goals 
Pearson argues that there has been a widespread absence of discussion within Indigenous policy 
discourse concerning responsibility. He argues that this is due to the belief that better healthcare, 
                                                
86 Hence, for example, the ‘embedded liberal compromise’ (see Ruggie 1994). 
87 This is akin to a more general argument that frames inequality and poverty not in social relational terms but as the 
responsibility of the individual. For more on this in relation to welfare debates in the United States, see Somers & Block 
(2005).	
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education and life expectancy and the like are rights that can be enjoyed if other people, specifically 
governments and wider society, are engaged in necessary action for them to be realised. Pearson’s 
fundamental point is that the most important right Indigenous Australians have is the right to take 
responsibility for themselves. According to him, after the experience of a state which has taken over 
individual responsibility, there is an ‘urgent need’ for responsibility to be restored back to the 
individual (Pearson 2007a:33). Subsequently, Pearson (2007c) places the notion of responsibility 
centrally within his interpretation of Sen’s CA. He proposes that responsibility is the difference 
between opportunity and capability, stating, ‘individual citizens may indeed have a right to 
opportunity, but such an opportunity will not become capability without the individual and her 
family (and community) taking responsibility to convert opportunity into capability’ (2007c:1). He 
gives the example of an Indigenous child, who, if she has access to a good school, will only develop 
capabilities if her parents and her community fulfil their responsibilities to ensure that she attends 
every day,  after a good night’s sleep, after breakfast, and with lunch. As she gets older, Pearson 
explains that she will also need to take her own responsibility for the choices that she makes 
(2007c:1). Pearson’s use of capability and opportunity in this way is distinct from Sen. For Sen, the 
notion of capability innately captures the ‘opportunity aspect’ of freedom. While in this specific 
example what he means by responsibility might not be controversial, it is necessary to unpack 
further how Pearson conceives of responsibility in relation to his conception of the ‘real economy.’ 
Pearson (2010) reiterates his point that it is not a case of opportunity provided by redistribution that 
facilitates development, but in order to produce ‘true capabilities,’ personal responsibility must be 
combined with opportunity. He argues, ‘you can well have many opportunities in the welfare state, 
but if someone does not take personal responsibility, then no capabilities will be developed. A 
society might have good opportunities for health and education, but without personal responsibility, 
their capabilities will not result’ (2010:7). The problems associated with ‘passive welfare’ arise not 
because of the unequal distribution of opportunity, but because of the lack of individual and family 
responsibility to convert opportunity into capability (Pearson 2007b:1). Therefore, for Pearson, 
governments should make ‘social investments’ for people to develop their capabilities, but this 
investment must be concerned with enabling people to pursue their own self-interests (Pearson 
2010:6-7). Pearson’s political stance of the radical centre, combined with him perceiving that Sen 
provides a conceptual solution concerning the relationship between the normative policy principles 
‘opportunity’ and ‘choice,’ translates into Pearson’s work in Cape York. As Curchin states:  
Pearson claims he and his colleagues at the Cape York Institute for Policy and 
Leadership have improved on Sen’s insight about capabilities by reconciling it with the 
conservative value of personal responsibility (Pearson 2009a: 255; 2010). He argues that 
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capabilities are not the simple result of social investment in the opportunities of the 
worst-off. Rather they are the combined product of this social investment and the 
personal responsibility the poor have to improve their own lives. If individuals within 
the underclass decline to take responsibility for their own health, education, the care of 
their children and so on, then social investment by the state can achieve nothing. In his 
assessment, lack of personal responsibility is a crucial explanatory factor in the dire 
social conditions currently experienced in Indigenous communities in Cape York and 
elsewhere around Australia (Curchin 2013:259). 
Although Pearson uses the language of capabilities and attributes his ideas explicitly to Sen, on 
closer inspection there are significant differences between the two, with considerable social and 
political implications. Pearson places greater emphasis on personal responsibility than Sen. Sen’s 
emphasis is on the responsibility of government to provide social opportunities and welfare 
provisions to improve well-being. Sen would argue that there exists a degree of personal 
responsibility within the CA in terms of the individual selecting capabilities to achieve valuable 
functionings. However, for him, this is in relation to a deep, theoretical understanding of the 
becoming of the self in line with individuals being able to achieve capability (what they are able to 
do and be) and choose a life they have reason to value (albeit within a liberal framework). For 
Pearson, incorporating the notion of personal responsibility into his reconceptualisation of Sen’s 
approach is politically motivated, informed by his perception of passive welfare and Indigenous 
Australians lacking the personal responsibility to improve their own well-being. As a solution, 
Pearson intends to facilitate and maintain a ‘real economy’ in Cape York.   
Pearson does acknowledge the responsibility of the state in ensuring well-being. However he 
focuses on this less than Sen.88 Pearson argues that Indigenous children will be able to choose their 
own life path only after they have received the best education and have been protected from ill 
health and neglect. This is the responsibility of government, with citizens entitled to opportunities 
and the redistributive mechanisms of the welfare state that increase these opportunities (Pearson 
2007b:1). This and further responsibilities of government according to Pearson will be discussed in 
the next section.  
Noel Pearson & the Role of the State 
Pearson specifies that the state’s role in Indigenous policy matters in Cape York is to ensure that 
there are solutions: providing resources, policy development, decision making, and the delivery of 
                                                
88 Despite acknowledging the state’s responsibility to invest in social opportunities for people to realise capability, 
Pearson believes that personal responsibility is still necessary for the improvement of well-being. 
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policies (2000b:78-79). Firstly, in regards to ‘ensuring solutions,’ this can be taken to mean 
providing solutions to what Pearson perceives as Indigenous underdevelopment – community 
disadvantage and dysfunction in Cape York. This, he argues, ‘is the ultimate responsibility of the 
state. However it must be clear to us that the state’s actual capacity to deliver on its responsibility is 
limited: it cannot deliver solutions on its own without a partnership with the community’ 
(2000b:78). Secondly, ‘providing resources’ relates to the government having to make ‘social 
investments’ for people to develop their capabilities and to this investment having to in fact enable 
people to pursue their own self-interests (Pearson 2010:6-7). This is indicative of a redistributive 
role for government and refers to both funding and expertise. In reference to funding, Pearson 
argues, ‘this is the state’s primary responsibility and it may sometimes be the only substantial role it 
should play in social services: provide and account for funding resources’ (Pearson 2000b:78). 
However, in light of the negative consequences of ‘passive welfare,’ Pearson is specific on how 
funds are to be distributed. He asserts, ‘government transfers are a valuable and necessary resource, 
but the passive transfer of these transfers has to be changed in order to make it a useful and 
productive resource’ (2000b:54).89 In reference to expertise, he states, ‘the state frequently has 
expertise and accumulated experience and information within the bureaucracy which is a very 
useful resource that can be utilised in the search for and development of solutions’ (2000b:78). 
Pearson’s assertion of the importance of a partnership between communities and the state is 
particularly evident in his explanation of the state’s responsibility for ‘policy development.’ The 
state’s ultimate responsibility for ‘ensuring solutions’ inevitably means that it will retain an interest 
in policy, however the state must limit the extent of its policy making. He argues, 
the days of the state developing and deciding policy must come to an end. The 
communities affected by social policy must develop the policies. The state will have the 
expertise to contribute to these policies. Communities should be able to develop their 
own expertise and to purchase expertise from the private and non-government sectors. 
Policies that apply to communities should be developed within the context of a 
partnership between the state and the community (2000b:78-79).  
Similarly, when referring to ‘decision making,’ he explains that the days of the state making 
decisions in relation to community policies must end. Instead, policy decisions should be made, 
‘within the context of a partnership between the state and the community’ (2000b:79). Moreover, he 
argues that, ‘this partnership needs to be real and its terms and ongoing operation must be 
negotiated …’ (2000b:79). Finally, with regard to the delivery of policies, Pearson states that policy 
                                                
89 Specifically, Pearson transforms welfare into an incentive, to be received after commitment or participation in certain 
policy trials by community members. As previously footnoted, this will be explained further in Chapter Four. 
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action may be carried out in different ways, but through negotiation between the community and the 
state, agreement must be reached on the state delivering various services. The context of community 
partnership is again important here, although Pearson recognises that other services may be 
delivered by non-government agencies or through ‘community mechanisms’ (2000b:79).  
The way in which Pearson outlines community partnership and appropriate service delivery 
combined with his plea for responsibility, individual choice, economic development and ‘passive 
welfare’ reform, inform his substantive policy delivery in the Cape York Peninsula. This will be 
outlined in more detail in the following section.  
The Cape York Institute & Cape York Partnerships 
The Cape York welfare reform trials have been operating since 2008. They were designed by the 
CYI and are implemented through CYP.  As previously explained, these are organisational bodies 
headed by Pearson and created to design and implement Indigenous policy initiatives and projects. 
The CYI is an independent policy and leadership organisation that receives funding from the 
Queensland and Federal governments, and is said to have been developed in partnership with the 
people of Cape York (CYI 2014). CYP was formed in 1999 through an agreement between 
Australian and Queensland governments and regional Indigenous organisations in Cape York 
Peninsula, and was created with a view to, ‘(build) innovative partnerships between Indigenous 
individuals and families, government and the philanthropic and corporate sectors’ (CYP 2012).90 
The trial operates in the remote Aboriginal communities of Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale and 
Mossman Gorge, but it is hoped by the Institute that their work will have ‘a national influence’ 
(CYI 2014). The Cape York Institute exists as the ‘think tank’ behind the welfare reform trials, with 
CYP implementing policy. 
Described by Watt (2013a:39) as a ‘social experiment,’ the trial entails various health, housing, 
employment education and financial management programs, with the ultimate goal of ensuring that 
the people of Cape York have the capabilities to choose a life they have reason to value (CYI 2014). 
The CYI work with ‘a guiding framework’ written by Pearson titled ‘The Cape York Agenda.’ 
Published in 2005, the agenda outlines the way in which this ultimate goal is to be realised. Pearson 
states that the ‘essence’ of the agenda is summarised by the following: 
Our ultimate goal is to ensure that Cape York people have the capabilities to choose a 
life they have reason to value. Economic and social development is about expanding the 
                                                
90 In its first five years, the small CYP team was involved in educating communities and informing governments and 
others on the problems of passive welfare and the need for welfare reform (CYP 2012). CYP has continued to be 
engaged in welfare reform, designing and implementing a range of initiatives and projects concerning family income 
management, education, and work placement schemes (CYP 2012). 
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choices available to people. This range of choices is enriched not only by income, but 
also other capabilities, such as education, health and community. Development will 
require access to the opportunities of the real economy. But to make this possible, we 
must restore social order, attack ‘passive welfare’, and tackle substance abuse. This will 
only happen if we exercise our right to take responsibility. We have to be as forthright 
about our responsibilities as we are unequivocal about our rights – otherwise our society 
will continue to fall apart while we are still fighting for our rights This is how we will 
deliver our future as a recognised first world indigenous people, retaining a culture 
which requires strong inherited and ongoing connection to ancestral lands, with the 
freedom to orbit into the wider world and return to home base again (Pearson 2005:3). 
The expansion of individual choice and the economic development of Indigenous Australians are 
therefore aims of the CYI that they claim are based on the work of Sen, along the line of thought 
that the more capabilities or personal and social resources available to an individual, the greater 
their range of choices (Evans 2006:1). In relation to welfare, the CYI understands passivity as a 
negative capability that undermines all positive capabilities, and argues that external intervention 
such as welfare payments reinforce this. They therefore use the CA framework to explain what is 
damaging overall capability sets in Cape York communities and decreasing well-being. The 
following sections will establish this in more detail by outlining the Institute’s ‘Staircase Model for 
Progress,’ and the conceptual presence of capabilities in their thinking.  
The Cape York Institute: ‘The Staircase Model for Progress’ 
Pearson insists that before formulating a policy response to ‘passive welfare’, it is necessary to 
understand how individual and social progress occurs in a liberal, capitalist world. He does so via a 
staircase ‘model for progress’ (Pearson 2011:3). This staircase metaphor is a normative model that 
according to Pearson (2011), has enabled the CYI to, ‘see where social provisioning and communal 
values are relevant, and where individual self-interest is’ (2011:4). The model has three parts, the 
first being the foundation of the stairs in the form of social norms, the cultural norms of a 
community group, family or society (2011:3). These norms should advocate personal and social 
responsibilities to family and community. Pearson argues, ‘wherever people possess strong norms, 
they are well prepared for advancement’ (2011:4). The support structures underpinning the stairs 
are the second part of the staircase model, which are the investment in capabilities provided by 
society to people in the form of what Sen termed capabilities: investments in health, education, 
infrastructure and other economic and political opportunities and freedoms. Lastly, incentives and, 
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‘their rational alignment that shape the stairs individuals need to climb’ form the third part of the 
model. Pearson explains this element in terms of the market and the individual, stating,  
 
The market sets the prices on each rung going upwards. Our model highlighted a simple 
point that had long been obscured in traditional social democratic thinking on social 
justice: that each rung on the stairs must be climbed by individual human beings. The 
stairs are narrow and only allow individuals clutching their children to their breasts to 
ascend two by two. There is no mass elevator for communities (2011:4).91  
 
Pearson states that at Cape York, ‘we understood the power of choice, rational incentives and that 
the ultimate engine of development and progress is the self-interest of individuals on behalf of their 
families’ (2011:4). Pearson (2010) places self-interest and the individual at the centre of the 
fulfillment of development and progress because,  
 
When it comes to social progress no matter how big and powerful the engine of 
government might be, it is the numerous engines of self-interest that lie dormant in the 
breasts of the disadvantaged that must power people up the stairs of social progress. 
Yes, governments can and should make social investments so that people develop their 
capabilities, but that investment must be about enabling people to pursue their own self-
interests, not to assume that government can be a substitute actor in the development 
story (2010:6-7).  
 
His location in the radical centre is therefore a combination of the social democratic principle of 
opportunity investment, the conservative principle of personal responsibility and the liberal notion 
of self-interest (2010:7). Concerning Indigenous policy and specifically projects in Cape York, 
Pearson argues, ‘we say that our people have the right to take responsibility. We locate this radical 
centre by understanding that responsibility is the greatest power. It is in fact the true meaning of 
self-determination’ (2010:6-7). In Cape York, ‘there exists the unity of the leftist agenda of 
Indigenous rights and the rightist agenda of Indigenous responsibility,’ within which Pearson claims 
that the right to take responsibility is the most important right (2010:7). 
 
 
                                                
91 This ‘staircase model’ closely aligns with Rostow’s (1960) stages of economic growth and Sach’s (2005) 
development ladder metaphor. It is reasonable to argue that this ‘staircase model for progress’ frames development 
according to neoliberal principles and is rooted in a neoliberal conception of inequality. It is therefore inconsistent with 
Sen. 
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The Cape York Institute: How and Where ‘Capabilities’ are Present  
 
Pearson’s staircase model and notion of ‘social progress’ are rooted in social and economic 
development justifications of the CYI and linked to a notion of capabilities. As previously 
indicated, the CYI (2005) recognises that Sen considers freedom to be the critical measure of 
individual well-being, and that he also considers that the ability to choose may be constrained by 
the range of choices available to people. This choice is dependent on capabilities, or personal and 
social resources that people can utilise to improve their lives (2005:2). Using the CA framework as 
an organising principle and capabilities as indicators for the analysis of economic and social 
development in Cape York communities, the CYI has selected a set of eleven basic ‘capabilities’ 
that they consider as central to wellbeing (2005:2) (Figure1). These capabilities have been 
preliminarily assessed by the CYI and compared to Australian averages according to the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (Figure 2). ‘Passivity’ is included as a negative capability in the framework, in 
reference to which the Institute states, ‘our conviction is that permanent income provisioning has, 
over generations, led to the situation where outsiders have taken all of the rights and responsibilities 
to make decisions and take actions on behalf of a relatively powerless people. This has led to a 
poisonous passivity, which has destroyed skill, pride, purpose, the sense of achievement and 
fulfillment, dignity and hope’ (Pearson 2005:3). 
 
Figure 1: Eleven Basic Capabilities Central to Well-Being in Cape York (2005:3) 
 
Capability Description 
Employment ‘The number and type of employment opportunities for members 
of the community’ 
Income ‘The level of income, which indicates the consumption 
possibilities’ 
Wealth ‘The net worth of a household or individual, which gives the 
capacity to sustain consumption possibilities’ 
Income passivity 
(negative capability) 
‘The degree of the dependence on unearned income, which 
depletes all the other capabilities over time’ 
Health ‘The ability to access quality health services and maintain a 
healthy state (both physical and mental)’ 
Safety ‘The ability to live free from crime’ 
Housing ‘The ability to live in adequate housing’ 
Basic Infrastructure ‘The ability to access basic services, such as roads, water, 
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sewerage, power and communications’ 
Education ‘The ability to access a quality education’ 
Social capital ‘The ability to trust and connect with other members of the 
community’ 
Governance ‘The ability to depend on sound government institutions’ 
 
Figure 2:  Assessment of Capabilities in Cape York (2005:4) 
 
 Capability Comparison to 
Australian 
average 
Rationale 
Employment Very low ‘Very few ‘real’ jobs (excluding 2 day per week 
Community Development Program – CDEP)’ 
Income Low ‘Average personal income around 60 per cent of the 
Australian average’ 
Wealth  Very Low ‘Very few basic assets owned (e.g. cars, property, basic 
household items)’ 
Income 
Passivity 
Very High ‘Majority of personal income comes from welfare or 
pseudo-welfare’ 
Health Very low ‘Very low life expectancy, high levels of substance 
abuse’ 
Safety Very low ‘High rates of property and violent crimes’ 
Housing Low ‘Low quality housing coupled with high household 
size’ 
Basic 
Infrastructure 
Low ‘Most basic services provided, some are poor due to 
remoteness (e.g. road access)’ 
Education Very low ‘Very low rates of attendance, very low secondary 
school completion rates’ 
Social capital Very low ‘Low rates of social responsibility and community 
involvement’ 
Governance  Very low ‘Intensely political and high potential for conflict of 
interest’ 
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The assessment of these capabilities undertaken by the CYI corresponds to statistical inferences 
made by the Institute that employment was very low and that there were very few ‘real’ jobs 
Indigenous people were employed in across Australia. They state that at the time of assessment, 
only 14 per cent of Indigenous Australians were receiving income from paid employment in the 
‘real economy’ and that the average personal income for Indigenous Australians in the region was 
around 60 per cent of the Australian average (2005:4). The Institute recorded low health and 
education outcomes within the region, highlighting that life expectancy for Indigenous Australians 
is nearly twenty years less than the average Australian and the life expectancy of Indigenous 
Queenslanders was amongst the lowest in the world – considerably lower than some developing 
countries (2005:5). Low rates of attendance in secondary schools have led to low completion rates 
with 11 per cent of the population aged fifteen and over having completed year twelve, compared to 
38 per cent for Australia as a whole at that time (2005:5). 
 
In conceiving that capabilities in Cape York are in poor condition (2005:1), the CYI utilises the CA 
framework to focus attention on the underlying causes of this – a lack of social and economic 
development, the system of delivering services such healthcare and education and the passive 
receipt of income support (2005:7). They therefore use the CA framework to highlight that Cape 
York poverty needs to be understood not just as a lack of income alone. In order for poverty and 
well-being to improve and for people to live a life of their choosing, their individual capabilities 
need to be developed (2005:5). The Institute therefore understands that poverty also needs to be 
understood as a lack of opportunity to exercise meaningful life choices. They recognise that an 
approach to this issue that relies primarily on addressing income will not be successful if other 
constraints on opportunities remain unchanged (2005:6). 
In highlighting the presence of disadvantage and dysfunction in Cape York communities, the 
Institute’s interpretation of the CA is also used to highlight the complex relationship between the 
two (2005:6). Disadvantage encapsulates inadequate capabilities restricting life choices, which in 
turn causes dysfunction in communities. This manifests in the form of individual behaviours of 
passivity, addiction and the breakdown of social order, which again contribute to reducing 
capabilities in the form of disadvantage. This cycle can only be broken through an understanding of 
capabilities, with the Institute arguing:  
The only way to break this vicious cycle of disadvantage and dysfunction is to build 
capabilities through economic and social development based on engagement with the 
real economy. An artificial welfare environment continues to send the message: “there’s 
something about you that means you have to have extra assistance.” To get at issues of 
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agency, self-esteem and identity, full engagement in the real economy is a necessity. In 
addition, economic and social development allow the building of real incomes over 
time, higher levels of education, health and general consumption, and long-term 
employment opportunities and economic independence. It is thus also the only way to 
enrich the choices available to people in a sustainable manner (2005:6-7).  
 
The interpretation and use of the CA framework in Cape York therefore also facilitates a focus on 
the main purpose of the Cape York reform agenda – to develop a ‘real economy’ in Cape York 
(2005:1).  
So far, I have explained the political context informing Noel Pearson’s position on the Indigenous 
experience of ‘passive welfare’. Pearson has argued against Indigenous peoples having a non-
reciprocal relationship with the state and not being a part of the ‘real economy,’ as this generates 
social passivity and dysfunction within Indigenous communities. Pearson draws on Sen’s CA as a 
framework of thought with which to conceptualise that responsibility is necessary for the 
conversion of opportunity into capability. He proposes that the notion of responsibility should be 
incorporated into welfare reform in order to integrate Indigenous Australians into the ‘real 
economy.’ Pearson carries this interpretation of Sen’s CA through to the CYI to formulate a 
‘staircase model for progress’ – a normative model for Indigenous economic and social 
development in the Cape York region incorporating responsibility into the development process. 
The CYI further utilises the concept of capabilities in Cape York to assess Indigenous well-being 
and explain disadvantage and dysfunction in the region. Its stated aim is to fulfil the CA’s main 
principle to ensure that people in Cape York have the capabilities to ‘choose a life that they have 
reason to value.’ The principle of Cape York welfare reform is therefore to expand the choices that 
Indigenous peoples have available to them through the expansion and distribution of government 
resources and the provision of opportunities. With a view to improving Indigenous wellbeing 
through economic and social development, Pearson, the CYI and CYP aim to develop a ‘real 
economy’ in Cape York.92  
The next section of this chapter identifies Pearson’s specific reconceptualisation of Sen’s notion of 
capability and his alteration of the conditions of Sen’s CA. This section further establishes that 
although Pearson uses the language of capabilities and attributes his ideas explicitly to Sen, on 
closer inspection there are additional and significant differences between the two. 
                                                
92 It is worth noting here that even if one were to accept Pearson’s argument that ‘passive welfare’ contributes to 
dysfunction within Cape York communities, it does not necessarily mean that the creation of a ‘real economy’ in Cape 
York in the manner he suggests is the only solution.  
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Reconceptualising Sen’s CA: Noel Pearson’s Understanding of ‘Capability’ 
A close reading of Sen’s conception of freedom within the CA would involve conceiving of 
capabilities and instrumental freedoms in the same way he does. Freedom would be understood 
both as these substantive freedoms in the form of capabilities, and the processes that facilitate these 
substantive freedoms to be achieved – instrumental freedoms. In other words, freedom should be 
conceived of in terms of the ends (substantive freedoms/capability) and as a means 
(instrumental/process freedoms). In Pearson’s reframing of Sen, the link between capability and 
freedom is denied in favour of a focus on functionings. By implication, Sen’s instrumental 
freedoms are the conditions that ought to prevail in order to facilitate the development of 
capabilities. Pearson draws on Sen’s instrumental freedoms to assess the human development and 
well-being of individuals and communities in Cape York, and does so whilst labelling them 
‘capabilities.’ The CYI’s ‘capabilities’ therefore align with Sen’s instrumental freedoms rather than 
Sen’s conception of capability in a substantive way. In understanding capabilities as instrumental 
freedoms, Pearson reconceptualises Sen’s conception of capability, denying the individual their 
substantive freedoms in terms of what they can do or be. This would require a more ontological 
conceptualisation of capabilities such as ‘the ability to be literate’ rather than ‘the ability to access 
education.’  
Furthermore, for Pearson, Sen’s intrinsically valuable capabilities instead become instrumental to 
the facilitation of a ‘real economy,’ with an individual obligation to achieve them. Sen conceives of 
capabilities and functionings as intrinsic elements of doing and being that empower individuals to 
make choices that allow them to lead a life they have reason to value. However, Pearson conceives 
of ‘capabilities’ as functionings and instrumental elements to produce individuals who contribute to 
facilitating a ‘real economy’ in Cape York. Therefore, even though Sen’s instrumental freedoms 
may appear to closely align with what Pearson calls ‘capabilities,’ these conceptual differences are 
important. 
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Figure 3: Pearson’s Corresponding ‘Capabilities’ to Sen’s Instrumental Freedoms 
Sen’s Instrumental Freedoms Pearson’s ‘Capabilities’ 
Political Freedoms 
‘The opportunities people have to determine who 
should govern and on what principles … the 
possibility to scrutinise and criticise authorities … 
freedom of political expression … freedom to choose 
between political parties … political entitlements 
associated with democracies … political dialogue, 
dissent and critique … voting rights and 
participatory selection of legislators and executives’ 
(Sen 1999:38). 
Absent 
Economic Facilities  
‘The opportunities that individuals respectively 
enjoy to utilise economic resources for the purpose 
of consumption, or production, or exchange’ (Sen 
1999:38-39). 
Employment: ‘The number and type of 
employment opportunities for members of the 
community.’ 
Income: ‘The level of income, which indicates 
the consumption possibilities.’ 
Wealth: ‘The net worth of a household or 
individual, which gives the capacity to sustain 
consumption possibilities’ (CYI 2005:3). 
Social Opportunity 
‘The arrangements a society makes  for education, 
health care and so on, which influence an 
individual’s substantive freedom to live better’ (Sen 
1999:39). 
Basic Infrastructure: ‘The ability to access 
basic services, such as roads, water, sewerage, 
power and communications. 
Health: ‘The ability to access quality health 
services and maintain a healthy state (both 
physical and mental).’ 
Education: ‘The ability to access a quality 
education.’ 
Housing: ‘The ability to live in adequate 
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housing.’ 
Safety: ‘The ability to live free from crime.’  
(CYI 2005:3) 
Transparency Guarantees 
‘The freedom to deal with one another under 
guarantees of disclosure and lucidity’ (Sen 1999:39). 
Governance: ‘The ability to depend on sound 
government institutions.’   
Social Capital: ‘The ability to trust and 
connect with other members of the 
community.’  (CYI 2005:3) 
Protective Security 
‘A social safety-net for preventing the affected 
population from being reduced to abject misery, and 
in some cases even starvation and death … includes 
fixed institutional arrangements such as 
unemployment benefits and statutory income 
supplements to the indigent as well as ad hoc 
arrangements such as … emergency public 
employment to generate income for destitutes’ (Sen 
1999:40). 
Income Passivity (negative capability):  
‘The degree of dependence on unearned 
income, which depletes all the other capabilities 
over time.’ (CYI 2005:3) 
 
Taking education as an example, Sen would regard education as an instrumental freedom under 
‘social opportunities’ that are the responsibility of government to provide. If educational 
opportunities have been adequately provided through public policy, an individual ought to have the 
capability or substantive freedom to be literate as part of his or her capability set. The individual 
then has the choice to select this capability from that set to achieve a corresponding functioning, 
such as reading the newspaper or engaging in political debate through writing. They also have the 
choice not to select this capability from that set to achieve a corresponding functioning, in order to 
choose the life they have reason to value. In this sense, a person’s substantive freedom of being 
literate has been secured through the government’s responsibility of providing the adequate 
instrumental freedom. However, Pearson places, ‘the ability to access a quality education’ within a 
person’s capability set. He does therefore perceive the role of government and public policy as to 
provide the educational ‘opportunity’ element of his formula, ‘Responsibility + Opportunity = 
Capabilities’ (Pearson 2010:7). 
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Pearson places an emphasis on the need for individual responsibility to make the most of the 
opportunity for education provided by the government in order to become literate and 
knowledgeable. Only then is opportunity converted into capability. However, whilst rhetorically 
Pearson aligns with Sen in terms of it being necessary for government to create the conditions 
through which capability can be realised, these conditions not substantively form the development 
policy framework of the Cape York project.93 Rather, Pearson uses ‘capability’ within this formula 
as a rhetorical justification for facilitating individuals to engage in the “real-economy” rather than 
be reliant on unconditional welfare. 
 
The Alteration of Sen’s Conditions 
 
Whilst Sen has predominantly placed more emphasis on the importance of government 
responsibility, Pearson places more emphasis on personal responsibility and the individual 
converting opportunity to capability. He supplements the CA with this notion of personal 
responsibility with the political motivation of encouraging a particular type of functioning that 
facilitates and maintains a ‘real economy’ in Cape York. This framing of development is 
inconsistent with the CA not least because of Pearson’s reconceptualisation of ‘capability’ aligning 
more with an understanding of Sen’s instrumental freedoms; it is not cogent with Sen’s conception 
of development subjects being able to do or to be, and having the freedom to choose a life they have 
reason to value. For Sen, personal responsibility exists within the CA so far as it is up to the 
individual to select the relevant capabilities to achieve valuable functioning. However, as I have 
previously argued, this is consistent with the logic that realising capability aligns with the becoming 
of the self in order for people to live a life they have reason to value. These differences between Sen 
and Pearson have substantial implications. 
 
Importantly, according to Pearson, it becomes the individual’s obligation to realise particular 
functionings in Cape York. These obligated functionings subsequently become the means through 
which to realise Pearson’s desire to create a ‘real economy’ within the region. The subject of 
development therefore becomes instrumental to economic development; facilitating Pearson’s 
reordering of Sen’s development goals to prioritise the creation of a ‘real economy’ as part of the 
Cape York project. This is contrary even to the ‘thin view’ of Sen’s CA. Therefore, for Pearson, the 
expansion of capabilities is the means to what he perceives as the ends of human development: 
                                                
93 For example, although Pearson emphasises the ability to access a quality education, subsequent Cape York 
development policy does not facilitate this (rather, it encourages individuals to engage with the formal labour market).  I 
elaborate on this in Chapters Four and Five. 
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economic growth.94 This he illustrates clearly through the metaphor of the (neoliberal) individual 
development subject climbing up the staircase ‘model for progress’ and in not making provision for 
unconditional welfare. Additionally, political freedoms are notably absent from a conception of 
capability for Pearson’s project and the Institute. This further contrasts with Sen’s insistence that 
the role of the development subject should be one of an individual agent who has the freedom to 
participate politically.95 From this evidence, it can be established that neither the CYI, nor Pearson 
conceive of political freedoms as a necessary condition for realising capability. Therefore, a formal 
means through which the people subjected to  the Cape York welfare reform trials can 
democratically select and deliberate on the capabilities necessary for them to lead a life they have 
reason to value is missing. These alterations by Pearson are tantamount to a reframing of Sen’s CA. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the CA substantively being drawn upon in a cross cultural context. It has 
presented Noel Pearson’s use of Sen’s approach in the Cape York Peninsula as a solution to his 
identification of specific social conditions within the region: alcoholism and the corruption of 
traditional obligations to share resources, leading to ‘dysfunction and disadvantage’ and the 
breakdown of social order. Pearson attributes this ‘dysfunction and disadvantage’ to ‘passive 
welfare.’ However, although he recognises the economic and social history of Indigenous Australia 
(and that welfare dependency is a part of this colonial history) he chooses to overlook this social 
context when discussing policy provisioning for improving Indigenous well-being. Pearson 
attributes the particular social deterioration in the region to ‘passive welfare’ arguing that this 
causes individuals not to engage in social, political or economic action or in the ‘real economy.’ He 
therefore calls for the creation of a ‘real economy’ in Cape York – an individual’s ‘proper place’ 
(Pearson 2000b:22). Within this economy, responsibility is a moral obligation, which leads Pearson 
to reconceptualise Sen’s approach with this emphasis in mind. According to him, the problems 
generated by ‘passive welfare’ are not due to unequal distribution of opportunity (instrumental 
freedoms) by government, but due to a lack of individual and family responsibility to convert 
opportunity into capability (Pearson 2007b:1). Here we begin to see the conditions through which 
Sen’s CA is to be realised change, with Pearson arguing that the difference between opportunity and 
capability is individual responsibility. The individual is responsible for converting opportunity 
provided by government into capability.  
                                                
94 As established, Sen’s primary goal of development is the expansion of capabilities and human freedoms, with 
economic growth as the means and secondary development goal.  
95 Sen argues that development as an enhancement of freedom must address such ‘deprivations’ such as the freedom to 
speak or (politically) participate (Sen 1999:37).		
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Pearson’s ideas translate through to the CYI and its ‘staircase model for progress’ that sees the 
individual functioning within a ‘real economy’ and ascending the stairs, indicating progress. For 
Pearson, the subject of development is instrumental to this process, emerging as one who 
contributes to the market mechanism and facilitates economic growth. Further, the development 
subject is denied a formal means through which to democratically participate in the selection of 
capabilities with which to consider well-being in Cape York. These ideas are rooted in the social 
and economic development justifications of the CYI, which uses Sen’s notion of capabilities 
rhetorically to explain the cycle of ‘disadvantage and dysfunction’ within Cape York communities, 
rather than substantively. Here, ‘disadvantage’ refers to inadequate capabilities restricting life 
choices and causing dysfunction in communities. This manifests in the form of passive behaviour, 
addiction and the breakdown of social order (CYI 2005:6-7). The Institute argues that the solution 
to this is for development subjects to, ‘engage in the real economy’ in order to resolve issues of 
agency, self-esteem and identity (CYI 2005:6). ‘Responsibility’ is the difference between the 
conversion of opportunity into ‘capability’ and the achievement of well-being and this social order 
and dysfunction. 
To what extent then does Pearson’s approach align with my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type? I 
have argued that Pearson significantly alters Sen’s approach. His reconceptualisation begins to 
manifest in the Institute’s selection of eleven basic ‘capabilities’ with which to assess the quality of 
life within Cape York. Pearson conceives of ‘capabilities’ as functionings and instrumental 
elements to create a ‘real economy’ within the region (the CYI’s selection of ‘capabilities’ aligns 
with Sen’s five types of instrumental freedom rather than Sen’s notion of capability). Sen’s notion 
of capability ontologically captures what it is to do or to be, such as the ability to escape premature 
mortality. However, Pearson’s reconceptualisation of ‘capability’ denies a conception of what a 
person can do or be. Additionally, Pearson removes the concept of freedom from his understanding 
of Sen’s approach entirely – notably absent is a condition of political freedom for realising 
capability. Moreover, Pearson places greater emphasis on individual responsibility than Sen. He 
also reorders Sen’s development goals to prioritise economic growth as the ends of the development 
process, rather than the means. Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s CA leads to a 
changing of the conditions through which the CA and Development as Freedom are to be realised – 
Sen’s three conditions as outlined in Chapter One are distorted. 
Firstly, condition one I identified is that the development subject should be conceived of as having 
agency, and as a ‘constitutive part of the development process’ (Sen 1999:4). They should have the 
ability to act on behalf of goals that matter to them in terms of ‘agency freedom’ and be free to 
achieve whatever goals or values they regard as important (Sen 1985a:203) within the limits I have 
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identified. In addition, there must be a consideration of the five ‘distinct’ sources of variation that 
may affect a person’s ability to convert resources into capability (See Sen 1999:70). The 
identification of this ‘capability handicap’ is vital to understanding the variation in being able to 
achieve substantive freedoms. Pearson does identify specific social conditions that he terms 
‘disadvantage and dysfunction’ and these conditions are not as straight forward as assumed in the 
CA (even if we consider Sen’s five sources of variation). Pearson also overlooks Sen’s notion of 
capability handicap entirely. Pearson identifies social, cultural and historical and (psychological) 
factors that could potentially be conceived as aspects that Sen does not account for in his conception 
of capability handicap. However, because the creation of economic growth is his primary 
development goal, he conceives of the development subject as instrumental in facilitating, 
contributing and upholding this process. Subsequently, the development subject’s ability to choose 
the life they have reason to value is restricted to choices that facilitate and uphold a ‘real economy’ 
in Cape York. This aligns with the tension that I have identified within Sen’s approach in Chapter 
Two – that the freedom the approach offers can be interpreted and applied in ways limited to that 
afforded by a liberal political economy. 
The second condition I identified in Chapter One was Sen’s role for economic growth and 
redistribution and wealth as a means to development. Pearson magnifies this role, and in doing so 
reorders Sen’s development goals and instead considers economic growth as the ends of the 
development process. In reconstructing welfare as a social contract and moral obligation to facilitate 
the economy, Pearson does not recognise the potential structural inequalities that this economy can 
create. Sen does however recognise that this economy can create inequalities and includes welfare 
provisions within his approach in the form of ‘protective security.’ This is cogent with a liberal 
approach. Pearson does not include welfare provisions in his operationalisation of Sen’s approach, 
but sets out to overlook such provisions due to his framing of them as ‘passive welfare.’ This, 
coupled with Pearson’s conception of the development subject as instrumental to economic 
development sees his use of the CA move in a neoliberal direction. 
Lastly, the third condition I identified explains Sen’s commitment to democratic participation in 
terms of public policy and political freedoms. A thickening of this commitment established that for 
Sen this commitment ensured that culture would be secured as a means and ends of development. 
Pearson not only removes the conception of freedom in his interpretation of Sen’s approach, but has 
no conception of ‘political freedom’ included in his understanding of ‘capabilities’ – nor does the 
CYI have a ‘capability’ in its list that is synonymous with this concept. Moreover, Pearson makes 
no assertion that ‘tradition’ or ‘culture’ is to be included within his development approach. He 
posits ‘distorted’ cultural reciprocity and resulting behaviour (as he perceives it) as part of the 
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‘disadvantage and dysfunction’ within Cape York and ‘tradition’ in conflict with the wider 
economy (Pearson 2000b:23). Therefore, for Pearson, ‘tradition’ is something to be overcome in 
favour of the creation of a ‘real economy’ in the region. This aligns with the tension that I have 
identified within Sen’s approach in Chapter Two – that by implication, aspects of ‘tradition’ must 
be overcome in favour of a liberal political economy according to the CA. 
From this analysis, there is sufficient evidence to argue that Pearson’s use of Sen’s CA is a 
significant reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s ideal-type, according to my interpretation. 
Fundamentally, the operationalisation of Pearson’s altered version of Sen’s approach in Cape York 
has the potential to be problematic in its magnification of the internal tension present within Sen’s 
approach that I have identified in Chapter Two. It is therefore necessary to examine in more depth 
Cape York development policy in order to establish the social and political implications of 
Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of the CA in this way. The next chapter is an empirical 
presentation of the three most significant Cape York development policies for establishing these 
implications. In particular, these policies are significant in considering the implications of Pearson’s 
alteration of the approach moving in a neoliberal direction. In the next chapter, I will argue that 
Cape York development policy aligns with this alteration of the conditions of Sen’s approach and 
also argue that this development policy significantly deviates from Sen’s intended framework. 
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Chapter Four 
A Critical Evaluation of Cape York Development Policies: Operationalising Sen’s Capability 
Approach through Pearson’s Conception of the ‘Real Economy’? 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to introduce and evaluate specific development policies adopted and 
advanced by the CYI as part of the Cape York welfare reform project. As established, the overall 
development framework of the CYI is, according to Pearson, a policy framework that is conceived 
in relation to Sen’s CA. The task of this chapter is to examine closely and precisely how Pearson 
operationalises his CYI development policy and to assess the extent to which it deviates from Sen’s 
ideal framework (within the limits identified in Chapter Two). In turn, I will then be able to better 
establish whether Pearson's reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen can be attributed to the 
shortcomings of and theoretical spaces within Sen's approach as elaborated in Chapter Two, or 
whether his deviation is substantial enough for these shortcomings not to apply. Specifically, the 
chapter introduces and examines three development policies that are part of the welfare reform trials 
implemented by CYP. I have chosen to focus on and examine these three development policies as 
they centrally underline Pearson’s aim of creating a functioning neoliberal development subject 
conceived first and foremost as a specific kind of labourer and consumer (this will be discussed in 
more detail below). I follow through on this critique when I establish the implications and 
consequences of Pearson's development approach in the next chapter. 
 
The first section of this chapter will explain the Cape York welfare reform project as a policy 
response to the specific social conditions in Cape York that Noel Pearson identifies (explained in 
Chapter Three). It provides an outline of this reform project which has been presented as a holistic 
development agenda trialed by the CYI together with CYP to address what Pearson has referred to 
as ‘passive welfare,’ in order to, ‘restore social norms and build employment-related capabilities’ in 
the region (CYI 2011:12). This section will also explain the ‘conditional welfare’ that the reform 
trials implement in order to combat ‘passive welfare.’ This involves incentives that support earning, 
learning or other community obligations (Pearson 2005:6). As will be shown, community 
obligations are attached to welfare payments such as those included in the ‘Pride of Place’ program, 
which involves one to one coaching on the management of individual income. As explained in the 
previous chapter, although policy is formulated by the CYI, CYP are responsible for implementing 
this policy. CYP organise the implementation of policy into four, broad overlapping streams; Social 
Responsibility and Well-Being, Education, Housing and Infrastructure, and Economic Opportunity 
(CYP 2014). This chapter is primarily concerned with the Economic Opportunity and Social 
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Responsibility and Well-Being streams because these streams are the most strongly justified by 
Pearson in reference to Sen’s CA. Most notably, these streams incorporate Pearson’s push for 
individual responsibility and the creation of what he refers to as a ‘real economy’ into Cape York 
development policy. 
 
The second section of this chapter introduces and examines three development policies that fall 
under these streams; the ‘Work Placement Scheme,’ ‘MPower’ and ‘Wise Buys.’ The Work 
Placement Scheme is modelled on ‘Boys from the Bush Projects’ – a not for profit organisation 
established to address disadvantaged young Indigenous Australians by social worker Milton James. 
I will examine the core aspects of this organisation’s projects that inform the principles of the Work 
Placement Scheme’s pilot project, a ‘work socialisation scheme’ to facilitate employment 
opportunities for the unemployed in Cape York. The aim of the Work Placement Scheme is to 
encourage and place these unemployed people into employment. Most notably, the scheme is 
informed by five principles that underpin the Boys from the Bush Projects. Principle one 
encourages mobility and employment elsewhere in Australia, away from ‘negative’ influences of 
peers, family and community that James argues, compromise work ethics (James 2004:3). Principle 
two ensures that participants are placed in employment for short periods of time – two to three 
months – in order to combat homesickness. Principle three ensures that participants receive mutual 
support and are placed in positions alongside family members in some cases, or friends in order to 
build a common peer group (2004:3). Principle four enforces ‘effective peer supervision’ to reduce 
the risk of ‘negative peer influences’ within a group, and principle five sees participants placed in 
an appropriate job given their skill set (2004:3). 
The second significant development policy this chapter explores is ‘MPower’ – a scheme that aims 
to advise on effective money management and ‘financial literacy’ (CYP 2014) for families to meet 
their basic material needs and accrue savings. This policy aims to socially and economically 
‘empower’ the people of Cape York as they engage in the ‘real economy.’ MPower is 
operationalised within purpose-built community centres where professional bank employees 
provide support for their customised products and services, including internet and telephone 
banking. Participants are coached in better money management, creating budgets and setting 
financial goals. This is linked to the improvement of family well-being. As part of their Social 
Responsibility stream, CYP argue that, ‘MPower builds good money management which is at the 
heart of any family as it reduces family stress around money and precipitates financial, economic 
and social inclusion’ (CYP 2014). This section examines how MPower derives from CYP’s Family 
Income Management policy and is funded by the Department of Families, Housing, Community 
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Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA). MPower exists as a pre-requisite to the third policy 
that this chapter explains – the Wise-Buys scheme. 
The Wise Buys scheme aims to increase consumer knowledge and access to household goods and 
services at ‘value for money’ prices. CYP argue that this scheme, ‘supports families to increase 
their access to quality and affordable mainstream goods and services and become consumer savvy’ 
(CYP 2014). Wise Buys aids families in purchasing material goods and utilising specific payment 
means such as online and telephone banking, and involves consultation with support staff according 
to the scheme’s operating model. Wise Buys is justified by CYP on the basis that Indigenous 
families are not spending enough on basic needs and are instead spending on ‘harmful addictions’ 
(CYP 2014). The scheme therefore provides ‘controlled spending’ with access to ‘mainstream 
markets’ for increased engagement with the ‘real economy.’ Having introduced and examined these 
three development policies, this chapter will critically engage with the outcome of these policy 
trials. CYP has established an increase in participation in these schemes corroborated by statistics, 
and they have presented selective individual stories of ‘achievement’ to substantiate their overall 
claims of successes. 
In conclusion, through my critical evaluation, I demonstrate that CYI and CYP policy closely aligns 
with Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s approach. This means that it deviates 
from my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type significantly, in six ways. Policy responses in Cape York 
that are derived from Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s approach do not amount to an operationalisation 
of the CA according to Sen’s intended framework. Therefore I argue that Pearson’s 
reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s CA cannot be attributed to the spaces within and 
theoretical shortcomings of Sen’s approach because his use of Sen’s framework is such a substantial 
deviation. Secondly, I begin to construct the argument that Pearson’s reconceptualisation and 
alteration of Sen’s framework, and subsequent policy responses in Cape York are premised upon 
advancing a neoliberal approach to development. This is evident through the way in which policies 
that align with neoliberal development are prioritised as well as the overall privileging of the ‘real 
economy’ over the expansion of human capabilities. These policies are designed to align 
development with functionings identified in terms of the economy. This is in contrast to the 
prescriptions within Sen’s liberal framework, the implications and consequences of which will be 
established in Chapter Five.  
The chapter begins with an overview of the CYI’s response to the specific social conditions in Cape 
York that Pearson identifies. 
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Cape York Welfare Reform: Social Justice & Conditional Welfare  
As explained, the welfare reform trials have been initiated by Pearson, formulated by the CYI and 
implemented by CYP. This quest for economic and social development is rooted in Pearson’s push 
for ‘personal responsibility’ in response to his diagnosis of the problems associated with ‘passive 
welfare’. Similarly to the CYI, CYP describe the welfare reform trial as, ‘a process of moving from 
‘passive welfare’ dependence to engagement in the real economy’ (CYP 2014). As a ‘holistic 
development agenda,’ the reform agenda seeks to engage people in the ‘real economy’ and support 
individuals and families in communities to choose a life they have reason to value and from their 
perspective exists as, ‘a way to deliver social justice to Aboriginal families in Cape York’ (CYP 
2014). More specifically, the Partnership argues that in order to engage individuals in the real 
economy, the ‘rebuilding of norms,’ the ‘reform of incentives,’ ‘a retreat of government from the 
domain of individual responsibility’ must occur (CYP 2014). Cape York welfare reform comprises 
a broad policy framework, and its objectives are as follows: 
1. To rebuild social norms and restore Indigenous authority 
2. Address the welfare pedestal through changing incentives 
3. Support engagement in the real economy  
4. Move from welfare housing to home ownership 
5. Enable children to make full use of their talents and creativity 
  (CYP 2014) 
These objectives fall into four broad overlapping streams: Social Responsibility and Well-Being, 
Education, Housing and Infrastructure, and Economic Opportunity (CYP 2014). CYP state that the 
Economic Opportunity stream is concerned with, ‘the power that comes from individual desire to 
improve income and family prospects by having choice and access to development opportunities — 
including employment and private enterprise …’ (CYP 2014). This mission is said to be, 
‘underpinned by land reform, availability of investment, necessary infrastructure, human capital 
investments that enables local and regional economic development, as well as supporting mobility 
and economic participation beyond the community’ (CYP 2014). 
The welfare reform trials fall under the CYI’s ‘economic opportunity’ policy area, with a view to 
reform and ‘catalyse’ Indigenous economic development (CYI 2012b:11). As previously stated, 
whilst the Institute focuses on issues in Cape York, their work also guides state and federal policy 
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and they aim to have a national influence on policy (CYI 2012a).96 The Institute’s rationale for its 
welfare reform project is stated as follows:  
A key focus of the project is to produce a social justice strategy – a comprehensive 
summary of elements of the Cape York agenda most relevant to individuals’ 
engagement with the real economy, laying the foundation for a national policy agenda. 
The goal of this strategy is to articulate an alternative to welfare – the opportunity 
system – that mandates responsibility and guarantees opportunity for all Australians. In 
the opportunity system, individuals’ circumstances will not dictate their destiny and all 
Australians will be able to choose a life they have reason to value (CYI 2011:12).  
These reforms aim to restore social norms and build employment-related capabilities. A key 
challenge for the reforms will be to address the ‘welfare pedestal effect,’ which the CYI argue, 
‘creates a sense of entitlement and weakens individuals’ incentives to learn, train, and earn’ 
(2011:12). Economic development according to the Institute also includes supporting ‘Native Title’ 
and land negotiations as well as, ‘viable and sustainable homeownership and economic 
development outcomes for Cape York Aboriginal People’ (2011:13). This, the CYI maintains, is 
premised on the fundamental statement that defines Sen’s CA – for individuals to choose the life 
they have reason to value – and seeks to address welfare dependency through a range of policy 
reforms that are based on the notion of capability, responsibility and opportunity (according to 
Pearson’s interpretation of Sen’s approach). These reforms include; building children’s capabilities 
through education, health and housing reform; helping parents take responsibility for their children 
through family development; ‘work and asset accumulation for all’ by improving ‘universal 
economic opportunity;’ ‘mandating responsibility for parents and the unemployed’ through welfare 
conditionality; ‘making sure work pays and welfare dependence is discouraged’ through reforming 
welfare, tax, labour and ‘market price signals;’ and ‘supporting policy implementation on the 
ground, and restoring law and order in dysfunctional communities’ through governance reforms 
(2011:12). 
Following Pearson’s conception of ‘passive welfare,’ the CYI perceives classical welfare as 
concerned with investing in capabilities, but that this should not involve passive receipt. Its critical 
stance on ‘passive welfare’ has led to the Institute incorporating monetary incentives within policy 
reform (CYI 2005; 2012a). Pearson (2005) states, ‘the capability investments need to be priced so 
that people are choosing to ascend the staircase. If these incentives are rational, people will make 
choices that build their lives’ (2005:6). In a quest to encourage ‘real employment’ (2005:6; CYI 
                                                
96 The CYI has intent to roll out the Cape York Reform Agenda across Australia, if successful  
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2005:10), Pearson argues that welfare payments should be structured to support and encourage 
earning or learning, or other obligations to support the community (Pearson 2005:6). The CYI’s 
welfare reform initiatives therefore involve incentives as a means to encourage individual 
responsibility and the individual choice to become a self-sustaining economic agent. The Institute 
states that incentives matter because they influence behaviour and can be in the form of ‘carrots’ 
that ‘pull’ and ‘sticks’ that ‘push’ (CYI 2012a; 2005:10). They argue that, ‘currently, there are no 
meaningful sticks, and the only carrots ‘pull’ to passive behaviour instead of study or real work…’ 
and state that people need to perceive greater benefits from working entrepreneurial activity, and 
investing in themselves (in their education and health for example), rather than staying on welfare 
(2012a).97 
‘Conditional welfare’ has therefore been introduced in Cape York as part of the welfare reform 
trials, and involves incentives for the receipt of welfare with a view to encourage individuals to 
convert opportunity into capability (CYI 2012a). ‘Capability’ is understood here as including, 
‘skills, and knowledge development and developing behaviours conducive to getting ahead’ (CYP 
2014). Obligations are therefore attached to the welfare payments of recipients in Aurukun, Hope 
Vale, Coen and Mossman Gorge (Rothwell 2012:17). These obligations include, ‘making sure kids 
attend school,’ ‘keeping kids safe from harm and neglect, not committing drug, alcohol or family 
violence offences’ and, ‘abiding by tenancy agreements’ (CYI 2012a). In order to implement these 
obligations, from July 2008, the FRC has been ‘charged with ensuring that people live up to these 
state responsibilities’ (CYI 2012a). If recipients do not comply with these obligations or 
responsibilities, the FRC has the power to put their welfare under ‘income management,’ where 
payments are put aside for essential expenses such as food, housing, clothing, education and 
medicines (CYI 2012b). Policy development is underway for an alternative system whereby 
individuals can ‘opt-in’ to a similar welfare-centered system that will, ‘increase access to 
opportunities and increase the incentives to move from ‘passive welfare’ to training or employment, 
based on obligations for the individual’ (CYI 2012a).  
The ‘Pride of Place’ program currently being trialed in the same communities is one such ‘opt-in’ 
scheme. It involves coaching and management of individuals’ income: planning, budgeting and 
setting funds aside for home improvements and school needs with the aim of ‘building 
independence’ (Rothwell 2012:17).98 The trials are in conjunction with CYP, the Queensland and 
Commonwealth governments and regional bodies, and so according to Rothwell (2012), ‘sit within 
the existing social support system at the same time as seeking to transform the behaviour of 
                                                
97 The presence of these incentives mean that although Welfare Reform schemes are presented as voluntary, community 
members are obliged to participate.  
98	This is similar to the second policy presented in this chapter called ‘MPower.’	
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community members and break the ingrained welfare habit’ (2012:17). The Pride of Place 
program’s aim has been described as wanting to, ‘reshape almost every aspect of the governed, 
administered lives of people in the four communities; help them from positions of dependency to 
control over their environment, assets and finances; guide them to a place of social potency where 
they can engage on equal terms with the wider world; choose how they wish to live, rather than 
have choices dictated’ (2012:17) 
In addition to welfare reform, the CYI (2012b) is concerned with other elements of Indigenous 
social and economic development. Current concerns regarding social development under the 
heading ‘Social Responsibility and Well-Being’ are anti-gambling reforms in the form of structural 
changes and programs (although according to the CYI, gambling in the selected welfare reform 
communities is not problematic due to income management) (2012b:57-58). The remedy for 
gambling addiction and its associated social problems similar to that of ‘passive welfare’ is 
presented in economic development terms similar to that of the welfare reform trials, such as 
income management and ‘real’ employment (2012b:57). According to the CYI (2005) critical to 
this social and economic development is land reform. Integrated more strictly under ‘economic 
development,’ land reform is a central component in facilitating the responsibility of Indigenous 
Australians to own their own home, with a view to encourage asset accumulation and economic 
development more broadly (2005:11). Land reform seeks to reconcile both communal title integral 
to Indigenous culture and transferable property rights which are perceived as integral to 
development (2005:10). They state, ‘the challenge is to preserve the culture of communal tenure 
whilst enabling maximum individual and private economic use of the land’ (2005:11) for, for 
example, building private homes. 
The next section presents the first of three development policies significant in establishing the social 
and political implications of Pearson’s framing and operationalisation of the CA. The ‘Work 
Placement Scheme’ falls under the stream of Economic Opportunity. 
Welfare Reform Policy: The Work Placement Scheme  
The ‘Work Placement Scheme’ is a policy trial modelled on a program from the Boys from the 
Bush Projects, a not for profit organisation committed to addressing the disadvantage of young 
Indigenous Australians. CYP facilitates employment opportunities for Indigenous people by placing 
them in full-time employment and providing ongoing support to ensure they can live independently, 
without the support of welfare (CYP 2014). The scheme aims to remove dependence and the 
negative impact of welfare programs by encouraging ‘self-reliance and responsibility’ by, ‘assisting 
participants to become satisfied, productive and respected members of their local and broader 
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community.’ It operates by recruiting workers from remote communities and negotiating 
employment opportunities outside of the region in sectors with worker shortages, such as fruit 
picking or the meat processing industry (CYP 2014). The scheme differs from the CDEP scheme as 
part of Cape York welfare reform, which was designed, developed and delivered by CYP, the 
Queensland government and the Federal government.99 According to some, the CEDP scheme 
failed to address the issue of welfare dependency by not encouraging people into mainstream 
employment (Taylor & Hunter 1998; James 2004, 2005; Arthur 2002).100 Among the objectives of 
the Work Placement Scheme is the ability for Indigenous youths and adults to be placed in full time 
employment and be provided with support at home and work to make the transition into 
employment and remain employed, and for Indigenous youths and adults to ‘live independently’ 
and ‘become self-sufficient employees in the real economy and active participants in society’ (CYP 
2014).101 
The Boys from the Bush program was introduced to CYP in 2001 by social worker Milton James. 
The program was originally crafted as a social enterprise project for young Indigenous Australians 
to gain work experience in the production and sale of eucalyptus and melaleuca oils. In recognising 
the value of this program, CYP state that, ‘Boys from the Bush showed that supervised, real work in 
functional environments can accomplish behavioural change among young people from 
dysfunctional backgrounds’ (CYP 2014). The program has acted as a model for the Cape York 
Work Placement Scheme, based on its principles behind placing young Indigenous people in 
employment to earn a wage and become independent from the welfare economy. CYP have stated 
that their Work Placement scheme has demonstrated that, ‘young Indigenous peoples can take up 
employment outside their home communities and cope with the demands of mainstream private 
sector employment in spite of intergenerational welfare dependency’ (CYP 2014). 
Speaking of Milton James directly, Noel Pearson opines that, ‘of all the people who have worked in 
the social welfare field, Milton James is the one person who has properly understood the way in 
which ‘passive welfare’ operates amongst youth. The insights he has accumulated in his work with 
the Boys from the Bush program and now the Work Placement Scheme represent the most rigorous 
and important practical work in the area of Indigenous welfare reform that is available’ (Pearson 
2006:1). It is therefore important to examine early Work Placement Scheme trials that took place 
                                                
99 This initiative is discussed later with regards to and co-existing with the Work Placement Scheme to create economic 
opportunity in the region, but I am noting here that due to participants working for what is essentially their 
unemployment entitlement under the CEDP scheme, it still has a welfare base. 
100 Under the push for Indigenous self-determination by the Australian government at the time, it was expected that 
through the restructuring of welfare payments, Indigenous communities themselves would create work programs 
through the CEDP scheme rather than receive welfare. However this was unsuccessful.  
101 CYP state that the scheme provides ‘extensive support’ to these workers through housing, meals and training to 
assist with them living independently (CYP 2014). 
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before they became part of CYI policy, in line with the Boys from the Bush program in order to 
understand the thinking behind Work Placement Scheme policy and the creation of a ‘real 
economy’ within the region. The success of the program is attributed to individual support and, ‘a 
good understanding of how environments determine behaviour’ (James 2004:2). James argues that 
the program has demonstrated how, ‘behavioural change can be achieved by providing support and 
supervision in a new pro-social real work environment’ (2004:2). Subsequently, there are seven 
‘pillars’ to the structure of the Work Placement Scheme: 
1. The provision of unsubsidised full-time private sector employment; 
2. Within a socially functional community; 
3. Situated far enough to deter participants from leaving when faced with the 
challenges of mainstream work and living; 
4. Situated far enough from the distractions, negative influences and ‘ignorance’ of 
family, peers, and community, including those individuals and organisations that 
patronise and infantilise young Aboriginal people, and promote ‘passive welfare’ 
dependency and rights without responsibilities; 
5. Participants are required to be self-reliant and take responsibility for their own 
actions and general maintenance; 
6. Provision of ongoing support and supervision to achieve the above within clearly 
defined rules that will enable them to maintain their employment and acceptance by 
the local community; 
7. Provision of positive peer support.      
(James 2007:1) 
 
The next section of this chapter explains the Work Placement Scheme’s pilot project, which was 
(and continues to be) influenced by these pillars.  
 
Pilot Project: Work Socialisation 
 
James headed a work socialisation scheme for young people from the Cape York Peninsula in 2005, 
a pilot project for the Work Placement Scheme of CYP that involved placing sixteen young 
Indigenous people aged sixteen to twenty-five from Cape York into fruit harvesting work in the 
Murray Valley region of Victoria and the Riverland region of South Australia for three months 
(James 2005:1). The development of the scheme is documented in a series of ‘development notes’ 
written by James himself. According to James, the aim of this pilot project was, ‘to assess the 
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concept of a work socialisation scheme designed to integrate young Indigenous people from Cape 
York Peninsula and the Torres Strait into mainstream employment and the non-welfare economy. 
This project was intended to help form the basis of future program and policy development by the 
CYI of Policy and Leadership’ (James 2004:2). The Work Placement Scheme trial offered work 
opportunities outside of Cape York, as there were very few employment options outside the CDEP 
scheme for young Indigenous people in the region (2004:2). This employment mobility is still 
encouraged within the region today. 
Unlike the CEDP scheme, this project wanted to ensure, ‘successful participation in mainstream 
employment and the non-welfare economy’ (2004:2). This was encouraged by similar support and 
supervision and the principles of the Boys from the Bush program (2004:2). James states, ‘in 
essence this scheme will socialise young people into work and the non-welfare economy while they 
are still young102 and impressionable. This socialisation will take the form of strong tailored 
individual support and supervision within selected real world environments’ (2004:5), hence the 
term ‘work socialisation.’ The work undertaken by participants was described by James as 
including, ‘climbing ladders, standing, bending or kneeling while moving through the crop’ 
(2005:6). In addition he explains,  
crops are collected in different ways. They can be picked into buckets, cartons or into 
bags strapped to the shoulders and when full are poured into large bins. The work is 
repetitious and can be tiring. Starting time is from early morning (before sunrise) and to 
late in the day. Pay is usually by piecework (per bucket or bin) or occasionally wages 
(per hour). No young person over the age of fifteen will face a presumption that they are 
incapable of doing this type of work (James 2005:6).  
The first principle behind the Work Placement pilot scheme was that by encouraging mobility 
within the region and employing Indigenous youth elsewhere in Australia, work placements would 
be well away from any negative influences of peers, family and community (James 2004:3). These 
negative influences according to James, included a, ‘lack of educational and work ethic, combined 
with the unrestricted, unconditional license endowed upon young people by their families and 
community at large to do as they please’ (2004:3). James argues that experience has proven that 
placements must be far enough away to stop youths from returning back to their family or 
community, ‘as soon as conformity is required and restrictions applied’ and is the, ‘most effective 
strategy’ (2004:3). Secondly, participants would be placed for short periods of time in order to 
combat homesickness. In addition, James argues that, ‘there are a number of young people who 
                                                
102	They are to be a minimum fifteen years old (James 2004:5).	
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value not just their personal freedom by desire to live a totally uninhibited life – free of all 
responsibility towards self and others. It is this that drives many young people to try and return back 
home where they live a near totally uninhibited life’ (2004:3). He acknowledges that, ‘it will take 
time to replace highly dependent, anti-social behaviour with a new sense of autonomy and 
improved pro-social behaviour. This work placement scheme will strike a balance between these 
two factors – 1) the need for a prolonged exposure to new patterns of behaviour and 2) the genuine 
plea of ‘homesickness’ (2004:3). In order to help balance the need for ‘prolonged exposure,’ 
thirdly, mutual support was provided by a participant being placed along with a family member or 
friend, building a peer group with a common identity, language, mannerism, needs and concerns 
(2004:3).  
Fourthly, ‘effective peer supervision’ was provided so as not to run the risk of ‘negative peer group 
influences’ overwhelming the group. This was based on knowledge from the Boys to the Bush 
program that, ‘rational thought processes can be easily abandoned by groups of people with low 
impulse control and underdeveloped social consciences,’ and, ‘critical self-analysis of the inherent 
consequences of their behaviour, can, at times, become near impossible’ (2004:3). Fifthly, the pilot 
scheme wanted to ensure that jobs will fit young Indigenous participants’ ability. James argues, 
‘many young Indigenous people on Cape York Peninsula are poorly educated and will continue to 
fall behind in the skills needed for successful participation in the mainstream work force and the 
non-welfare economy. At best, most young people are destined for unskilled labouring positions. 
This however, should not be viewed as a reason for not engaging in work’ (2004:4). Subsequently, 
the types of jobs considered appropriate for the Work Placement Scheme are: seasonal fruit and 
vegetable picking in southern states, unskilled farm/station hand, deck hands on commercial fishing 
boats, sales persons or shelf stackers in retail shops and stores, labourers in the construction and 
processing industries, labourers in the maintenance and cleaning industry and unskilled factory 
workers (2004:4).  
The scheme did not however, aim to place participants in permanent positions of work, rather, 
short-term or casual positions, although full-time. James explains that this is the nature of today’s 
job market for unskilled or semi-skilled labouring positions. He writes,  
the ‘Boys from the Bush’ program promotes ordinary young people who take pride in 
work, especially hard physical work. Good labourers are well respected, well rewarded, 
highly prized people. The best are promoted as role models. They are taught to take 
pride in being a fruit and vegetable picker, or a ganger on the railways, or a deck hand 
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on a trawler. There is no pride however in being dependent on welfare or a participant in 
a welfare program (2004:4).  
Lastly, James states that on the completion of the placement, participants will be, ‘returned, 
debriefed, and reabsorbed back into an educational environment while they are prepared for their 
next position’ (2004:4). He also states that the success of a work placement will not be decided on 
the completion of a single work placement by that individual, but by a series of successful work 
placements, as well as, ‘their willingness to remain in the scheme’ (2004:4-5). James summarises 
that the pilot project was, 
… based on the belief that young Indigenous people from Cape York Peninsula can be 
placed directly into mainstream employment, provided that they receive effective 
support and supervision. This includes the establishment of unskilled, seasonal work 
placements well away from the distractions and interference of family and community 
(2004:5).  
The scheme had clearly defined terms, which have been carried forward to Cape York’s Work 
Placement Scheme today. Participants were provided with employment and free travel to that 
employment. No other financial assistance was provided, and participants were to fund their own 
return to Cape York (Pearson 2005:5). On this issue, Pearson’s stance is very clear. He states,  
the scheme is based on the principle: you wear the responsibility for your actions. You 
are not on a welfare program. You are a worker in the real economy in a real job. You 
have been supported with an airfare to come to this job in Victoria or South Australia. 
You throw the towel in, you are in the same position as any other worker – you find 
your own way home (2005:2).  
Accommodation and daily transport to and from work were provided, with a strict departure time on 
the strict condition that the participant is willing to work up to six days per week and achieves, ‘a 
minimum standard of productivity’ and, ‘does not engage in disruptive behaviour including the use 
of drugs and alcohol’ (2005:5). If a participant lost their job for any reason, they needed to find 
alternative transport or employment and or return back home using their own resources. It is stated 
by Pearson that, ‘the scheme accepts no other responsibility towards participants’ (2005:5). 
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Outcome of the Policy Trial: The Demand for ‘Productivity’ Through Low-Skilled, Flexible 
Labour 
The Work Placement pilot scheme operated under the primary hypothesis that, ‘young Indigenous 
people from Cape York with little or no experience of living away from home, family and 
community, with little or no work experience and this [sic] assessed at high risk for long-term 
employment or dependent on CDEP, can still be successfully assisted to take up mainstream private 
sector employment far from their homes and families’ (James 2005:2). According to James, this 
hypothesis was confirmed: ‘Eleven of the sixteen participants remained living and working for the 
duration of the trial … Ten of the sixteen participants have chosen to remain living and working 
full-time in the two regions until the end of the summer harvest and the South Australian Autumn-
Winter navel orange harvest’ (2005:8). He continues, ‘by the end of the trial, five out of the seven 
participants of the South Australian group were excelling in their work, picking between five and 
seven bins of oranges per day (the average backpacker or amateur picker would pick between three 
and four bins per day at $26.00 per bin gross), six days per week. One participant was averaging 
around three bins per day, and the other was placed separately working as a general farm hand on 
wages’ (2005:8).103 
However, the group placed in Victoria were deemed not as successful: ‘The Victorian group never 
reached this level of productivity … one of the four participants was picking on average three bins 
of pears per day (the average backpacker or amateur picker would pick three bins per day at $30.00 
bin gross), five days per week. The remainder were averaging two bins of pears per day … their 
performance remained poor. They were picking and packing table grapes and earning between $280 
and $300 per week’ (2005:8).104 Participants who failed to be as productive were not regarded 
highly: 
Participant #6 is an interesting case. He is twenty years old and remains in the trial. He 
was the first participant to receive an official warning from his employer within the first 
week of his arrival. For this job he was paid wages. His work was unacceptably slow 
and he was caught lying down on the job. When the author questioned him over this he 
denied working slow saying the boss was “talking shit” and claimed that he laid on the 
                                                
103 It was also found that the scheme was suitable for petrol sniffers by the scheme actively discouraging such 
behaviours. James states, ‘One of the participants in this scheme was an active petrol sniffer. From the information I 
received from his peers, this participant is best described as a complier to petrol sniffing behaviour. As expected, I did 
not observe this individual engaging in the behaviour at any time during the trial, nor did any other participant report to 
have seen him do so, or hear of him expressing any desire to do so’ (2005:17). 
104 Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate whether this trial and Cape York policy in general is 
successful, the trial did run into a number of problems, including to do with initial financing, nutrition and cooking 
skills, money management, transport, alcohol and accommodation (2005:9). 
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ground so that he could pick the oranges on the bottom of the tree … For the following 
three months he remained the least productive member of the group, regularly late and 
forgetful. He was a major distraction for the other participants, as their productivity 
would drop when they were working beside him. The author assessed participant #6 as 
not unintelligent but lacking maturity, passive, very cunning and highly manipulative, 
and accepting of his most meagre existence due to his unwillingness to work and earn. A 
younger participant described him as “just chilling out.” By this, he meant that 
participant #6 did not come to the trial to do any serious work; he came primarily for the 
excitement and adventure and to pass the time away in a new location. The author 
considers this to be classical behaviour of ‘passive welfare’ dependency; a weak 
character, lacking ambition, lacking initiative and drive, thriftless and dependent 
(2005:13).  
James continues to highlight that there were many more participants like him in Cape York. The 
participant agreed to not return home, giving James ‘hope’ that, ‘over time his behaviour will 
change’ (James 2005:13). The last report on Participant #6 conveyed that he was ‘improving,’ 
picking up to four bins of oranges per day (2005:13). Moreover, the scheme found that it was more 
‘productive’ to treat all workers as individuals, instead of a collective: 
 In the beginning of the trial all the participants were working as a collective when 
placed on contract. This proved to be disastrous. The discrepancy in the productivity of 
each participant was enormous. The most productive were doubling the effort of the 
least productive whilst all were being paid equally. This resulted in widespread 
discontent and the most productive choosing to dramatically reduce their productivity. 
The author then advised the most productive to go it alone, which they did. Their 
productivity and therefore income dramatically increased. This in turn motivated the 
moderate workers to also work independently and before long their productivity 
increased. It was interesting to see that the least productive workers continued to prefer 
working as a collective and their productivity remained extremely low. The author later 
introduced the rule that nobody was to work as a collective. It then became clear who 
was dragging the chain … (2005:14). 
James concluded that, ‘the results of this trial confirm that young Indigenous people can 
successfully work in the private sector and live independently far from home, provided they are 
removed from the distractions and negative influences of family and community and receive 
appropriate support and supervision in their new environment’ (2005:1). Commenting on Cape 
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York’s Work Placement Scheme, Pearson (2006) argues that, ‘clear learnings from the Work 
Placement Scheme are that the sooner young people are engaged in working in the real economy, 
the better’ (2006:2). This supports James’ main concern that 15-21 year olds, in particular, ‘become 
and remain hard working, functional citizens’ (2006:3). In explaining the specific role of 
government in implementing a scheme that places young people from ‘dysfunctional’ welfare 
dependent backgrounds into ‘real work,’ Pearson argues that there are only two roles for 
government; to provide appropriate funding for the scheme, and get Job Network providers to refer 
participants to the scheme (2006:1). He states, ‘it should be noted that the Work Placement Scheme, 
which is operated through CYP, does not require government to design the scheme, or to manage 
the scheme, or to undertake any risks in relation to the scheme. Just provide the funding and see if 
the scheme produces the results’ (2006:2).  
After this pilot project by James, funding from the Office of Indigenous Policy Co-ordination 
(OIPC) and the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) provided 
fifty-five participants predominantly from Cape York with eighteen months placement into similar 
work in Renmark, South Australia, and in Boundary Bend and Mildura, Victoria. Further work 
placements developed by CYP are ongoing, and include placements in partnership with Boys from 
the Bush projects at abattoirs and other unskilled labour positions. Although originally designed by 
CYP, the Work Placement Scheme is currently operated in partnership with Mission Australia, who 
through scheme coordinators, work closely with CYP to assess eligible candidates for various 
Indigenous employment programs.  
The next section presents the second of the three relevant development policies I present in this 
chapter. ‘MPower’ is categorised under the Social Responsibility stream. 
Welfare Reform Policy: MPower 
The MPower scheme is said to, ‘(support) healthy, responsible, and thriving individuals, families 
and communities’ (CYP 2014). In order for the people of Cape York to have the capabilities to 
choose the lives they have reason to value, according to CYP, this requires ‘foundations of strong 
cultural norms, enabling structures, and rational incentives that ‘nudge’ people towards capability, 
and responsibility building opportunities’ (CYP 2014). Within the Social Responsibility Stream, 
CYP use a ‘scaffolding approach’ that supports people with education, coaching and incentives, 
which are slowly reduced as they begin to take more responsibility (CYP 2014). Placed within this 
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stream, and derived from Cape York Partnership’s Family Income Management policy,105 MPower 
is a money management scheme considered important because money management and budgeting 
are according to CYP, ‘indispensable’ to ‘aspirational planning’ and ‘the pursuit of opportunity’ for 
the people of Cape York (CYP 2014).  MPower is funded by FaHCSIA under the, Cape York 
Welfare Reform Agenda.106 According to CYP, the policy moves beyond passive income 
management to individual and family, ‘financial, social and economic empowerment.’ Individuals 
and families are therefore supported in order for their basic needs to be met and for them to, ‘build 
wealth through greater financial inclusion’ (CYP 2014). CYP describe MPower as, 
the portal through which community members can gain access to opportunity products 
and services. These products are designed to support personal responsibility and 
increase participation in education, employment, financial management, housing and 
other endeavours … the full scope of MPower is that it provides a framework for 
individuals and families to take stock of their situation and make plans for themselves, 
their children, their households and their families – and then to start putting these plans 
into practice. So MPower goes beyond merely providing greater access to financial 
services and developing financial literacy; rather, MPower seeks to support people to 
embark on the journey to realise their work and financial aspirations (CYP 2014).  
Practically, MPower operates out of ‘Opportunity-Hubs’ or ‘O-Hubs’ – purpose built community 
centres that are staffed by a team of professionals that include local people. Working with ‘Jawun 
Indigenous Corporate Partnerships’ has enabled CYP to have an annual intake of ‘Westpac’ (bank) 
employees who provide professional financial support for MPower and its customised products and 
services (CYP 2014). Within these hubs, MPower Coaches hold an ‘MPower Conversation’ with 
development subjects (individuals and families) who are referred to as ‘clients,’ which involves a 
discussion in order to ‘map out where they are in their lives, where they want to be and what they 
need to do to get there.’ Further, this process is posited as the means through which individuals can 
envision a financially secure future. An ‘MPower Plan’ is then written, comprised of a family 
budget, action plan, goal setting and coaching sessions. Training is also given in the use of 
‘specially designed money management tools,’ to improve ‘money management capacity.’ For 
example, the ‘iBank’ kiosk is offered as a customised facility that offers both independent and 
assisted access to telephone and internet banking and online shopping (CYP 2014). 
                                                
105 CYP launched Family Income Management in 2001 as a money management service. It aimed to support individuals 
and families to meet financial obligations and to, ‘direct money away from negative behaviours.’ This policy was rolled 
out nationally in Australia and has informed Australian Government Indigenous policy for ten years (CYP 2013). 
106 The Cape York Welfare Reform Agenda is a tripartite relationship between the Australian and Queensland 
Governments and CYP operating in Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale, and Mossman Gorge (CYP 2014).	
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Further justification of MPower is provided by CYP stating that the scheme provides a ‘Third 
Way’107 for government and non-government agencies to transfer support investments directly to 
families, and enables mutual obligation principles to be embedded into these transfers to ensure 
such investments are utilised for the best benefit of individuals and families’ (CYP 2014). As such, 
there are six objectives of MPower that are listed by CYP as follows:  
 
1. Enable families to manage money so that basic material needs (food, clothing, shelter 
etc.) are covered. 
2. Engage families to manage money as a means of tackling addictions to alcohol, drugs 
and gambling and to develop alternative ways for people to express cultural reciprocity. 
3. Rebuild social norms and capabilities through financial literacy. 
4. Enable families to build assets and realise aspirations through saving and disciplined 
money management. 
5. Take the stress out of money management and family well-being. 
6. Mechanisms are established for government and philanthropic agencies to make direct 
investments into opportunity products. 
(CYP 2014) 
 
The final development policy presented in this chapter is ‘WiseBuys,’ also categorised by the CYI 
and CYP under the Social Responsibility stream. 
Welfare Reform Policy: Wise Buys 
 
Wise Buys is part of MPower, also funded by the federal government department, FaHCSIA. CYP 
describe Wise Buys as, ‘a retail internet portal that increases a family’s consumer knowledge and 
access to household goods and services at value-for-money prices. Wise Buys empowers families to 
‘lock in’ money for essential needs and make ‘wise’ purchases that contribute to their wellbeing and 
wealth building and limit the risk of monies being diverted to inappropriate spending’ (CYP 2014). 
Their objective is for, ‘families to have access to a diverse range of home products that are sourced 
on the basis of quality, durability, value, and usefulness, through purchase, payment and 
distribution arrangements that provide best value for money’ (CYP 2014). Families are supported in 
the purchase of larger goods or ‘assets’ such as vehicles, boats and garden sheds. Overall, Wise 
                                                
107 This Third Way enables Indigenous families to move from passive welfare dependency to ‘real economic 
participation.’ They state, ‘this Third Way shifts from passive service delivery to an approach that combines personal 
family responsibility, capabilities, development and tangible opportunity products to enable individual and family 
pathways to a better life’ (CYP 2014).  
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Buys is supported by local, regional and national businesses, which are said to show ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ by, ‘supporting disadvantaged peoples’ through the Wise Buys scheme, whilst 
enhancing their own business opportunities108 (CYP 2014).  It is stated that CYP ‘seeks partnerships 
with businesses who are interested in developing commercial and consumer beneficial partnerships 
that increase access to the Cape York market and generate sales of attractive goods and services’ 
(CYP 2014).  
Cape York families are required to participate in the MPower scheme if they want to participate in 
Wise Buys. MPower consultants assist with direct options, laybys, and online payment options with 
the purchase of groceries, white-goods, furniture, clothing and electronic equipment that the Wise 
Buys scheme provides access to. There exists an ‘operating model’ as follows:  
Plan – MPower Consultant supports families to purchase their priority ‘needs’ and 
‘wants’ outlined in their budget and advises them on their spending options available. 
MPower – Families use the Wise Buying toolbox to learn about good consumer 
practices and what to avoid so they are confident to independently locate the best value 
for money products and services and negotiate with traders. 
Access – Families use the iBank to access up to date Wise Buys catalogues of goods and 
services including specially discounted items negotiated with suppliers and also to use 
the internet to locate their own items. 
Purchase – Families use their own financial products to make purchases or obtain 
support from an MPower Consultant through the purchasing steps including and specific 
payment arrangements like lay-by or Centrepay. 
Deliver – Families use the freight options brokered by MPower to arrange delivery to 
their home 109  
                               (CYP 2014) 
The Wise Buys scheme is justified as necessary by CYP because of the higher than average debt 
rate of Indigenous families in remote communities and families not spending enough on basic 
needs. Instead, CYP argue that Indigenous families spend a significant amount of their income on 
harmful addictions. Families are described as usually having limited local purchasing power and 
access to only one general store, with significant variation in quality, price and availability of goods 
                                                
108 For example, businesses would advertise their products as available for purchase to participants in the scheme.	
109 The MPower scheme uses local freight companies to deliver purchased items directly to families (CYP 2014). 
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and services (CYP 2014). Further, they are perceived as not being ‘consumer savvy’ and so CYP 
argue that families are, ‘routinely targeted by unscrupulous traders who sell inferior products at 
vastly inflated prices and lock families into payments they cannot afford’ (CYP 2014). As an 
alternative to uncontrolled or uninfluenced spending, Wise Buys is presented as a scheme that, 
enables access to ‘mainstream markets,’ which increases personal responsibility and participation in 
the real economy by ensuring families are directing their incomes towards meeting their basic needs 
and generating wealth (CYP 2014). The scheme is deemed as successful in this manner by CYP, 
who state: 
In 2008, CYP conducted a Wise Buys trial to assist families towards responsible 
spending. The trial was successful in showing that a large number of families will take 
up new opportunities when given the choice. It also affirmed that many families are 
vulnerable to impulse spending and pressure from others to divert income away from 
essential needs towards supporting addictions. Such families could best benefit from 
opportunities to voluntarily lock money down on essential needs and avoid supporting 
addictions (CYP 2014). 
Outcome: Policy Results of MPower & Wise Buys 
 
As previously explained, a total of four communities are involved in the welfare reform trials; 
Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale and Mossman Gorge and according to CYP, they can report the 
enthusiastic engagement of development subjects with MPower and Wise Buys, who are referred to 
as ‘partners’ of CYP. The latest available statistics from CYP’s Quarterly Family Empowerment 
Report (July-September 2013) indicate that Aurukun claims a 136 per cent rise in MPower 
members from the previous quarter, with 683 members. (CYP 2013:12). 57 per cent of Aurukun’s 
population is signed up to MPower, which, CYP claim, is indicative of, ‘financial management 
strategies…becoming increasingly embedded across the community, and offering us future 
opportunity to increase the scope of delivery’ (2013:13). The community also sees 327 iBank users, 
with each iBank user having accessed internet or phone banking services nearly seven times, or 
once a fortnight, and therefore the use of such services being described as a ‘regular habit’ 
(2013:13). CYP comment: 
 Expressing the desire to work towards positive change in their lives, partners are 
progressing along the MPower journey, taking ownership of their actions and 
committing to short-term goals to reap long-term benefits. Complementing increasing 
independence among partners’ capabilities, Aurukun coaching sessions are being well 
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received with attendance rates continually strengthened. Between quarter two and three 
of 2013, there has been a massive 550 per cent increase in … action plans being 
completed (2013:12).  
CYP also report a 146 per cent increase in Wise Buys membership (2013:12) and nearly four times 
as many consultations in the quarter reported as in the last quarter. In the first half of 2013, no 
purchases were made through the Wise Buys scheme. However from July-September, purchases 
totaled $3,617.30 (2013:17). CYP assert that, ‘This indicates that the encompassing financial 
management approach including ongoing budgeting advice and savings made through MPower 
coaching combined with researching of goods via Wise Buys is enabling partners to make and 
attain goods’ (2013:17). As further evidence of the success of MPower and Wise Buys, the story of 
Joylene Keppel and her partner Clifford Pootchemunka is presented within this report. It is said 
that, one of MPower’s key objectives is aiding families in realising their aspirations through helping 
them save money. According to CYP, Joylene and Clifford’s story highlights how MPower helps 
families work together to achieve savings goals, learn disciplined money management and how to 
take control of finances (2013:15): 
After both starting and completing their individual MPower Plans this quarter, Joylene 
is already seeing a significant change in their ability to manage their finances: 
“Everything has changed now! Before we did coaching, we were spending money every 
day. But now, we have money!” Working with an MPower coach, Joylene and Clifford 
identified why they were having budgeting problems and found ways to work towards 
their goals. “(The MPower Coach) was always there telling me to stop wasting money 
on junk food all the time. Before, we had no money left for the weekend. Now we have 
savings and can look up things we want to buy on the computer.” After completing the 
coaching, Joylene and Clifford created a household budget and a joint savings plan. 
They have now set up a joint savings account and are working together towards saving 
for their family goal. Through MPower, Joylene and Clifford have developed their 
capabilities in both budgeting and saving. “The best thing about what we’re achieving 
now is that we’re so happy! We always talk about how much we’re saving and that 
we’re achieving a lot for ourselves. We’re less stressed now and out debts are being paid 
off. We’re so proud!”’(2013:15). 
In Coen, 71 per cent of the community’s population belongs to the MPower scheme, with 186 
members. CYP report an increase in ‘unassisted’ iBank sessions. In addition, they comment that, 
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partners are beginning to internalise the buying process through seeking value for 
money. Of note is the increasing number of unassisted sessions, showing improved 
levels of confidence felt by partners in both using computers and decision-making. The 
wide range of payment types used in transactions also illustrates that partners are 
adopting financial technologies to suit their particular circumstances (2013:29). 
Only 13 per cent of Coen were reported as being Wise Buys members – 34 community members. 
$14,948 was spent in July-September 2013, however the majority of this was categorised as being 
spent on goods that are considered ‘needs.’ According to CYP, this indicates that, ‘partners are 
valuing household requirements over less essential items’ (2013:29). This is despite the major 
purchase of the quarter being a second hand car: ‘an item that will immeasurably improve life for 
one excited family …’ (2013:29). CYP consider the process of budgeting for such a large item as an 
indication that, ‘Coen families are taking responsibility for their finances and utilising Opportunity 
Products to achieve their goals’ (2013:29). 
In Hope Vale, similar success of MPower and Wise Buys was reported, with 458/634 community 
members participating in MPower (2013:34), and six new members of Wise Buys – a 20 member 
total (2013:39). The success of MPower is explained through the example of Leonard Casey, who 
saved enough money to buy a car: 
Having signed up to MPower only twelve months ago, Leonard Casey saved enough 
money to buy a vehicle: “I joined MPower to learn how to budget my money to afford 
the things I want and need.” Leonard successfully completed budgeting support training 
and also met with an MPower Coach to complete an MPower Plan. As part of his short 
and long term goals, Leonard identified that he wanted to purchase a vehicle, have a 
holiday and buy his own home: “I am now able to save most of my pay for a rainy day 
and I bought a car with my savings. My friends and family say that it’s really good that I 
saved to buy a vehicle at my age.” Leonard says that MPower has taught him to be more 
independent: “I’m able to save money now and I’m not depending on my family.”’ 
(2013:35).  
100 per cent of Wise Buys purchases in Hope Vale were categorised as ‘needs,’ with CYP reporting 
that, 
one member made three purchases unassisted this quarter, representing an excellent 
example of ongoing budgeting capabilities and increased computing confidence. That 
her purchases were also items of furniture, considered a household necessity, further 
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illustrates the improvements in life-style she has accomplished through utilising Wise 
Buys. Another member purchased a bed, with similar considerations placed on the 
purchase of a need versus a want alongside the ongoing budget requirements to make a 
large purchase. Taking into account the savings that were made and the increased well-
being achieved as a result of membership of Wise Buys, clearly members are finding 
any personal sacrifices are paying off in multi-faceted ways (2013:39). 
Finally, in Mossman Gorge, MPower boasted 135 members (2013:47) with a 100 per cent increase 
in budgeting sessions the reported quarter. Over $57,000 was spent on more than forty Wise Buys 
purchases by 67 members, and purchases of white goods and furniture were described as, ‘an 
excellent focus on “needs” verses “wants,” with the help of MPower Coaches providing more 
household budgeting advice than ever before’ (2013:46). CYP report that budgeting has become ‘a 
way of life’ for ‘partners’ in Mossman Gorge and ‘iBanking’ has become, ‘an ongoing habit’ 
(2013:47). Moreover, ‘of the 28 purchases made, 11 (or 40%) were by direct deposit online transfer 
of funds from a savings account. This is a clear sign our partners are managing their money and 
progressing towards their personal aspirations such as having a functional home with furniture and 
white goods’ (2013:51).  
Concluding Analysis  
This chapter has introduced and discussed Cape York development policies as part of a broader 
project of the CYI. It has introduced three development policies that are part of the welfare reform 
trials implemented by CYP to establish how Pearson operationalises his CYI development project. 
The welfare reform trials are policy responses that address the economic and social development of 
Indigenous Australians in Cape York and propose policy solutions for the perceived problem of 
‘passive welfare’ within the region. As noted above, the trials are framed in terms of a ‘social 
justice strategy’ for engaging Indigenous Australians in the ‘real economy’ with a view to 
improving well-being. Fundamentally, this strategy aims to improve social norms and encourage 
employment110 to counteract the impact of ‘passive welfare,’ which according to the CYI, creates 
entitlement and impairs individuals’ incentives to learn, train and earn (CYI 2011:12). In essence, 
welfare dependence is to be discouraged in favour of individuals facilitating and upholding the ‘real 
economy.’ This is informed by policies that are aimed at increasing individual responsibility, 
welfare conditionality and the restoration of law and order (2011:12). As such, policy solutions are 
presented as a means through which, ‘Indigenous Australians (are) able to choose a life they have 
reason to value’ (2011:12). 
                                                
110 However in the next chapter I argue that CYP development policy does not encourage the enhancement of 
capabilities.  
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The Work Placement Scheme is based on the pilot scheme run by the Boys to Bush Projects and 
social worker Milton James. Operating on the principles of this pilot scheme, the scheme aims to 
place young Indigenous Australians into skill-appropriate employment in order to integrate them 
into the ‘real economy.’ The pilot scheme concluded that Indigenous people can work in the private 
sector and live independently, provided they are removed from any negative family and community 
influences and provided with appropriate supervision (James 2005:1). From this, Pearson deduces 
that therefore, ‘the sooner young people are working in the real economy, the better’ (Pearson 
2006:2). 
MPower is a money management scheme that teaches budgeting and financial planning to the 
people of Cape York. The scheme is operated according to six objectives, which include enabling 
families to manage their money so that basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter are provided 
for – this is a means of redirecting funds away from addictions and the distorted cultural reciprocity 
that Pearson outlines in his identification of Cape York social conditions. MPower exists as a pre-
requisite to WiseBuys, a scheme aimed to increase families’ consumer knowledge and access to 
products and services. According to CYP, WiseBuys enables access to ‘mainstream markets,’ 
which increases personal responsibility and participation in the ‘real economy.’ As part of the 
Social Responsibility and Economic Opportunity streams, WiseBuys, MPower and the Work 
Placement Scheme are supported by additional policy trials and schemes that promote individual 
responsibility and engagement with the ‘real economy.’  
Statistical results of these policy trials published by CYP indicate all three policies have been 
successful in terms of participation by community members, funds spent and goods purchased. 
However, the fact that participation in some of these trials is conditional in order to receive welfare 
means that one must be cautious about accepting indicators of participation as a sign of success in 
assisting people to develop capabilities to live lives that they have reason to value. Therefore, 
despite CYP arguing that the trials have been successful, I argue that these three development 
policies centrally inform Pearson’s aim of creating a functioning neoliberal development subject 
conceived first and foremost as a specific kind of labourer and consumer (this will be expanded 
upon in the next chapter). The policies presented in this chapter inform Pearson’s aim of creating 
this functioning development subject in accordance with his alteration of Sen’s approach, and they 
deviate from my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type significantly. 
Overall, the Work Placement Scheme, MPower and Wise Buys prioritise functionings in a 
neoliberal political economy over the expansion of capabilities which could empower persons to 
choose and live the life they have reason to value. This aligns with Pearson’s drive to create a ‘real 
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economy’ in Cape York through his reordering of Sen’s development goals and overall framework. 
This he does in order to create the conditions within which the economy (and specifically a 
neoliberal economy) can be maintained and facilitated. For example, the Work Placement Scheme 
encourages employment for the production and commodification of goods conducive to economic 
growth. Moreover, this labour is unskilled with employment positions offered being farm/station 
hands, deck hands, or shelf stackers in retail shops and stores. This “unskilled” employment is 
offered by the CYI and CYP instead of positions that could require the acquisition of skill or 
training that would lead to the expansion of capabilities. Therefore, Pearson is not operationalising 
the CA as he himself understands it. Whilst the CYI and CYP aim to ‘restore social norms and build 
employment-related capabilities’ and strengthen individuals’ ability to ‘learn, train and earn’ (CYI 
2011:12), they are in fact initiating schemes that do not promote the acquisition of skills. 
Moreover, while MPower and Wise Buys encourage financial literacy for engagement with 
products and services, and one needs to recognise that while this may well be a useful set of skills 
and opportunities for some, they nevertheless primarily aim to contribute to economic growth by 
increasing ‘consumer knowledge’ and access to ‘mainstream markets.’ However, CYP would 
perceive this financial literacy as improving capability through their understanding of capability as 
including ‘skills and knowledge development, and developing behaviours conducive to getting 
ahead’ (CYP 2014). This is not the kind of (basic) capability that Sen envisages, such as the ability 
to be literate, the ability to meet nutritional requirements, or the power to participate in a social life 
and the community. 
Further, behaviour not conducive to facilitating this economy is labelled as ‘undesirable.’ For 
example, in the demand for productivity, those who were not productive enough or unwilling to 
engage with the task at hand were labelled as ‘passive,’ ‘lacking initiative, drive and ambition’ and 
‘dependent’ – ‘classical behaviour of welfare dependency’ (James 2005:13).111 For Pearson, the 
sooner young people are working within this economy, the better (2006:2). He therefore assumes 
that undesirable behaviours not conducive to facilitating the neoliberal political economy can be 
discouraged. These policies further align with Pearson’s approach by encouraging personal 
responsibility in ensuring that ‘welfare’ is received only as an incentive for functioning that 
facilitates the ‘real economy.’ As established in Chapter Three, Pearson believes opportunity 
combined with responsibility will secure capability. He therefore assumes that the opportunities to 
engage with the liberal political economy provided by CYI and CYP policy will result in increased 
capability, well-being and choice.   
                                                
111 This perception is potentially problematic because of pre-existing alternative Indigenous conceptions of labour that 
may not be conducive to the type of productivity conceptualised and favoured by the liberal political economy (see 
Povinelli 1995).  
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Although these policies predominantly align with Pearson’s reconceptualisation of Sen’s 
framework, they therefore deviate from my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type significantly. Firstly, 
Sen prioritises the expansion of freedoms and capabilities above economic progress and the 
expansion of the liberal political economy. Although Sen is unclear regarding ‘skilled’ and 
‘unskilled’ capabilities, the closest he comes to referring to ‘skills’ is his discussion of a ‘human 
capital approach’ – that is, the human qualities that can be employed as ‘capital’ in production 
(much like physical capital). He argues that this thinking fits into the more inclusive perspective of 
human capability that encompasses what he terms, the ‘direct and indirect consequences of human 
abilities’ (Sen 1999:293). An operationalisation of the CA should therefore encompass the 
acquisition of human capital (of which ‘skilled’ capabilities would be a part) and facilitate the 
acquisition of skilled capabilities to expand freedom to choose the life one has reason to value. Sen 
would, arguably, not see the value of the Work Placement Scheme encouraging unskilled labour 
that does not enhance capabilities and would reduce individual ability. Instead, the Work Placement 
Scheme is geared towards utilising unskilled labour such as fruit picking, which does not involve 
any skills training as Sen (and Pearson) would envisage.112  
Secondly, engagement with this type of work as part of the Work Placement Scheme is not the free 
choice of development subjects; therefore compromising their agency freedom to choose a life they 
have reason to value. Thirdly, the financial literacy encouraged by MPower and Wise Buys does not 
align with the (basic) capabilities that Sen envisages. Fourthly, the means through which 
capabilities are decided upon by the CYI that inform these policies is unclear beyond the phrase 
‘community engagement.’ A transparent role for democratic deliberation is missing from the CYI’s 
formulation of capabilities and CYP’s policy response in contrast to the emphasis that Sen places on 
democratic deliberation for ensuring agency freedom within his ideal-type (even if one accepts that 
it could be argued that Sen’s approach ultimately does have a bias towards modernisation processes 
and a place for the liberal political economy). Fifthly, the CYI’s list of ‘capabilities’ contains no 
provision that aligns with the condition of political freedom and deliberation as offered by Sen. As 
established in Chapters One and Two, political freedom for the democratic deliberation of what 
capabilities ought to be decided upon (beyond the basic capabilities that Sen identifies) and the 
achievement of agency freedom is fundamental to Sen’s framework. 
The absence of a condition to ensure political freedom for the democratic deliberation of 
capabilities is supported by a large amount of criticism concerning community consultation and 
                                                
112 Rather, this type of work is indicative of Pearson’s focus on functioning rather than the enhancement of capabilities 
according to Sen’s approach.  
	
155 
 
engagement for the welfare reform trials. The CYI claims to have consulted widely with members 
of the four Cape York communities before the trials began, however it is unclear if the aspirations 
of the CYI correspond with those of the four communities (Altman & John 2008:11). Having 
worked on the welfare reform trials in Aurukun, Martin (2008) also expresses concern for the level 
of community engagement in Cape York. He argues that engagement by CYP for the CYI was 
‘hasty’ and involved ‘premature conclusions.’ Community engagement in fact occurred after initial 
welfare reform trials and proposals were drawn up, which were drafted and designed to appear as a 
completed welfare trial design instead of this being a truly informative process (2008:11).  
Moreover, Martin states that he was encouraged by CYP to articulate Welfare Reform principles as 
if they were the communities’ own. He was also prompted to ensure that these responses were built 
into Aurukun’s ‘community vision’ and subsequently the CYI’s policy reform proposal to 
government (2008:4; Martin 2007a:1). CYI policy was therefore to appear as if it were a response 
to community-identified problems (2008:4).113 Martin argues that a lack of community engagement 
led to a narrow focus on community ‘dysfunctions’ and social norms. He argues that this has caused 
the CYI to have a very ‘foggy’ idea of what services will assist individuals and which will be 
ineffectual and that failures to engage with the community were not seen as failures of the project, 
but as failures of community members themselves (2008:7). The democratic provision that Sen 
assigns is therefore overlooked by the CYI, in favour of foregrounding functionings both within and 
that facilitate the liberal political economy. 
The final way in which these policies deviate from my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type is through 
their role for welfare. Sen’s ideal-type includes welfare provision for the severely deprived without 
any form of attached social obligation placed on those subject to severe deprivation. However, the 
CYI and CYP offer welfare support as an incentive for appropriate functioning conducive to the 
organisation of the neoliberal political economy. Although there is an attempt here to work against 
welfare dependency, by identifying ‘passive welfare’ as a social problem, focusing on functioning 
and not creating the conditions Sen envisages in order for people to choose a life they have reason 
                                                
113 Due to the way in which qualitative community consultation information was to be recorded, Martin insists that there 
was no way the system could usefully analyse it or feed it into policy. He argues, ‘when people in Aurukun said they 
were worried about violence between groups in the community, we had to tick the ‘alcohol’ box despite Aurukun 
consisting of six clans who really do not get on very well sober or drunk’ (2008:5). CYP community engagement with 
workers were therefore limited by ideological constraints: ‘Information collected from the eight engagement workers 
across four very different communities was refracted through a narrow, instrumental lens which obscured both the 
diversity and the complexity of the challenge found in each community The rationale for this subtractive taxonomy was 
that CYP already knew what was going on in the communities, or what was important, anyway. Pearson had outlined 
all of this way back in 2000’ (2008:5).  
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to value, this means of attempting to solve dependency is a ‘quick fix’ solution. ‘Work-for-welfare’ 
has the effect of securing a neoliberal political project of development and is justified through 
Pearson’s argument that it will encourage personal responsibility. However, this deviates 
significantly from Sen’s ideal-type by assuming the development subject will convert the 
opportunity to work into capability. Sen’s ideal-type places emphasis on the state providing social 
opportunities for the acquisition and expansion of capabilities. 
It is therefore reasonable to argue that Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s 
approach and subsequent development policy in Cape York does not amount to an ideal-typical 
operationalisation of the CA according to Sen’s intended framework. Such a substantial deviation 
means that in turn, it cannot be argued that Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s 
approach can be attributed to the spaces within and theoretical shortcomings of Sen’s original 
framework. However, the observations and critiques of Sen’s work that I established in Chapter 
Two are still significant to a critical analysis of the use of the CA in Cape York. I elaborate on this 
in the next chapter, where, in light of Pearson’s substantial deviation, I ask, what purpose does 
Sen’s CA serve in Cape York?  
The next chapter will also critically investigate and explore the social and political implications of 
Pearson’s development project in the region. Significant to these implications, in this chapter I have 
begun to establish that ‘work-for-welfare’ within a neoliberal political economy is prioritised over 
enhancing human capabilities as per Sen’s approach. Furthermore, welfare is conditional upon 
‘functionings’ that facilitate this economy. Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s 
framework are therefore premised upon a neoliberal approach to development, in contrast to Sen’s 
implicit acceptance of liberalism, albeit in its tempered form (i.e. the provision of welfare and 
redistribution). Pearson’s reordering of Sen’s development goals and prioritisation of economic 
growth over the expansion of capabilities means that any problems associated with Sen’s implied 
embedding of the CA in the liberal political economy are amplified. I argue that this has significant 
implications for the way in which the development subject in particular, is conceptualised in Cape 
York and the extent to which they are able to choose a life they have reason to value. 
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Chapter Five 
 
A Political Analysis of Pearson’s Reconceptualisation & Reordering of Sen’s Capability 
Approach: Implications & Consequences 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the last two chapters I identified and examined Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of 
Sen’s CA and evaluated concrete policy in Cape York against my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type 
development framework. In this chapter I establish the consequences and implications of Pearson’s 
alteration of Sen’s approach for development. Having carefully examined Pearson’s deviation from 
Sen’s CA, and having established that Pearson and CYP do not operationalise Sen’s approach 
according to his ideal-type (rather, they reconceptualise and alter his development framework), this 
raises the question of, what political purpose does the use of the language of Sen’s CA and 
Development as Freedom serve in the context of Cape York? Here, I argue that Pearson and the 
CYI employ Sen’s language of capabilities rhetorically as a justification for development based on 
‘work-for-welfare,’ whereby responsibility to accept opportunities for work is prioritised. ‘Work’ 
and skills for functioning in a market economy hence becomes problematically aligned with 
capabilities. This allows them to create a (problematic) development strategy to solve the problems 
associated with what Pearson terms, ‘passive welfare.’ This chapter argues that significant 
restrictions on development subjects’ abilities to choose the ‘lives they have reason to value’ are 
due to Pearson’s reordering of Sen’s development goals – his privileging of a neoliberal political 
economy – and the focus on ‘functioning’ instead of capabilities. 
 
Sen conceives of the development of capabilities as the means to enhance human freedoms, with 
capabilities having intrinsic value that enable individual choice. However, Pearson places emphasis 
on the importance of functioning that is instrumental to producing individuals who facilitate a ‘real 
economy.’ Moreover, by introducing conditional welfare in return for participating in welfare 
reform trials, the CYI and CYP overlook Sen’s provision for unconditional welfare for the severely 
deprived. In this way, Pearson’s reordering of Sen’s development goals results in the prioritisation 
of the prerogatives of the market economy as the ultimate vanishing point for the CA, justifying the 
‘work-for-welfare’ impetus of the CYI and CYP, who prioritise the growth of a neoliberal political 
economy rather than the expansion of capabilities and human freedoms. In this chapter I also 
undertake a political analysis of these implications.  
 
As a direct result of Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of the CA, the CYI and CYP focus 
on ‘functioning’ instead of expanding capabilities, and facilitating schemes linked to unskilled 
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labour, rather than those linked to an enhancement of capabilities as envisaged by Sen. In 
encouraging particular ‘functioning’ that is conducive to a neoliberal development agenda, Pearson 
and CYP do not focus on or encourage capabilities as Sen would conceive – what people are able to 
do and to be. I am not seeking to make a normative statement by arguing that formal employment is 
problematic per se, as one could argue that formal employment and the purchase of necessary 
household goods are positive elements conducive to well-being and are therefore a good thing. 
Rather, the critique I establish concerns the way in which these ‘functionings’ are linked to create a 
development subject who is instrumental to the growth of a neoliberal economy, and potentially at 
the compromise of specific cultural values and practices. For example, Indigenous Dreaming and 
socio-economic systems are insufficiently accounted for, which is problematic for the improvement 
of well-being in terms of the people of Cape York being able to choose lives they have reason to 
value.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section establishes how Cape York has facilitated a 
neoliberal development project and the production of a development subject primarily as labourer 
and consumer. I argue that this project is implicated in development as a ‘method of rule’ 
(McMichael 2012:50) rather than development as the expansion of human freedoms. CYP policy 
can therefore be regarded as an imposition on Cape York communities. Secondly, the chapter 
discusses the implications of Pearson’s welfare reform trials more broadly in terms of their 
extension across the Queensland and Remote Jobs and Community Program (RJCP) policy rollout 
across Australia. I make the case that arguably, CYP policy has helped to justify and facilitate RJCP 
policy, replicating similar values and the facilitation of a comparable development subject. Thirdly, 
the chapter considers literature that substantiates how Pearson’s neoliberal framework can be 
regarded as an imposition within non-liberal communities. That is to say that the neoliberal logic 
underpinning Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s approach and his emphasis on functioning may be 
incompatible with cultural values, practices and Indigenous conceptions of, ‘the life they have 
reason to value’ that exist within some communities.  
 
In the absence of ethnographic literature on the welfare reform trials, this section draws on literature 
on Indigenous Australia more broadly to identify potential cultural incompatibilities with Pearson’s 
alteration of Sen’s approach (with limited democratic provisions for those who reject a neoliberal 
development framework in the region, this is especially important). I establish that Pearson’s 
alteration of Sen’s development framework is likely to be incompatible with Indigenous socio-
economic systems as there exists a qualitative difference between the mainstream, economic values 
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encouraged by Pearson, and Aboriginal socio-economic frameworks.114 Moreover, there is some 
specific evidence to suggest that Pearson’s framework has been problematic in Cape York. The 
fourth section of this chapter presents some examples of resistance to the Cape York welfare reform 
trials and some concerns that Pearson’s ‘one size fits all’ approach is not sufficient in accounting for 
the cultural diversity of Indigenous Australia. I explain further concerns regarding community 
consultation, criticisms of the FRC in overseeing income management characteristic of MPower, 
and evidence of specific cultural clashes with policy in the region.  
 
In the penultimate section of this chapter, I contextualise and substantiate my argument by 
establishing how Pearson’s development approach is indicative of a neoliberal trend in Australian 
Indigenous policy more broadly (Altman and Hinkson 2009). This entails a reshaping of Aboriginal 
values towards the Australian mainstream nationally and is a reflection of the economic ideology of 
the dominant society. Finally, I explained in the previous chapter that as a substantial deviation 
from Sen’s approach, Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of the CA and subsequent 
implications and consequences cannot be attributed to the weaknesses of the CA and Development 
as Freedom established in Chapter Two. In spite of this, in the final section of this chapter I 
establish that some critiques from Chapter Two still apply in the context of Cape York. These 
critiques are predominantly those that concern the cross-cultural application of Sen’s approach in a 
non-liberal context and the implied embedding of his approach in a liberal political economy. These 
critiques become amplified in Cape York because Pearson’s reordering of Sen’s development goals 
causes the CYI’s and CYP’s neoliberal principles to be more prominent. Specifically, I argue that 
the tension identified in Sen’s approach – that by implication, ‘tradition’ is to be overcome in 
favour of the liberal political economy, and that this economy limits choice to the goods, products 
and services conducive to this economy – still manifests in Pearson’s altered version.115 
 
I argue that in Cape York, the presence of the tension between cultural values and the creation of a 
‘real economy’ leads to the encouragement of ‘functionings’ conducive to a neoliberal political 
economy being privileged over cultural values and practices that are alternative to neoliberal logic, 
with significant implications. Concomitant with the fact that cultural values and practices become 
secondary to functioning that is conducive to a ‘real economy,’ there exists a limited formal, 
democratic means for communities and cultural groups to deliberate the values (and capabilities) 
                                                
114 This is not to discount those communities who may want to realise a (neo) liberal conception of development, but for 
those who reject such development, development according to Pearson or CYP could be regarded as an imposition.   
115 In Sen’s approach, the presence of this tension is despite Sen’s assumption that any problems generated by the 
ordering of public spaces through the liberal political economy can be overcome by leaving a democratic space within 
which cultural practices can be ensured and upheld. Pearson however, does not ensure such a space. 
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they wish to adopt and enhance in Cape York. Development subjects are therefore limited to 
pursuing development according to neoliberal prescriptions instead of being given the option not to 
pursue development according to CYP’s development framework, or to pursue development on 
their own terms. The goods, products and services provided and approved for development subjects 
are also therefore, primarily those that are characteristic of the (global) liberal political economy. 
The freedom for development subjects to choose the ‘lives they have reason to value,’ as promised 
through CYP development policy, is therefore limited. 
 
As a political analysis of the implications of the welfare reform trials and comparable policy rollout, 
the first section of this chapter establishes Pearson’s development project as a ‘method of rule’ 
(McMichael 2012:50). His reordering of Sen’s development goals means that in Cape York, 
development as the expansion of freedoms is secondary to the facilitation of a neoliberal 
development subject. This subject’s ‘functioning’ is instrumental to the development process, as 
Pearson conceives it. 
 
Cape York’s Neoliberal Development Project  
 
The argument that Pearson, the CYI and CYP align their alteration of the CA with the neoliberal 
politics of development has been substantiated by closer analysis of the Work Placement Scheme, 
MPower and Wise Buys. The Work Placements Scheme is an example of policy that creates the 
conditions through which Pearson’s ‘real economy’ can be ensured, regulated and established as a 
means through which Cape York society can be organised. This is instead of policy that encourages 
the expansion of capabilities as human freedoms and the development of specific skills. Instead, 
emphasis is placed on ‘functioning’ in the form of engagement with the formal labour market. This 
‘functioning’ generates income and the accumulation of personal capital to uphold the neoliberal 
economy and not have the people of Cape York be reliant on welfare. Welfare is only offered as an 
incentive for participation in trials that facilitate appropriate ‘functioning.’ Therefore, it is 
reasonable to argue that Pearson’s reordering of Sen aligns the CA with the politics of neoliberal 
development. Subjects must engage in employment, private enterprise as forms of ‘economic 
participation’ in order to overcome Pearson’s conception of ‘passive welfare’ and adopt liberal 
values of ‘self-reliance’ and responsibility for their own well-being. As explained in Chapter Three, 
only then are development subjects viewed by Pearson as ‘active participants in society.’  
 
Moreover, CYP unintentionally convey that development subjects engaging with the formal labour 
market is the primary way in which they are valuable to society as ‘self-sufficient’ and ‘active 
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participants’ (CYP 2014). The term ‘work socialisation’ implies that Pearson and CYP assume the 
people of Cape York are in need of being introduced to the ‘correct functioning’ that aligns with 
principles valued by the neoliberal political economy. For example, continuing rhetoric of the Work 
Placement Scheme in particular, conveys the expectation of ‘productivity.’ Productivity is used to 
discern between valuable (i.e. active) participants and those who are not (inactive participants), or, 
those who are essentially contributing or not contributing to economic growth. 
 
Participants of the Work Placement Scheme are deemed successful on the basis of those who 
‘excelled’ in their work. That is, those who realised and maintained the appropriate (productive) 
level of functioning in this context. These subjects are those who generate the most value by 
harvesting the maximum amount of vendible commodity per working day. Those who do not, such 
as Participant #6 (as referred to in Chapter Four), demonstrate what Smith (2005:88) terms, 
‘unproductive labour’ and were said to therefore have behaviour deemed ‘classic’ of welfare 
dependency – ‘lacking ambition (and) drive,’ and were described as weak in character (James 
2005:13). Working at this level is seen as insufficient and unfavourable as it entails a low 
contribution to economic growth and the facilitation of the economy. It is therefore reasonable to 
argue that what are conceived as ‘valuable functionings’ in Cape York are primarily those which 
adequately generate personal capital, allowing development subjects to receive their own income 
instead of being reliant on welfare. Policies that generate job opportunities and provide the means 
for the people of Cape York to function according to these ideas and practices will, according to 
Pearson and CYP, produce development subjects who, by earning their own income, are 
independent of the welfare state. This (theoretically) solves what Pearson terms ‘passive welfare’ 
and allows development subjects to further facilitate the economy by being able to spend income on 
purchasing commodities, as consumers. 
 
The accumulation of personal capital through policy trials such as the Work Placement Scheme is 
managed by MPower. The people of Cape York are encouraged to spend their money on the 
purchase of approved goods through the Wise Buys scheme. The control of income and 
encouragement of appropriate spending behaviours through these policies is with a view to further 
facilitate and maintain a ‘real economy’ in Cape York. Through MPower and Wise Buys, 
development subjects are encouraged to maximise the accumulation of personal capital by creating 
spending budgets and financial goals. They are also introduced to and taught how to use features of 
the global liberal political economy – that is, its products and services such as internet and 
telephone banking. This policy is categorised as a form of social responsibility and empowerment, 
and presented as a means through which capabilities can be expanded. However, these are not 
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‘capabilities’ in terms of what that Sen would envisage as the possible combinations of, ‘the various 
things that a person may value being or doing’ (Sen 1999:75). Rather, Sen’s notion of capability 
encompasses the freedom that a person has to do or to be – freedom that informs a person’s 
being.116 
 
Following money management advice, Wise Buys ‘approved’ goods such as groceries, furniture 
and white-goods are referred to as needs, and additional goods such as ‘junk-food,’ cars and 
holidays are categorised as ‘wants.’ Subjects are taught how to most efficiently make these 
purchases using the products and services introduced to them through MPower. Wise Buys is 
justified in terms of the behaviours of development subjects – money is spent on approved goods, 
deemed necessary to improving well-being, rather than on harmful substances that negatively affect 
well-being. According to their logic, this contributes further to CYP facilitating the eradication of 
‘passive welfare’ and associated dysfunctional behaviours. In reference to development subjects, 
the spending and consumerism encouraged through Wise Buys are described by CYP as an, 
‘(expression) of desire to work towards positive change in their lives,’ as ‘progress,’ ‘taking 
ownership of their actions and committing to short-term goals to reap long-term benefits … (CYP 
2013:12).117 
 
Given this analysis, I argue that CYP policy places emphasis on the production of a ‘neoliberal 
development subject’ – a person who is expected to function according to, and uphold the ideas and 
practices that are centered on, the role of the free market as part of the global liberal political 
economy. This sees a rejection of the provision for unconditional welfare by Pearson, the CYI and 
CYP. The next section explains how similar principles of this neoliberal development strategy are 
informing wider development policy, as provisions are made for CYP policy to be rolled out across 
Australia. 
 
Cape York Policy Rollout  
 
With the CYI having established that they aim to have an influence at a national policy level (CYI 
2012a), in October 2014, the Queensland State Parliament passed law so that the welfare reform 
                                                
116 This is not to say that the skills taught through MPower and Wise Buys are not useful, but that they are indicative of 
broader principles of CYP policy that are problematic. This is the focus of this thesis.  
117 Again, it is important to note here that I am not arguing that development subjects should not be discouraged from 
substance addiction, or that purchasing necessary household goods is not a good thing. Rather, I make the point that 
these expected functionings, when put together, are linked primarily for the creation of a neoliberal development subject 
instrumental to the growth of a neoliberal economy. This may be at the expense or compromise of specific cultural 
values, practices and preferences, which itself is substantively problematic for the improvement of well-being and the 
primary valuable functioning of development subjects themselves.	
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trials operating through CYP and the FRC could be extended to other remote communities in far 
north Queensland (Worthington 2014). In particular, policy rollout further north of Cape York 
focuses on income management and the creation of employment opportunities. The extension of the 
welfare reform trials has the support of Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, 
Glen Elmes, who has stated that, “by restoring social norms in welfare reform communities we are 
reducing dependency on welfare income and supporting real improvements in … (the) retention of 
employment opportunities” (Worthington 2014). Further, as of December 2014, the federal 
government announced changes to the RJCP to be rolled out across Australia between July 2015 
and July 2016 (Taylor 2014). The proposed changes are set to address ‘passive welfare behaviour’ 
and are cogent with the neoliberal operating principles of the Cape York welfare reform trials. The 
new RJCP scheme requires people in remote communities to work five days per week for twelve 
months of the year to receive welfare payments. This is in contrast with those in urban and regional 
areas who are only required to work six months of the year in order to receive payments (Taylor 
2014). 
 
Moreover, the new RJCP scheme requires job providers to be ‘contractually obligated to report non-
compliance’ and a briefing document for the proposed changes states that, ‘the changes proposed 
will ensure RCJP job seekers do attend their appointment or feel the consequence of their passive 
welfare behaviour more immediately … Job seekers will learn the behaviours expected of workers, 
for example by there being immediate consequences for passive welfare behaviour’ (Taylor 2014). 
The difference in working requirements for the receipt of welfare between remote and urban areas 
is of great significance. Indigenous populations are higher in remote areas, and the document also 
states that ‘work-for-welfare’ is being introduced only in Indigenous Australia because, in these 
areas there exist, ‘limited or no real labour models, as well as unique social problems that stem from 
passive welfare.’ In addition, the government states that, ‘these social problems stem from idleness 
and are making communities unsafe and dysfunctional ... we need to set expectations in remote 
communities that build the same behaviour and norms of workers in ordinary Australian workplaces 
(Taylor 2014). They state further that the reforms will, ‘give jobseekers the opportunity to be 
continuously engaged in work for the dole activities, five days a week, all year round – just like a 
real job’ (Taylor 2014). Therefore, operating on similar principles to Pearson’s framework, 
comparable consequences and implications of this development framework are likely to be 
experienced more widely than Cape York.  
 
Because of the fact that in his reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen, Pearson reorders Sen’s 
development goals and aligns his adaptation of the CA with neoliberal development, it is reasonable 
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to argue that McMichael’s concept that ‘development as not just a goal; it is a method of rule’ 
(McMichael 2012:50) that was originally elaborated in Chapter Two (as a potential critique of a 
cross cultural application of Sen’s approach), is also relevant and amplified in Cape York. This is to 
say that Pearson uses development discourse of enhancing capabilities as a tool with which to 
legitimise power in the pursuit of increasing the consumption of goods and services and desired 
behaviours conducive to economic growth – according to the values of the dominant society 
(McMichael 2012:50). He does not facilitate development as the enhancement of capabilities and 
the expansion of human freedoms. Further, with a limited formal, democratic means for 
communities and cultural groups within communities to secure cultural values and principles and 
limited democratic provisions for those who reject CYP’s development framework (as established 
in Chapter Three), little context is given to what the people of Cape York have reason to choose and 
value, which when referring to development in general, Deneulin insists is important (Deneulin 
2002:501). Therefore, it is important to ask, what political purpose does the appropriation of the 
language of Sen’s CA and Development as Freedom serve in the context of Cape York?  
 
Having carefully examined Pearson’s use of Sen’s development framework, I have argued that his 
reconceptualisation and alteration are not inevitable consequences of the weaknesses in Sen’s 
approach as established in Chapter Two. Rather, Pearson’s use of the CA is a substantial deviation 
from my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type.118 I further argue in this chapter that as such, Sen’s 
language of capabilities is used rhetorically as justification for a (problematic) neoliberal 
development strategy to solve the problems associated with what Pearson terms, ‘passive welfare.’ 
Therefore as a highly problematic strategy, Pearson’s framework can be regarded as an imposition 
on Indigenous communities. This is cogent with Watson’s point that, ‘while it is the choice of some 
Indigenous people to adopt dominant values of white Australia – those who choose different options 
can be severely constrained … in a contemporary Australia … the state limits support for cultural 
diversity’ (Watson 2009 cited in Jordan, Bulloch & Buchanan 2010:354-355). 
 
To expand on Watson’s point, in an Australian Indigenous context, there inevitably exist 
Indigenous cultural values that will compete with the prominent neoliberal values that Pearson and 
CYP are encouraging in the name of development. I originally raised this concern in Chapter Two 
when discussing potential problems of the cross-cultural application of Sen’s liberal CA in non-
liberal societies. I argue that Pearson’s Cape York development framework insufficiently considers 
Indigenous cultural values and practices. This is especially the case in communities where notions 
of commodity and exchange according to the global liberal political economy are unfamiliar or in 
                                                
118 This is in-spite of a similar tension and problems that I identify. 
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communities where there exists Indigenous economic diversity – a combination of subsistence 
economies and engagement with the mainstream market economy. This is not to categorise 
Indigenous communities as ‘modern’ or ‘traditional,’ rather, I infer that a cross-cultural application 
of a pre-established (neo) liberal framework within non-liberal contexts is not as clear cut as 
Pearson (and Sen) would suggest, especially in Indigenous Australia given its socio-historical 
context and socio-economic and cultural diversity. 
 
In order to highlight what may be a very real political struggle for some, the next section will 
further consider the potential for Pearson and CYP’s development framework to be regarded as an 
imposition within Indigenous communities. I make this argument whilst acknowledging that more 
specific anthropological evidence is needed to establish whether Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s 
approach is an imposition within Cape York communities themselves. However, there are a few 
studies that specifically point to problems concerning development in Cape York (Watt 2013b; Kim 
2013; Fraser 2014; Worthington 2014), and I elaborate on these.  
 
Pearson’s Neoliberal Framework as a Potential Imposition: Cultural Incompatibilities 
 
That Pearson’s neoliberal development framework could be considered as an imposition in Cape 
York is despite the fact (as I have established in Chapter Three), that Pearson himself acknowledges 
that the Indigenous ‘traditional’ economy remains a component of ‘Indigenous livelihood’ in the 
region (Pearson 2000b:5) and his acknowledgement that there exists conflict between Aboriginal 
‘tradition’ and the economy (2000b:23). This conflict concerns Pearson’s perception of ‘distorted’ 
Aboriginal tradition impeding functioning that is conducive to economic progress. He also 
recognises that social conditions and colonial experience have forced Indigenous Australians to 
move between the subsistence economy and the ‘mainstream economy of the outside world’ (what 
he terms the ‘real economy’) (2000b:27). Despite this, through the welfare reform trials, elements 
of Indigenous society are to be overcome in favour of the functioning that facilitates this economy, 
in spite of the fact that development subjects may have their own preference formations and 
priorities conducive to alternative (non-liberal) cosmologies. For example, in order to function 
effectively as members of a capitalist society, (in Cape York) it is perceived that Indigenous 
Australians must develop an ego-centred worldview, and conceive him or herself as the centre of 
action (Altman and Hinkson 2009:188-189). However, it is this world view that Indigenous 
Australians may not privilege culturally, because of a commitment to community. Altman and 
Hinkson state that, 
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this is not to suggest that across remote Australia one universally finds all-loving 
communally minded individuals, but rather the structures that continue to frame 
Aboriginal worldviews are differently organised to those generally associated with 
mainstream Australia. These worldviews do not privilege the individual as the primary 
unit of society, but rather a set of relationships that bind particular persons inter-
generationally to specific places via carefully delineated bodies of cosmological 
knowledge (2009:188-189). 
 
Through the notion of Indigenous Australians’ ‘right’ to have a place in the real economy, Pearson 
assumes that the functioning that he and CYP value is the desire of all Indigenous Australians and 
that they will forego any Indigenous socioeconomic systems in favour of a more mainstream 
economy.  
 
As noted in Chapter One, Sen does recognise that cultural concerns have a strong influence on 
human behaviour, and affect individual choices and social and political behaviour (Sen 2001:2). He 
states that cultural identity is an aspect of the self – and influences ‘what we do and how we do it’ 
(Sen 2004a:43). This is substantiated by Altman and Hinkson (2009), who argue that fostering the 
‘appropriate’ values of Indigenous Australians through a notion of individuality causes Pearson’s 
approach to be precarious and causes ‘culture’ to become a matter of individual choice. They state 
that culture becomes, ‘the kind of activity people might participate in after they have secured an 
education, a job and a mortgage, as a lifestyle option rather than a form of ontological anchorage’ 
(2009:191). Conceiving of culture as a secondary activity is cogent with Pearson’s conception of 
the individual development subject as a logical extension of his privileging of a neoliberal political 
economy. It assumes that cultural values and practices are secondary to those conducive to the 
facilitation of the liberal political economy. 
 
Further substantiating Pearson and CYP’s conception of ‘culture’ as a secondary activity, the CYI 
suggest that there is in fact no tension between Indigenous and non-Indigenous values. The Institute 
insists that focusing on economic development creates material security so that Indigenous culture 
can then flourish (Jordan et al. 2010:353-354). They further insist that economic and social 
development is not more important than culture, arguing that without development, ‘Indigenous 
Australians are more likely to lose their heritage and identity not less. Indigenous Australians 
should have the opportunities and freedoms enjoyed by most Australians, while at the same time 
ensuring that significant elements of their traditions and identity remain’ (CYI 2005b:1-2 cited in 
Jordan, Bulloch and Buchanan 2010:354). However, their assumption that culture can flourish only 
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after economic and social development has been secured reinforces the tension I identified through 
critics of Sen – that ultimately, some elements of ‘tradition’ are to be overcome in favour of the 
liberal political economy. This assumption is despite specific cultural ‘Dreaming ontology’ being 
prevalent in Cape York and within Indigenous Australian communities as a whole (Altman and 
Hinkson 2009:190).  
 
Although ‘Dreaming ontology’ has changed and shifted due to colonisation and Indigenous groups 
living more settlement-based lives, Altman and Hinkson argue that it remains an organising 
principle for, ‘the relations between people, other living things and the environments (Indigenous 
Australians) inhabit’ (2009:190). In support of this, they draw on Stanner’s research on Indigenous 
Australia to state that, 
 
Stanner left his readers in no doubt as to the implications of the Dreaming for the kinds 
of persons Aboriginal individuals could be, and of the great distance between Aboriginal 
notions of personhood and those called out by modernity: “one cannot easily, in the 
mobility of modern life and thought, grasp the vast institutions of stability and 
permanence and of life and man, at the heart of Aboriginal ontology …”’ (Stanner 1979 
[1953] cited in Altman and Hinkson 2009:189). 
 
The Dreaming is therefore an ongoing ontological anchorage in Indigenous communities that 
dictates ‘tradition’ and customs which are fundamental to the people of Cape York choosing a life 
they have reason to value. Pearson’s neoliberal alteration of the CA and his desired functioning for 
the people of Cape York may be incompatible with The Dreaming. For example, Dreaming 
cosmology dictates the importance of location and connection to land – which would compete with 
the Work Placement Scheme displacing workers to other parts of Australia, and the value of 
community relationships – which would compete with Pearson’s conception of a neoliberal 
individual. 
 
In addition and related to ‘Dreaming ontology,’ Indigenous Australians are embedded within a 
variety of economic circumstances. Altman (2000) argues that economic systems are areas where 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous differences are most prevalent (2000:1). He asserts that in cities and 
country towns, Indigenous people support themselves through mainstream economic activities, 
whilst those who reside in rural communities maintain important aspects of their ‘traditional’ 
economy. For example, elements of their subsistence economy based on foraging and other 
subsistence activities are the central means of a productive economy for these communities 
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(2000:2). Indigenous communities are also culturally heterogeneous within themselves as there are 
also those who do not reject a liberal economy. Instead, Altman argues that, ‘at locations where 
subsistence activities remain significant, people have not rejected introduced goods, nor have they 
returned to a pristine pre-contact mode of subsistence. Rather, they have adopted and adapted new 
foods and technologies and financed their market dependence with welfare transfers and other cash 
earnings’ (2000:3). Remote Indigenous communities may be ‘tradition-oriented’ and where 
Indigenous people are not a minority; their lifestyles may not be directly influenced by ‘traditional’ 
value systems, despite maintaining a strong Indigenous identity (2000:3) Altman therefore 
establishes the extent of socio-economic and cultural diversity within Indigenous Australia.  
 
In further illustrating how Indigenous values may compete with a neoliberal development 
framework, Altman also explains that within ‘tradition-oriented’ communities a person’s economic 
status is determined by their ‘access to religious knowledge,’ rather than material resources. For the 
mainstream economy, economic status and the measure of well-being are conceived in terms of 
employment, cash income and the ownership of assets generated by the formal labour market 
(2000:3). Formal measures of economic status or considerations of well-being are focused on the 
mainstream market economy and its ideology rather than Indigenous perspectives (2000:4). 
However he argues that in remote communities, Indigenous people are, ‘frequently fully employed 
in subsistence pursuits (or informal productive activities), which provide income in kind (that is, 
foods) rather than cash’ (2000:3-4). Therefore, Altman further argues that, ‘in many communities 
the individualistic or household oriented economic aims that are prevalent in modern society are 
regarded as running counter to ‘correct’ behaviour. In short, materialistic considerations are of 
lesser importance among sections of the Indigenous population’ (Scwab 1995 cited in Altman 
2000:3). Addressing remote Indigenous Australians’ disadvantage and attempting to improve their 
well-being using mainstream criteria from the dominant society will therefore not be successful 
(2000:4). He concludes that, 
 
A combination of cultural factors create constraints on the incomparability of many 
Indigenous people into the mainstream. In particular, people living off the land continue 
to pursue their own distinct prerogatives. Other Indigenous people are just not 
comfortable working in a labour market where mainstream values dominate and where 
they are a distinct minority. Some Indigenous people are not able, and others are not 
willing to mould themselves to suit labour market requirements at the expense of their 
Aboriginality’ (2000:10-11).  
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Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s approach is therefore questionable in terms of 
its potential incompatibility with The Dreaming and existing and hybrid Indigenous economies and 
its push for community members to engage in mainstream markets and the formal labour 
economy.119 Altman (2000) goes so far as to argue that prejudice and negative stereotyping of 
Indigenous employees are present in Australia as a means of explaining why Indigenous Australians 
are unemployed. This, he argues, is due an insufficient understanding of Indigenous cultural and 
economic circumstances and ‘rigidity’ in the employment requirements of the formal labour market 
(2000:11).  
 
With regards to Indigenous cultural and economic circumstances, Povinelli (1995) identifies 
alternative Aboriginal conceptions of labour – a fundamentally different way in which labour is 
conceptualised by Australian Indigenous communities compared to that offered by the framework 
of a non-Indigenous economy. For example, in an evaluation of Aboriginal labour action by 
government, Povinelli argues that for non-Indigenous Australia, Aboriginal beliefs concerning 
work, productivity and labour action are separated, labour action in particular being, ‘quantified and 
qualified by western empiricism’ (1995:509).120 According to Povinelli, this productive difference 
between non-Indigenous and Indigenous Australians and the effect of leisurely labour is the way in 
which Indigenous Australian leisure ‘produces both life-enabling knowledge about the countryside 
and the abundancy or scarcity of the foods and materials found there’ (1995:513). For some 
Indigenous communities, leisure produces knowledge that, ‘will have important long-term 
consequences on the material basis of (their) social life’ (1995:514). Povinelli argues, ‘whether or 
not a person actually hunts, gathers or fishes on a bush trip, he or she is likely to gain various levels 
of useful knowledge, such as what sites are rich with foods and what sites are dangerous due to 
current Dreaming or social conflicts’ (1995:513).  
 
                                                
119 For example, as I have explained, according to liberal economic conceptions of labour, those who were 
‘unproductive’ during the Work Placement Scheme Trials (in particular, Participant #6) were considered lazy, lacking 
ambition and initiative (James 2005:13). 
120 In examining the ways in which the Dreaming environment interacts with human socio-economic action, Povinelli 
(1995) indicates that for some Indigenous communities, the Dreaming ‘provides all humans, animals and objects with 
the potential to act as an agent, all events may be a result of a Dreaming’s, animal’s or object’s subjective intentionality’ 
(1995:509). The subjects of intentional action are therefore not always human, but animals and plants can have 
knowledge of, or relationships with other animals, places and people (1995:510). She identifies a ‘shared belief’ that 
animals act intentionally and ‘on the shared background knowledge’ of the ‘social ties’ that bind individuals and their 
environments, therefore ‘knowing the social ties that bind people to each other and to places critically affects the 
interpretation and socioeconomic use of … stories’ (1995:510). For example, Belyuen women ‘do not assume that 
transformation, appropriation or intentionality are attributes that reside either uniquely or most fully in the human 
realm, Rather, humans are simply one node in a field of possible intentionality and appropriation’ (1995:513).  
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Particular notions of subjective intentionality and appropriation also mean that the by-products of 
human labour – sweat and speech – are perceived to influence the productivity of the environment 
‘by affecting the disposition of the Dreaming’ (1995:514). Povinelli states that, ‘if local language 
and sweat make the environment productive and sweet – one’s bodily productions are constantly 
producing the environmental conditions in which one is acting – are there any limits to what 
constitutes work?’ (1995:513). Therefore, cogent with Altman’s critical argument, Povinelli 
identifies multiple cosmologies and knowledge systems within Aboriginal Australia. She argues 
that these are problematic to policy formulation and implementation, and when considering a single 
framework for the evaluation of well-being. These single frameworks typically conceptualise 
Indigenous society as a convenient, homogenous whole. In acknowledging that western (liberal) 
notions of human intentionality, subjectivity and production exist as only one form of knowledge, 
Povinelli builds on Bird-David (1992) who examines how beliefs affect people’s material 
conceptions and how attention to these would/should reformulate public policy on ‘hunter 
gatherers.’ They identify discrimination within legal and economic policy with regards to these 
communities due to the prevalence of cultural assumptions and ideas of western political economy 
and labour action informing policy (1995:507).  
 
In light of this discrimination, Povinelli calls for a ‘reconceptualisation of Aboriginal socio-
economics’ (1995:507) by governments that is informed by local understandings of labour action 
and Aboriginal notions of what occurs when humans work in the environment. These are notions 
that are usually conceptualised under the umbrella term ‘Aboriginal Tradition’ (1995:507). For 
example, the way in which leisure produces knowledge that has long-term effects for Aboriginal 
social life becomes more critical when framed in the context of subjective intentionality and 
appropriation. If government policy is restrictive, and Indigenous communities are limited to small 
settlements and community areas, this threatens to restrict the range of Dreamings and, ‘narrows … 
attachments to places’ (1995:514). This therefore highlights the limits of an approach characteristic 
of western governmental policy to those who conceptualise labour action and subjectivity 
differently (1995:515).  
 
Similarly, in acknowledging Aboriginal socio-economic frameworks that are incompatible with 
mainstream economic development approaches, Altman (2010) calls for a different approach to 
mainstream economic development that includes, ‘a wider set of economic forms and intercultural 
values’ (2010:262-263). He insists that important aspects of the pre-colonial ‘hunter-gatherer’ 
economy remain productive stating,  
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these elements provide a means to maintain land-based ways of life in many situations 
and has resulted in the emergence of a complex form of economy that includes state, 
market and customary sectors. This economic reality in remote areas is actualised 
through a diversity of economic forms and an array of sectoral overlaps that influence 
everyday livelihood strategies (2010:271).121  
 
This qualitative difference between mainstream economic values, ‘Dreaming ontology’ and 
Aboriginal socio-economic frameworks strongly indicates some problems of Pearson’s Cape York 
development policy in terms of its incompatibility as a cross-cultural framework that values the 
logic and behavioural principles of a mainstream economy. 
 
Pearson is broad in referring to the problem of Indigenous welfare, and Indigenous economic and 
social development – his terms are all inclusive. However, he does also refer to smaller collectives 
within Indigenous Australia: a community, group, family or society. Nevertheless, he expects his 
alteration of Sen’s framework to suit Indigenous Australians as a collective. Given the diverse 
socio-economic circumstances within Indigenous Australia, a single framework for the evaluation 
of the well-being of Indigenous communities that essentially conceptualises Indigenous society as a 
convenient, homogenous whole is problematic. Pearson is therefore limited in accounting for the 
diversity of cultural values and practices and the multitude of social structures differences in social 
norms, meaning systems and modes of action that Indigenous Australia is comprised of. In this 
sense, Pearson aligns with Sen in insufficiently appreciating the substantive social and political 
relations of the development process.  
 
In light of what Pearson presents as a holistic approach, his lack of support within some Aboriginal 
communities has been well documented, and it has been argued that he, ‘lacks authenticity in the 
eyes of his people’ (Koch 2012:2). Whilst his influence among Indigenous Australians is largely 
untested, a fundamental criticism of Pearson – particularly from Indigenous Australia itself – is that 
he, ‘speaks for other people’s country’ and has, ‘one size fits all’ solutions for Aboriginal people 
(Graham 2010:6). Graham (2010) argues that Pearson’s biggest problem therefore lies within 
Indigenous communities themselves, commenting, ‘it plays out well on “struggle street” and 
Pearson’s political stocks soar. But, of course, he doesn’t get away with it in the parts of our nation 
that are really struggling – Aboriginal communities’ (2010:9). In laying the blame for low living 
standards on Aboriginal people themselves, Graham argues that Pearson is ‘left out in the dark’ in 
                                                
121 Further, Altman has developed a hybrid-economy development model to influence policy and for considering 
alternative development methods to mainstream approaches (see Altman 2010:270-276).  
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Indigenous affairs (2010:9). He opines that if Pearson understood his own history better, he would 
not be so alienated from those he is trying to help, ‘born black but raised Lutheran, Pearson will 
never lead Cape York out of the darkness of welfare dependency until he learns to accept personal 
responsibility for his own “grievous failing:” a complete lack of authenticity in the eyes of his 
people’ (2010:10). 
 
Having established the potential for competing mainstream economic and Indigenous values in 
Cape York, and having begun to raise the issue of a lack of support for Pearson, the next section 
presents specific evidence to suggest that the operationalisation of his development approach is 
problematic within the region.  
 
Specific Cultural Concerns & Resistance in Cape York 
 
Resistance to the welfare reform trials from the Indigenous Mayors and the Councils of 
communities themselves has been widely reported (Watt 2013b). Eight Mayors from Aurukun, 
Mapoon, Lockhart River, Kowanyama, Napranum and the Northern Peninsula have expressed their 
desire for Pearson not to have any more control over funds, policy or service delivery in Cape York 
(Kim 2013). Their primary concern is that Indigenous community leaders have not been consulted 
on new policy directives. This is despite Pearson (2000b) arguing that the state cannot deliver 
solutions on its own without a partnership with the community (2000b:78), and stating that new 
policy directives are an ongoing operation with terms to be negotiated (2000b:79). Kim (2013) 
reports that Philemon Mene, the Mayor of Napranum has said that Mr. Pearson never consulted 
local government leaders about (future) plans. Mene addresses Pearson in stating, “work with us, 
rather than trying to be the Mayor of Cape York” (Kim 2013). He argues that governments should 
directly fund councils to run community programs, rather than funding going through Pearson’s 
organisations (in order for the communities themselves to have more control). In addition, Lockhart 
River Mayor Wayne Butcher has called for his position to be respected:  
 
You’d think the best people to make any decision over addressing social issues in our 
community is the community themselves … There needs to be some understanding 
there is leadership now on the ground … You’d think the best people to make any 
decision over addressing social issues in our community is the community ourselves 
[sic]. But that hasn’t happened for such a long time (Kim 2013).  
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Similarly, Hope Vale Mayor Greg McLean and three other Mayors are said to have, ‘joined a 
chorus of traditional owners who say officials haven’t consulted their communities on the draft 
Cape York Regional Plan, which maps out future use for the Peninsula’ (Fraser 2014). Aurukun 
Mayor Dereck Walpo is also reported as having said, “the people who put this plan together should 
explain it a bit more because they haven’t come and visited us about it” (Fraser 2014). This is 
echoed by Wujal Wujal Mayor Clifford Harrigan who has stated, “it’s just like any other plan they 
want to put through Cape York – there’s been no on ground consultation” (Fraser 2014). The Cape 
York Indigenous Mayors Alliance have also expressed their concern over Pearson’s lack of contact 
with Indigenous community leaders, especially with regards to ‘The Empowered Communities 
Blueprint’ – aimed at improving how funding is spent in the region (Nancarrow 2014). An 
extension of the reform trials to other Cape York communities is therefore not welcomed by 
everyone. The Labour Party’s Curtis Pitt has explained that, ‘the Cape Indigenous Mayors Alliance 
wrote to the Health and Community Services Committee [and] indicated that they, quote, “do not 
want to see the FRC extend in the existing communities without a full independent assessment and 
the informed consent of the elected councils,” end quote’ (Worthington 2014).  
 
The majority of wider critical literature on the Cape York welfare reform trials directly criticises the 
FRC. This is largely because the FRC is the legitimate government body responsible for punitive 
action within the trials – restricting welfare payments and limiting community engagement.122 This 
literature raises similar concerns to those I have raised regarding Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s 
approach and CYP’s emphasis on the facilitation of ‘functioning’ that is conducive to the 
facilitation and maintenance of a neoliberal political economy. With regards to the expected 
behaviour of Indigenous communities in Cape York, Smyth (2011) goes so far as to criticise the 
welfare reform trials for breaching the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (which was suspended 
for the creation of the FRC (Altman & Johns 2008:13)). She argues that the trials limit the rights of 
Aboriginal people by placing conditions on access to welfare that are not imposed on the broader 
population (Smyth 2011:13). By operation of the Family Responsibilities Commission Act 2008 
(Cth) Cape York communities do not enjoy, like other Australians, the ‘right to equal participation 
in cultural activities and practice of traditional customs,’ and, ‘access to goods and services’ 
(2011:13). 
 
Specifically, Smyth claims that there are suggestions that the Cape York reform trials have affected 
participation in cultural activities such as funeral attendance, which is of huge cultural significance 
for Indigenous people (2011:13-14). She explains that missing a funeral may breach Aboriginal law 
                                                
122 There are those however, who are not entirely critical of the Commission. For example, see Billings (2010). 
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and lead to social isolation. This has been particularly problematic with regards to school 
attendance (a means through which the trials restrict welfare payments to parents if their child 
misses school), which Smyth argues is a breach of Aboriginals’ right to participate in cultural 
activities. She explains, 
 
The FRC Commissioner is on record as saying “the old days of saying … ‘we’ve been 
to a funeral’ won’t be accepted” as an explanation for school absence for the purposes of 
a Notice. Further, the Implementation Review of the FRC provided evidence to suggest 
some residents under a (Compulsory Income Management) order have been unable to 
use their welfare benefit to pay for travel to attend funerals (2011:14).  
 
Moreover, Basics Cards that are given to people under Compulsory Income Management (a scheme 
similar to MPower) are loaded with welfare money and can only be used in certain stores. Smyth 
argues that this has led people to be, ‘left at the mercy of unscrupulous vendors’ prices … and 
(they) have been unable to travel for medical care and buy essential medicines’ (2011:14).  
 
Although Smyth acknowledges that the welfare reform trials may have helped some individuals, at 
a more general level, she argues that the project has failed (2011:16). Using published data from the 
FRC, Smyth finds no clear evidence that the reforms have been effective (2011:12). Further, she 
argues that the trials should be revised as there is no justification for racial discrimination or the 
measures the trials currently carry out in offering welfare payments for particular behaviour or 
outcomes (specifically for Aboriginal communities) (2011:16). Smyth suggests that the trials should 
be modified to include culturally appropriate [emphasis added] family social supports services, 
case managers and education programs. Further she asserts that all decisions should be subject to, 
‘genuine community consultation and a standard administrative appeals process’ (2011:16). 
Similarly, Watson (2008) argues that the FRC should not be replicated, and falls short of being 
designed in partnership with Indigenous communities, conforming to natural justice and the 
principles of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (2008:4). This is despite the Australian 
Government Department of Social Services (2012) reporting that use of the FRC in Cape York was 
an overall success.123  
 
So far this chapter has established that there is enough evidence to argue that Pearson’s 
development strategy in Cape York is problematic in terms of its (neoliberal) logic and values being 
                                                
123 In particular, this reported success is in regards to income management. See the Australian Government Department 
of Social Services’ Cape York Welfare Reform Evaluation (2012:204-212).  
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incompatible with Indigenous cultural values, practices and socio-economic systems. With limited 
provision for community consultation to secure Aboriginal cultural practices and existing socio-
economic systems, Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s approach can be conceived as an imposition on 
communities. However, it is worth noting that as of April 2015, there are moves headed by Pearson 
to return power to Indigenous communities. The ‘Empowered Communities Model’ that has been 
proposed in a report to the Federal Government calls for eight trial regions across Australia, 
including Cape York to sign an agreement with the Federal Government to commit to delivering on 
a set of priorities that are decided by Indigenous communities themselves, rather than those dictated 
by State or Federal Governments (Wahlquist 2015). However, it is too early to gauge the extent to 
which this model, if accepted will help to facilitate Indigenous communities to, ‘choose the life they 
have reason to value.’  
 
In order to contextualise and substantiate the implications of Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s CA in 
Cape York, in the next section I situate my argument in the context of Indigenous Australian policy 
more generally. I argue that Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s approach and facilitation of a neoliberal 
development subject are indicative of a trend in Australian policy more broadly. With Cape York 
development policy having an influence at an Australian Indigenous policy level nationally, 
Pearson’s development framework, justified by Sen’s language of capabilities has the potential to 
be experienced by Indigenous Australians nationwide, compromising their ability to ‘choose the life 
they have reason to value’ on a much wider scale. 
 
The Trend of Neoliberal Indigenous Policy in Australia  
 
Given that there are policies that operate with a similar neoliberal logic to Pearson’s development 
framework, the problems associated with the production of a neoliberal development subject are 
likely to be extended more widely than Cape York. Altman and Hinkson (2009) argue that 
occurrences where development subjects are expected to engage in the neoliberal economy through 
accepted practices and behaviours that are characteristic of global liberalism, are, ‘a radical form of 
cultural redevelopment … modeled around the fostering of self-respect and individual 
responsibility’ (2009:191). They identify the ‘cultural redevelopment’ involved in this process as a 
cultural shift in governing Aboriginal Australians. They refer to a shift from a focus on community 
to a focus on individuation, which they term ‘mainstreaming action’ (2009:185) and argue that this 
is contradictory: 
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From one perspective the state can be interpreted as acting responsibly and decisively to 
reduce the risk posed by a section of its citizenry who represent a refusal to conform to 
mainstream social values. This refusal is viewed as constituting risk not just for the 
Australian nation, but also for Aboriginal communities and persons themselves. Yet 
such mainstreaming action will be shown to have opposite effects. Rather than working 
to re-establish the kinds of social forms through which ontological security might be 
fostered within this distinctive section of Australian society, government policy is 
increasingly geared towards producing mobile, formally educated, individualised 
Aboriginal citizens who will embrace the values of the free market. Paradoxically, the 
production of this new Aboriginal subject is urged at a time when the deep 
contradictions of neo-liberal processes have never been more apparent124 (2009:185-
186).  
 
The reason for this ‘cultural redevelopment’ is because the neoliberal state locates a fundamental 
risk posed by remote Indigenous Australians – that is, ‘at the level of subjectivity and cultural 
commitment: quite simply, Aborigines [sic] do not behave like other Australians and are not 
necessarily motivated by the same aspirations’ (2009:188). This justifies ‘mainstreaming action’ 
and policies that encourage ‘correct’ behaviour (such as employment in the formal labour market 
for a cash income) conducive to the facilitation of the neoliberal economy. The cultural shift in 
governing Aboriginal Australians from a focus on community to a focus on individuation and 
towards mainstreaming Indigenous Australians towards a neoliberal state means that the Cape York 
welfare reform trials can be understood as part of a neoliberal trend in Australian Indigenous policy 
more broadly. Altman (2010) explains that Pearson’s welfare reform trials exist as part of the 
National Indigenous Reform Agreement (NIRA) across Australian states and territories that, 
‘articulates principles to incorporate those in remote locations to mainstream education and training 
and the market economy; and to promote personal responsibility and behaviours consistent with 
positive social norms’ (2010:268). This fundamentally reshapes Aboriginal values, beliefs, social 
norms and practices that are different from the mainstream (2010:277).125 
                                                
124 The contradictions of neoliberalism referred to here can be aligned with the generation of unfreedoms by the liberal 
political economy. 
125 Altman gives four reasons for the Australian state increasingly embracing neoliberal principles. These are, briefly, 1) 
a discourse of policy failure linking Indigenous violence to economic marginalisation, 2) the view that Aboriginal 
culture, combined with neglect of Indigenous peoples by the state, contributes to disadvantage. Welfare payments have 
rendered Indigenous peoples dependent, whilst the government has failed to deliver public services and development 
services to remote communities, ‘on an equitable needs basis,’ 3) an ‘excessive influence of neoconservative thinkers’ 
within policy making and ‘neopaternalistic welfare policy approaches.’ Further, ‘ascribing to principles that only 
valorise the free market, private property and entrepreneurship’ is also problematic, and 4) the assumption that ‘closing 
the education gap will improve socio-economic outcomes,’ which Altman renders unhelpful to those who, ‘live non-
standard lives’ (Altman 2010:266-267).  
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This reshaping of Aboriginal values towards the Australian mainstream is critically considered by 
Sanders (2004), who acknowledges Pearson’s concern that ‘passive welfare’ has been detrimental 
to Aboriginal society (2004:3). Although Sanders accepts Pearson’s reservations, he looks closer at 
the nature of the Australian social security system more broadly – specifically, its purported 
universalism. Sanders argues that the norms and aspirations of this system are social constructs. 
They originate from and are intended for the social and economic circumstances of the dominant 
society (non-Indigenous Australia). Therefore, when these rules are applied to minority groups such 
as Indigenous Australians, he argues that, ‘major issues of alteration and interpretation arise’ 
(2004:3). Sanders deduces that most recently, the Australian welfare system for Indigenous 
Australians is not just and fair because the system’s rules do not reflect their own particular social 
and economic circumstances.  
 
Despite these contentions, it is important to note that Pearson can be credited for identifying 
specific social conditions for Cape York communities (the problems he associates with ‘passive 
welfare’) and for bringing concern for the well-being of Indigenous communities to government 
attention. In doing so, has been a figurehead in encouraging concern for communities where there 
has previously been very little focus. However, whilst acknowledging Pearson’s identification of 
pervasive social problems within Indigenous communities, as established, his approach to solving 
these problems is problematic. His framework can be said to reflect the social and economic 
circumstances of the dominant society. In facilitating dominant social and economic circumstances 
with limited space for the social and economic circumstances of the minority, Pearson’s 
development framework is an imposition. 
 
Moreover, despite Pearson’s adaptation of Sen’s approach not being a consequence of the CA’s 
internal weaknesses I identified in Chapter Two, I argue that some critiques of Sen’s approach still 
apply in the context of Cape York. I argue that regardless of having reconceptualised and altered 
Sen’s approach, Pearson’s use of his framework still results in the manifestation of the implied 
fundamental tension that is also present within Sen’s approach – that in Cape York, ‘tradition’ must 
be overcome in favour of the (neo) liberal political economy and that the ‘freedom’ to choose the 
life one has reason to value is limited to that permitted by the liberal political economy. Although 
Sen is careful to ensure conditions prevail for democratic deliberation, Pearson has not made similar 
provisions. This is discussed further in the next section. 
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Implications of Pearson’s Neoliberal Conception of Development: The Manifestation of Sen’s 
Fundamental Tension & Relevant Critiques 
 
Sen makes it clear that the economy is to be instrumental in enabling freedoms according to the CA. 
Development incorporating his approach is to be a ‘support led’ process involving skillful social 
support of healthcare, education and relevant social arrangement by governments not a ‘growth-
based’ process reliant on economic development (Sen 1999:46). I argue that in reordering Sen’s 
development goals, Pearson implements a ‘growth-based’ process of development, with the creation 
of a ‘real economy’ at the forefront of his endeavor. This means that he operates upon what Sen has 
called an inadequate conception of development that is based on the accumulation of wealth and 
income related variables (see Sen 1999:14). As established, rather than a focus on the expansion of 
capabilities, as envisaged by Sen, Cape York development policy focuses on the facilitation of and 
maintenance of ‘functioning’ according to neoliberal logic. This development policy encourages 
low-skilled employment opportunities, engagement with services and the purchase of goods 
conducive to the growth of this economy. Moreover, Cape York development policy attaches social 
obligations to the receipt of welfare payments for those who are severely deprived. 
 
Favouring functioning that is conducive to a neoliberal economy means that development subjects 
are expected to engage with the formal labour market and products, goods and services 
characteristic of global liberalism. By facilitating development subjects to function in this way, the 
welfare reform trials limit the political and agency freedoms of its participants. Development 
subjects are restricted in their ability to democratically select and prioritise functioning for the 
fulfillment of cultural values and practice. They are resigned to pursuing development according to 
neoliberal prescriptions rather than being given the option not to pursue development according to 
this framework or to pursue development on their own terms. Consequently, the substantive ability 
for the people of Cape York to choose a life they have reason to value is compromised, which is 
highly problematic for the improvement of wellbeing.  
 
The presence of the tension that I identify is substantiated by the acknowledgment of a similar 
tension between Indigenous and non-Indigenous values by Smith (2003). Smith argues that 
Indigenous development in Cape York, ‘involves an ongoing compromise between often 
incommensurable forms of social, political and economic organisation’ (2003:99). Smith concludes 
that, ‘development intervention is likely to fail when it is not properly cognisant of differences 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous ideal and ways of doing things’ (2003:99). Further, Jordan, 
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Bulloch & Buchanan (2010) who, when considering statistical indicator frameworks for Indigenous 
well-being,126 examine Pearson’s use of the CA in Cape York argue that, 
 
the unreflexive use of statistics without a concomitant examination of choice and 
aspirations generates a clear paradox in the Cape York Institute’s deployment of the 
capability approach. This is, while choice is held up as the ultimate signifier of 
wellbeing, implicitly people are expected to choose certain things above others (in this 
case for example, participation in the mainstream market economy). In this context there 
is a risk of cultural difference being subsumed beneath dominant cultural logic 
(2010:349).    
 
A consideration of Indigenous welfare therefore entails a tension between statistical equality 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, and, ‘the maintenance of culturally-informed 
differences in life choices’ (2010:353). This is echoed by Dockery (2010) who argues that in 
Australia, when considering Indigenous well-being there is a tension ‘between maintenance of 
Indigenous culture and achievement of socio-economic ‘equity.’ Further, he asserts that implicit 
within this tension is the assumption that, ‘attachment to traditional cultures and lifestyles is a 
hindrance to achieving ‘mainstream’ economic goals (2010:315). That is to say that ‘tradition’ is to 
be overcome in favour of modernisation and economic progress. 
 
Competing Indigenous and non-Indigenous values in Cape York render the concerns regarding the 
cross-cultural application of Sen’s approach I raised in Chapter Two important. Here, I am referring 
to Povinelli (1995) identifying the limitations of political economic approaches. She explains that 
when specific cultural constructions of economies are considered in the context of these approaches, 
the reinscribing of dominant power over local minority communities is visible (1995:506). Jordan et 
al. (2010) assert that Indigenous well-being is often concerned with the relationship between 
economic development and the maintenance of Indigenous cultural values (2010:354). They argue 
that economic development can be compatible with maintaining culture only if this development is 
consistent with existing Indigenous preferences (2010:354). Further, the cross-cultural concerns of 
Altman and Hinkson (2009) and Altman (2010; 2011) apply to Pearson’s framework as well as 
Sen’s. For example, through the production of a neoliberal development subject as labourer and 
consumer, Pearson’s welfare reform policy can be identified as neoliberal in so far as it is indicative 
of, ‘government policy … geared towards producing mobile, formally educated, individualised 
                                                
126 Statistical indicator frameworks use social determinants such as employment, health and education to measure and 
judge well-being. Jordan, Bulloch & Buchanan explain that implicit in each framework is a particular conception of the 
‘good life’ for Indigenous peoples (2010:333). 
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Aboriginal citizens who will embrace the value of the free market (Altman and Hinkson 2009:185). 
Further, Pearson’s reordering of Sen’s development goals and his privileging of functioning in the 
economy (which Sen subordinates in his approach), has the effect of aligning Pearson’s alteration 
more closely with neoliberal principles than is the case with Sen. Critiques of Sen’s CA that 
concern the implied embedding of the approach in the liberal political economy therefore become 
amplified in the context of Cape York.  
 
As explained in Chapter Two, Gasper (2002) argues that Sen’s framework is typical of economic 
theories – working with a conception of welfare that focuses on the investor and consumer of 
commodities (Gasper 2002:13). This criticism is amplified in Pearson’s reconceptualisation and 
alteration of Sen’s approach, with the neoliberal political economy acting as a greater external 
pressure – constraining and conditioning individual benefit on processes and choices that in turn 
benefit economic progress. Similarly, I have explained that Evans (2002) argues that the liberal 
market economy can be a source of unfreedom for development subjects (2002:59). Evans insists 
on the importance of allowing space for (the less privileged) to, ‘develop their own distinctive 
preferences and priorities based on their shared economic positions and life circumstances, and to 
develop strategies for pursuing those preferences’ (2002:59). Being able to develop their own 
distinctive preferences – including the possibility of pursuing development on their own terms 
rather than according to a pre-established, liberal framework – is important for the people of Cape 
York in order for them to choose a ‘life they have reason to value.’ 
 
Moreover, with a limited formal, democratic means for communities and cultural groups to secure 
cultural values and practices, collective political action is in turn limited within the region.127 In 
Chapter Two I argued in reference to Sen’s approach that insufficient provision for collective 
political action could be a means through which culturally valued capabilities could be overlooked 
in favour of capabilities and implied functionings that ultimately facilitate the liberal political 
economy. In Cape York, there is a similar manifestation. Formal collective political action would 
allow the people of Cape York to have the ability to respond to CYP’s development agenda (as 
communities or cultural groups for example). This would ensure that the inclusion of multiple 
forms of cultural values and practices are deliberated with the possibility of being secured as part of 
Cape York development; instead of the privileging of development in terms of policies that focus 
on ‘functioning’ through imposed unskilled labour regimes under a neoliberal framework. It would 
also create space for the achievement of Indigenous conceptions of well-being, rather than 
                                                
127 I have argued in Chapter Three that there is little evidence of community consultation (see Martin 2008) and that the 
CYI do not feature ‘political freedom’ or anything synonymous with this on their list of ‘capabilities.’  
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Pearson’s ‘one-size fits all’ approach. I have explained that when critiquing Sen, Ibrahim (2006) 
argues that institutional support to facilitate the pursuit of collective, alternative perceptions of the 
good is important (2006:408).  
 
Ibrahim’s argument and Shilliam’s critique that Sen does not recognise the market can act as a 
constraint to developing different types of freedoms (Shilliam 2012:131-132) also becomes 
amplified in the context of Cape York. Shilliam argues that ignorance regarding the market as a 
constraint on human freedoms becomes especially important given the rise of neoliberalism 
(2012:332). In a neoliberal context, the logic of the global market is more pronounced, without 
minimal provisions to correct the substantive inequalities generated by this logic. With neoliberal 
logic underpinning development policy in Cape York, and with conditions placed on the receipt of 
welfare that would usually help to correct this inequality, Pearson and the CYI have a limited 
appreciation of the market as a constraint on human freedom. They insufficiently recognise that the 
‘real economy’ has the potential to restrict the ability for the people of Cape York to ‘live the life 
they have reason to value,’ and subsequently, Indigenous preferences are compromised.  
 
The compromise of Indigenous preferences due to a limited consideration of the substantive social 
and political relations of development echoes Navarro’s critique (as elaborated in Chapter Two) that 
Sen insufficiently appreciates the politics of development (Navarro 2004:17). Fundamentally, 
Pearson’s development subjects are to engage with the ‘real economy’ through accepted practices 
and behaviours that are characteristic of global liberalism. A consideration of Indigenous values and 
practices would require Pearson, and the CYI to acknowledge the significance of their adoption and 
alteration of a liberal framework in an Australian Indigenous (cross-cultural) context and its 
limitations. This consideration would then prompt a more adequate understanding of the substantive 
social and political relations of development and, in turn, a consideration of competing neoliberal 
and Indigenous values. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has critically considered the social and political consequences and implications of 
Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s approach in Cape York. I have argued that 
these consequences and implications arise because through Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s approach, 
he and the CYI prioritise a neoliberal political economy rather than the enhancement of capabilities 
according to development as the expansion of human freedoms. Instead of a focus on the expansion 
of capabilities, I have established that Pearson, the CYI and CYP policy place emphasis on 
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functioning conducive to the facilitation and maintenance of a ‘real economy.’ In Cape York there 
are also limitations, formal and substantive, on the democratic means for communities as well as 
cultural groups within communities to actively participate in shaping cultural values and practices. 
This leads to functioning in the economy valued by Pearson and CYP being privileged over cultural 
values and practices and the production of a neoliberal development subject, primarily as labourer 
and consumer.   
 
I have argued that in this way, Pearson’s policy and development approach is an imposition on 
communities and is reflective of the verdict that can be implicated in ‘development as a method of 
rule’ (McMichael 2012:50). This is evident in Pearson’s pursuit of encouraging particular 
behaviours as ‘functioning’ and engagement with the goods, services and practices conducive to 
economic growth. It can be argued that Pearson uses development as a tool with which to legitimise 
this process, justified through his rhetorical use of Sen’s language of capabilities. The limited 
provision for a formal democratic means through which Aboriginal cultural and socio-economic 
values can be secured in Cape York and evidence of a lack of community consultation further 
substantiates the possibility for Pearson’s development framework to be regarded as an imposition, 
and the means through which specific cultural preferences are suppressed.  
 
Literature that considers the socio-economic status of Indigenous Australians more broadly and 
indicates problems regarding the cross-cultural application of Pearson’s development approach, 
substantiates the idea that Pearson’s development framework is an imposition. The most prominent 
of this literature is Altman (2000; 2010) and Altman and Hinkson (2009). This evidence supports 
the idea of an ongoing compromise between Indigenous and non-Indigenous values more broadly. 
The opportunity for development according to Indigenous preferences is important given that Cape 
York policy and similar policy informed by neoliberal logic is being rolled out across Australia. 
This chapter has also established that Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s approach is indicative of a 
neoliberal trend in Australian policy more broadly – where Aboriginal values are compromised in 
favour of encouraging behaviours conducive to mainstream economic values and economic growth, 
reflecting the values of the dominant society. 
 
Finally, I have argued that despite Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s CA, the 
fundamental tension that I identify within Sen’s approach – that ‘tradition’ (synonymous with 
cultural values and practices) is by implication, to be overcome in favour of a liberal political 
economy – is also relevant and in fact amplified in Cape York. Consequently, the goods, products 
and services provided and approved for development subjects through Cape York development 
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policy are characteristic of the global political economy, rather than a reflection of non-liberal 
preferences, or both. Development subjects are limited to pursuing development according to pre-
established prescriptions rather than given the option not to pursue development according to a 
neoliberal framework or, to pursue development according to their own preferences. The ability for 
development subjects to choose ‘a life they have reason to value’ is therefore compromised. 
 
Although more specific research on community impact is needed, it is reasonable to argue that 
Pearson’s alteration of Sen’s approach is problematic in promoting mainstream economic values 
and functioning, at the expense (in some instances) of maintaining Indigenous cultural practice and 
existing socio-economic systems. This is not to say that the Cape York welfare reform trials have 
not been beneficial, as some communities may welcome a liberal framework or be a hybrid of 
subsistence economy and the mainstream market economy. Rather, I have established that 
competing Indigenous and non-Indigenous values may be a very real political struggle for some and 
have suggested that a cross-cultural application of a neoliberal framework within Indigenous 
communities is not as clear cut as Pearson (and Sen) suggest. Moreover, Pearson projects the 
possibility of reconciling these competing values by simplifying what is in fact a complicated 
problem, as demonstrated by Shilliam (2012); Evans (2002); Altman (2000; 2010), and Altman and 
Hinkson (2009). 
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Thesis Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has critically considered Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of Sen’s CA in 
Cape York. Rather than operationalising Sen’s ideal-typical development framework, Pearson and 
the CYI substantially deviate from Sen’s approach by shifting towards a neoliberal development 
agenda. CYP policy therefore aligns with Pearson’s reconceptualisation and alteration of the CA, 
but deviates from my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type significantly. I have therefore argued that 
Pearson and the CYI use Sen’s language of capabilities rhetorically rather than substantively, in 
order to justify their own development agenda. I have established that CYP development policy is 
problematic, with substantive social and political implications. Fundamentally, Person’s 
development framework restricts Cape York development subjects’ ability to ‘choose the lives they 
have reason to value.’ This is due to his reordering of Sen’s development goals. CYP policy focuses 
on ‘functioning’ and encouraging behaviours that facilitate a ‘real economy’ within the region, 
overlooking existing socio-economic systems, cultural values and practices. I have elaborated on 
this point using the Work Placement Scheme, MPower and WiseBuys as policy examples. In 
reordering Sen’s development goals, Pearson and the CYI encourage mainstream economic 
‘functioning’ instead of expanding peoples’ capabilities – that is, what they are able to do and be in 
terms of enhancing human freedoms, according to Sen. The latter would align with Sen’s CA and 
Development as Freedom. 
 
CYP may argue that they are helping develop ‘capabilities’ in terms of teaching individuals and 
families skills for online banking and shopping and managing money. Although one cannot 
discount the fact that these skills may be useful, I have posited these examples as indicative of the 
broader problems associated with Pearson’s and CYP’s development framework. I make the point 
that these are not the types of capabilities fundamental to ‘what people are able to do or to be’ that 
Sen would envisage. By focusing on ‘functioning’ and encouraging behaviours that facilitate a ‘real 
economy’ within the region, Pearson and the CYI overlook the potential to enhance real capabilities 
– for example,  the education and acquisition of skills for workers as part of the Work Placement 
Scheme through higher education programs or apprenticeships in skilled labour. As substantiated by 
Altman (2010), this is indicative of a trend in neoliberal policy in Australia more broadly, with a 
view to encouraging mainstream behaviours of Indigenous Australians in line with the 
characteristics of the dominant (non-Indigenous) society. This mainstreaming process sees notions 
of ‘culture’ and the realisation of Indigenous values and practices – such as The Dreaming – as 
secondary to the achievement of mainstream behaviours, which inform a particular conception of 
well-being. 
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Moreover, because Pearson and the CYI’s use of Sen’s CA is such a substantial deviation, I have 
found that their alteration cannot be directly attributed to the shortcomings of Sen’s approach – in 
particular the theoretical ‘spaces’ he leaves open to alteration, as elaborated in Chapter Two. 
However, because Pearson reorders Sen’s development goals and aligns their development 
framework with neoliberal principles, some of the critiques of Sen explored in Chapter Two are 
amplified in the context of Cape York. Fundamentally, the tension that some cultural values and 
practices are by implication, to be overcome in favour of the liberal political economy is also 
present, and becomes magnified given the presence of competing neoliberal and Indigenous cultural 
values. Coupled with a limited formal means of democratic deliberation for the people of Cape 
York to have their say on the development process in the region, and as previously explained, the 
presence of this tension means that Indigenous cultural values, practices and socio-economic 
systems are to be substantially limited in favour of the ‘functioning’ conducive to the development 
framework proposed by Pearson and the CYI. I have substantiated this argument with literature on 
Indigenous Australia more broadly, and that specific to Cape York, although I acknowledge that 
further research is needed on the welfare reform trials that is inclusive of Indigenous voices. 
 
Although is important to acknowledge that Pearson can be credited for highlighting the need for an 
improvement in well-being for the people of Cape York and for asserting the ongoing importance of 
addressing Indigenous well-being for Australian development policy, it can be argued that his 
development framework is typical of other (problematic) Indigenous development approaches more 
broadly. Contextualising Pearson’s approach allows us to see how the Cape York welfare reform 
trials are part, and indicative, of a much broader political project; the development of Indigenous 
peoples globally the way Strakosch (2014) emphasises. The reform trials are typical of the way in 
which Indigenous communities are conceptualised in terms of this global development paradigm. It 
can be argued that Pearson’s approach embodies the problematic assumptions of these mainstream 
global approaches to Indigenous development. Strakosch (2014) argues that, 
 
Indigenous focused neoliberal development paradigms emphasise the importance of 
economic ‘mainstreaming,’ resource development and progress measured comparatively 
in terms of statistical indicators of health and material well-being. According to this 
framework, Indigenous people have been left out of the economic development that has 
often been going on around them, and therefore need to be intensively moved along the 
development pathway in order to ‘catch-up’ with mainstream societies (2014:54). 
 
186 
 
It is typical of these approaches to link the disadvantage of Indigenous people to their alternative 
socio-economic models (such as subsistence economies) (2014:54). Further, the ‘mainstreaming’ 
response that Strakosch and Altman and Hinkson (2009) identify, takes place in a context where 
pre-established hierarchical relationships exist between developers and development subjects. 
Strakosch has noted that in these settler-colonial contexts, there already exists, ‘intricate and 
intimate political conflict’ (2014:50). This point, and my argument that Pearson’s approach is an 
imposition on Cape York communities, assert the importance of a more inclusive form of 
Indigenous development – what Strakosch terms, ‘responsive forms of development practice’ 
(2014:55). This is cogent with Sen’s conception of a development subject who can, ‘shape their 
own destiny’ and not be, ‘passive recipients of cunning development programs’ (Sen 1999:11).  
 
More inclusive types of Indigenous development enable Indigenous peoples to have greater control 
over the means and ends of the development process. Communities are more involved rather than 
development policy being imposed in a ‘top down’ fashion. This type of development incorporates 
‘traditional’ knowledge into the development process for an improved and more sustainable 
outcome (Strakosch 2014:55). Although responsive forms of development practice are also not 
without problematic assumptions (see Strakosch 2014:57-64), a more inclusive framework of 
development would reduce development in Cape York being implicated in ‘development as a 
method of rule’ (McMichael 2012:50). This framework should then recognise that, as Strakosch 
argues, ‘ … Indigenous people occupy a unique economic position and that rather than attempting 
to create economic sameness, developers should incorporate existing economies and lever 
Indigenous cultural and environmental comparative advantage’ (2014:55). It would be a move 
towards seeing alternative economics as comparable with mainstream market participation, in order 
to contribute to well-being (2014:56). Further research is therefore needed on the formulation of a 
more inclusive development framework for Cape York, in order for the people of the region to have 
free and sustainable agency and, ‘choose a life they have reason to value.’  
 
Moreover, although not directly attributable to Pearson’s rhetorical adoption and altered version of 
the CA, I make a broader statement regarding Sen’s CA and Development as Freedom. Given that 
Sen makes provision for democratic deliberation to ensure that individual choices are made as 
freely and independently as possible, ultimately, his approach is problematic when presented as 
universal. In theory, the core liberal premises of my interpretation of Sen’s ideal-type would have to 
be accepted upon an operationalisation of his approach, and this may be incompatible with some 
cultures. If subjects choose a life they have reason to value outside of a liberal framework, this is 
problematic. If Sen’s approach were applicable in a liberal context where people were accepting of 
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liberal principles, the CA is a viable development framework. Despite this, Sen still facilitates 
problematic abstractions. Criticisms such as those offered by Evans (2002:58), Shilliam (2012:131-
132) and Gasper (2002:14; 21-22) still hold and in non-liberal societies, alternative conceptions of 
development (especially those that may disregard the incorporation of the global liberal political 
economy) are unaccounted for by the approach. It is therefore reasonable to argue that Sen’s 
approach is based on abstractions, impliedly without a full consideration of the substantive social 
and political experience of the pre-established liberal prescriptions of the CA and Development as 
Freedom. Some observations about the universality of Sen’s CA and Development as Freedom can 
therefore be made from the critical analysis of this thesis. 
 
Specifically, these concern Sen’s limited flexibility on an implied role for the liberal political 
economy and his insufficient provision for all (collective) modes of political action as a political 
dynamic in development. Sen must be credited for pioneering an approach to development that 
prioritises the expansion of human freedoms, rather than economic progress (typical of mainstream 
approaches). However, I have argued in Chapter Two that by implication, his approach is premised 
upon a pre-established liberal framework that includes a role for the liberal political economy. For 
Sen, this economy is instrumental to ensuring development as the expansion of freedoms. 
Inevitably, freedoms that are secured and achieved will eventually contribute to securing the 
“market episteme” (McMichael 2010:3) and are likely to be prioritised over alternative conceptions 
of well-being outside of a non-liberal framework. Further, Sen is limited in his engagement with the 
‘unfreedoms’ that this economy generates. These include the restriction of preferences generated 
through development subjects’ own lives – in particular development preferences that are unlikely 
to be reflected through goods, products and services that are indicative of global liberalism (the 
critique offered by Evans (2002) and Shilliam (2012)). Broadly, Sen’s approach has the potential to 
restrict the choice of development subjects in non-liberal contexts. Therefore, those who wish to 
realise non-liberal conceptions of well-being – conceptions that perhaps reject the formal labour 
market for example – can be unaccounted for. 
 
Sen assumes that any problems generated by alternative conceptions of well-being can be overcome 
by leaving a democratic space within which cultural practice can be ensured and upheld. However, I 
have identified the tension that ensuring and upholding cultural practice through the selection of 
culturally valued capabilities is not to be done at the expense of the liberal economy and the 
economic and social changes necessary for development to take place. The presence of this tension 
– that by implication, ‘tradition’ is to be overcome in favour of the liberal political economy, in fact 
means that specific cultural values and practices such as alternative socio-economic systems or 
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conceptions of well-being that do not facilitate the maintenance of this economy are limited. This is 
because implicitly, Sen’s approach values capabilities and freedoms that are conducive to 
facilitating a liberal political economy – for example, even his instrumental freedoms (that reinforce 
one another) encourage the production of a development subject who will be educated, literate, 
healthy and ready to be engage with the formal labour market and contribute to the economy.  
 
By the CA being closely aligned with the values of a liberal subject, Sen’s ideal-typical 
development framework assumes a liberal conception of the development subject that is universally 
applicable and desirable – but can be interpreted as one that detracts significantly from appreciating 
specific histories and social and cultural features of ‘lives people have reason to value.’ I suggest 
that this is a potential source of ‘unfreedom’ for development subjects; which, in turn, shows that 
the CA itself may be (particularly in non-liberal contexts) intrinsically implicated in ‘development 
as a method of rule’ (McMichael 2012:50). In constructing a subject who is interested in realising 
development as he conceives it, Sen’s CA can also be interpreted as resting on a limited conception 
of the development subject that insufficiently accounts for the liberal political economy as a source 
of ‘unfreedom’ that development subjects may encounter. 
Moreover, although Sen strives for ‘basic capability equality’ and leaves additional capabilities to 
be decided by societies themselves, his framework remains a partial guide to the achievement of 
well-being (even if we were to supplement the CA with additional measures of well-being as Sen 
suggests). I have argued in Chapter Two that he does not fully consider what ‘real opportunities’ 
need to prevail in order for the CA and Development as Freedom to be realised. For example, he 
does not consider what opportunities would need to be provided by public policy in order for 
freedoms to be achieved (beyond the basic welfare provisions he specifies for when they do not). 
Through an examination of critical debates, I have established that by implication, Sen 
insufficiently appreciates the politics of development – the substantive social and political relations 
and lived experience of the development process. His approach is also based on idealised 
abstractions in this manner that mean he does not in fact address inequality.  
 
DaCosta and McMichael (2007) question Sen’s overall assumption that freedom and participation 
will bring about equality. They argue that inequality should also be considered as, ‘people’s 
inability to realise meanings and motivations that matter to them’ (2007:599). Substantively, 
viewing development as economic justice discounts alternative conceptions of equality and other 
choices about the organisation of material life. This economic conception of development is 
insufficient. They further argue that, 
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an enriching conception of development would value (alternative) means instead of 
abstracting them into a formalistic equation of equality with access to money … 
Viewing development as being about economic justice alone discounts alternative 
conceptions of equality that value other choices concerning the organisation of material 
life, not just the attempt to transcend material constraints (2007:599).  
Instead, dominant economic conceptions of development (such as that implicitly underpinning 
Sen’s approach) are legitimised through minimising [emphasis added] alternative conceptions when 
they are compared to potential economic gain (2007:599). McMichael & DaCosta state that, ‘the 
poverty of the global order lies in inability to move beyond the scarcity principle and recognise the 
diversity of values that could inform different conceptions of development and equality …’ 
(2007:599). It is this conception that acts as a barrier to critically engaging with dominant economic 
conceptions of development and the need to rethink equality as, ‘a complex combination of access 
to means of production, reproduction and representation rather than access to economic opportunity 
across a homogenous world’ (2007: 600).  
A deeper consideration of the social and political relations of the development process by both Sen 
and Pearson would lead to a more sufficient recognition of the contradictions of liberalism and 
neoliberalism respectively, along these lines. As it stands, their intended development frameworks 
are based on idealised abstractions that see their implied and ultimate roles for the economy 
transcend alternative conceptions of development and well-being. Presented as a progressive and 
universal approach to development, Sen’s CA and Development as Freedom in particular, need to 
more sufficiently incorporate means and strategies that are more inclusive of the diversity of 
choices one may have reason to value in order to secure equality, particularly in Indigenous 
contexts. 
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